JUN 29 1954
PARKER SCHOOL
OF FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE LAW
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

Volume LXIX June 1954 Number 2

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**Published quarterly at 8 West King Street, Lancaster, Pa., for the Academy of Political Science, Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, March 14, 1911, at the Post-Office at Lancaster, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879.**

***Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 7–36315.***

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*Volume LXIX* *June 1954* *Number 2*

# POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

## FRANCE IN EUROPE: PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT

SOME time after the catastrophic events of 1940, Marshal Smuts expressed the opinion that "France is gone in our day and perhaps for many a day." In this judgment many concurred at the time. The great international issue of the present day is that of the relations between the Free World and the Communist bloc of states. That issue, in mid-1954, is sharply focused on two specific problems, the fate of Indo-China and that of the scheme for the military integration of six West European countries. Western Europe and Indo-China are almost as far apart as any two points on the planet can be, but at the center of both problems it is France that we meet again.

This gives point to a consideration of the French situation as a whole, not so much with an eye on probable immediate developments as on some of the more fundamental aspects of that situation. This approach is warranted, furthermore, by the fact that the French position derives some at least of its importance from being representative of more than itself alone.

One hears much of neutralism in Europe. It is a most understandable emotional reaction to the physical fact of warfare waged on the European soil, but war weariness is a negative factor and two observations seem relevant in connection with it. First, the very fact of war which induces the feeling of weariness likewise produces a legacy of bitterness and unresolved dissensions which in itself may well be a source of further conflict. Secondly, Europe has been split into two parts which have been sucked respectively into the orbits of the two superpowers. The Eastern segment may be considered to have become, if not effectively integrated into, at least effectively controlled by the Soviet political and economic system. With it we are not concerned here.



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With some possible qualifications about Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia,[1] Europe outside the Soviet Union and its satellites has become increasingly involved with America. For motives of combined self-interest and humanity the United States made a large investment in and a mighty contribution to the recovery of war-torn Europe. The policy of which the Marshall Plan was the concrete expression may be regarded as having been successful: for all its remaining and divisive problems, Europe under the combined impetus of its own efforts and of substantial American assistance has essentially achieved its economic recovery.

The political outlook is more clouded. The persistence of political tensions, and especially the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in 1950, led the United States to take a more positive view and a more active part in the affairs of Europe.[2] This increased American interest has had two aspects: the broader long-term encouragement of some form of European unity; the more limited and more immediate effort to re-create military strength in Europe.

It is at this point that complications intervened. Not surprisingly, the stress on economic recovery after the war, combined with reliance on the protective shield of American power (more specifically the prior American possession of atomic weapons), resulted in Europe's military power being still quite small in 1950. Proceeding from a simple—perhaps too simple—arithmetical approach, the Americans took the view that the existence of a number of German divisions would be a useful adjunct to European military power, whether as a deterrent to possible Russian aggression or, if the worst came to the worst, as an effective instrument against such aggression.

But the prospect of a rearmed Germany could not but give rise to violent reactions in Europe. The French reaction, for

[1] The first two were neutral during the war but may fairly be regarded as belonging with the "free" nations. As to Yugoslavia, the fact that she was not under direct Russian occupation made it possible for her to break away from the Soviet bloc. She professes, however, continued adherence to the Marxist ideology and her present position of "independent" communist state with increasing ties with the "free" nations puts her in a unique and in some ways anomalous position.

[2] The turning point may be said to have come already in 1947 with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, first manifestation of the new American orientation.

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one, was not unexpected, but it was not the only one, being typical, in kind if not in degree. Most important, perhaps, the French view of German rearmament was in many respects rather closer to the Russian than to the American. Here was clearly an American as well as a French dilemma. From the American point of view, there was danger that the attempt to create greater force might be the very thing that would serve to disintegrate that force. From the French point of view, there was implied the necessity of a decision as to which was the greater ultimate danger—the Russian or the German. Understandably, the latter has greater concrete reality.

Quite apart from emotions and the willful distortions of propaganda, here is a case of honest difference of opinion that cannot be satisfactorily resolved either by misguided attempts at coercion on one side or by purely negative obstructiveness on the other. European military weakness and European fears are equally solid realities. Nor can these fears be dismissed as unfounded. There is still the example of Stresemann and the Weimar Republic. This is not to say that either or both of these had consciously and deliberately prepared the way for the Nazis; but, without entering the controversial realm of motivation or that of the degree of surreptitious German rearmament before 1933, there remains the simple fact, inevitable in the circumstances, that the foreign policy of Weimar Germany could have no other aim than the restoration of the country to a position of equality among the Powers. The demand for *Gleichberechtigung* long antedated Hitler's coming to power. Then Hitler came.

It is not impugning the motives of Chancellor Adenauer to point out that he, too, is working for the lifting of the disabilities visited upon Germany as a consequence of her latest defeat. Indeed he could do no other, nor for that matter could any German chancellor or foreign minister. The very fact of defeat to a degree simplifies the task of German foreign policy. In this context and from the German point of view the Russo-American conflict is merely an unhoped-for opportunity of which it is wholly natural to take advantage. Nor is much comfort to be found in the current commonplace that all the former Great

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Powers, save the United States and the Soviet Union, are so demoted in relative terms that they can constitute no threat to the only two remaining really Great Powers. The memory is recent and vivid of the fact that, virtually single-handed, Germany came close to encompassing the destruction of Russia, and might indeed have done so but for certain avoidable mistakes on her part.

To be sure, this last consideration may suggest the desirability of basing American policy in Europe on a firm German alliance, letting others accommodate themselves as best they may to this fact. Conversely, it has been suggested, half humourously, that the most effective domestic argument for Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policy has been put thus: let us do whatever America wants today so that America will do whatever we shall want tomorrow. The idea of a German alliance has been and is entertained by some in America; but, apart from considerations of sentiment, it is open to the practical objection that may be summed up as the inadvisability of securing front lines while endangering the rear. In the circumstances, America has found it necessary to accept considerable delays in the effort to aggregate German military power to the rest of free Europe's. One of the chief factors responsible for this delay has been French tergiversation. In this whole matter French tactics have been those of temporization rather than frontal opposition. The proposal of a European army was actually of French origin, but the project still awaits somewhat uncertain ratification by the French Parliament.

The basic and primary fact is the disparity between French and German potential, a disparity which, though very real, has been unduly magnified by the respective military performances of the two countries during the last war. The relative decline of French power is a phenomenon of long standing which may be traced through the whole nineteenth century and even beyond, but most markedly since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Without going back to that episode, we must say some things about the consequences of the First World War.

This may be the place to insert a note about the demographic

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factor. As is well known, France, which in terms of numbers (outside of Russia) held first place in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century, ranked fourth at the end of it behind Germany, Britain and Austria-Hungary. During the present century she has been passed by Italy. The French population has been virtually stabilized since 1870 and might even have begun to decline but for the compensating contribution of immigration. The French phenomenon was unique in the Europe of 1914.

In the circumstances, the loss of 1,350,000 killed in the war, to say nothing of other millions in varying degrees disabled, had a catastrophic impact upon the country. Such a loss, great as it was, could have been absorbed by a country with a high reproductive rate—Russia for instance was relatively little affected by a comparable bloodletting. In France it had a numbing psychological effect. An additional fact, difficult of appraisal in its consequences, was the removal from the scene of a large number of those individuals who would normally have emerged to positions of leadership during the decades of the twenties and the thirties. These circumstances serve to account for the French obsession with security after the war. There was the realization not only that France had shared in victory because she had been fortunate in being part of a powerful coalition, but that another war would find her in a relatively worse position vis-à-vis Germany. Without going the length of distortion that would reverse the rôles of defeated and victor, it may be said that for the long run the cost of victory was greater to France than that of defeat was to Germany.

The Second World War has been followed by a seeming reversal of the French demographic curve. It is often not realized that France's present birth rate is among the highest in Europe. If the fundamental cause of this reversal lies, as some think, in certain aspects of present social policy, the consequences of it may ultimately be considerable. At the psychological level they might appear fairly early; but in other respects an annual increase of some 400,000 will take time to make its effects felt and much more will be needed besides increasing numbers to alter perceptibly the operation and effectiveness of the French complex.

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The First World War had other consequences, disastrous in the end not for France alone but for much of the rest of the world, especially for Europe. It is worth dwelling on them briefly, for in their understanding lies the key to much that has happened since.

Put in simplest form, the chief shortcoming of the organization of the world, and of Europe in particular, that issued from the First World War was the unsound or "false" basis upon which it rested. This, for the long term, was far more serious than the specific faults of the treaties of peace, faults which have been overstressed. Or, to put it differently, the reason why the settlements did not prove lasting was that they rested on a false foundation. What made the situation particularly unfortunate was that, in large measure, these settlements were the "natural"—one is tempted to say almost inevitable—outcome of the circumstances of the time.

In 1919, the fact of German defeat so painstakingly achieved could not but loom largest in the eyes of the peacemakers, hence the German problem had priority. But, important as this particular aspect of Europe was, it is clear in retrospect that this was but one, and not necessarily the most important, element of the situation. For many other things had happened, wholly unforeseen concomitants of the war, though destined to have great weight in shaping the future. But, as usual, the available knowledge, the chief conditioning factor of the shape of the settlements, was knowledge of the past. In addition to this the period after 1919 was to witness an accelerated tempo in the rhythm of change.

One overwhelmingly important determinant in the outcome of the war had been the American intervention. America's most characteristic post-war contribution found expression in the new instrument of future peace and order, the League of Nations. But even before the opening of the peace congress in Paris, Wilson's position had been undermined in his own country, and in a sense it may be said that participation in the peacemaking exhausted America's capacity or willingness to accept the burden of responsibility deriving from her newly discovered position of power. The Treaty of Versailles was never ratified

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by the American Senate, and with the election of 1920 America sought a return to "normalcy", translated into a desire to be done with the quarrels of the Old World. If the reaction was understandable in the context of America's historic experience and development, the consequences of the act were not less for its being one of negation.

Another event, no less important than the American intervention, was the Russian Revolution of 1917, a fact more fraught with long-term consequences than the more immediately sensational Russian withdrawal from the war. Not only did Russia make separate peace with the enemy, but she was for some years plunged in the chaos of inner disintegration. As a consequence, Russia had no share in the European settlement as a whole and had to be content with arrangements with a series of new states largely carved from her former territory along her western border. If America voluntarily withdrew, Russia was quarantined behind the *cordon sanitaire*. In any case she constituted for some time a vacuum of power whose chief concern to others was that of an ideology dedicated to their undiscriminating destruction. Even apart from ideology, however, Russia would—and did—eventually reorganize herself and become once more a major factor in world affairs.

Germany was defeated beyond a doubt in 1919, but not destroyed. She, too, would reconstruct her power some day and clamor for an equal place in the community of nations. The case of the Dual Monarchy was otherwise. Not the Allies, but the disruptive force of her diverse nationalities encompassed her complete and irretrievable destruction. Here was not total defeat, but, in some respects far more troublesome for the future, fragmentation of power along with the disruption of an economy. Italy, weakened by the strain of an unexpectedly long war, fought with weaker purpose than the other allies, concentrated what energy she had on petty Fiume quarrels and domestic dissensions. At odds with all, disillusioned and disgruntled, she played an essentally negative rôle.

Of organized and effective Powers in Europe immediately after the war, the British and the French alone were left. Large as the undertaking was, they might in unison have successfully

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carried the responsibility and the burden of the reorganization of Europe and led the continent through the transition to a new basis of stability. This would have meant feasible policies toward the three great problems of Europe: Germany, Russia, and the Danubian area; but even more it would have meant community of purpose. Fate would not have it so.

Perhaps the case may be put this way: the representatives and leaders of Britain and France knew too much history and consequently were hampered by the burdens of their respective pasts. Furthermore, these nations were the foremost exponents in Europe of the democratic idea and practice, and the factor of public opinions swayed by divergent passions could at least on occasion place additional fetters on the operation of policy, however desirable or sane.

France did not give herself over to the elation of victory with optimistic confidence in the future. Hurt as she was, she mourned her losses and kept a fascinated glance of apprehension on the Rhine. But fear, if a source of wisdom, can also be a poor director of action. From the point of view and for the good of Europe as a whole, the problem might have been formulated thus: how to allay French fears (they were both real and legitimate) and make possible a return of Germany, for one, to the family of Europe. France and Germany would themselves have to make large contributions to the solution of the problem, but others could assist. Indeed an attempt to do this very thing was considered. Clemenceau was a disillusioned and clearheaded old man, a realist with a sound appreciation of the factor of power. For this reason he had yielded to the American (and British) pressure in 1919, accepting the guarantee of these two Powers in lieu of single-handed French control of the Rhine barrier. The Anglo-American guarantee could have been a powerful instrument of pacification. But this eminently sensible arrangement foundered on the understandable, but no less fatal, obstacle of American domestic necessities. At this point Britain committed one of the major blunders in her post-war record; taking shelter behind the American default she declined to implement the French guarantee alone.

The result of this state of affairs should be no cause for surprise. There were in Europe a number of states, France being only

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one of them albeit the most important, which had in common the desire to preserve for themselves the advantages deriving from a victorious peace. Gradually, there came into existence during the twenties the so-called French system of alliances. Beginning with the Franco-Belgian and Franco-Polish agreements, the network was extended to include Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia. These last three countries were in addition linked together in the combination known as the Little Entente, an organization that held in it the possibility of a solution of the troublesome Danubian problem. Up to a point, the later Balkan combination, through the connecting hinge of Yugoslavia and Roumania, might be regarded as an extension of the system.

It may be pointed out that the totality of power residing in the combination of France with her allies or satellites was considerable and might be held sufficient to insure the preservation of peace based on maintenance of the *status quo*. To a large degree this was the view of the British (and the Americans), who regarded with misgivings the magnitude of this power, hence could contemplate with equanimity its diminution. It was also the view of Italy, who looked upon French power as the chief obstacle to her own designs in Central Europe and the Balkans. Capitalizing on the discontent of the smaller ex-enemies—Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria—Italy set about organizing what has been adequately described as a league of the discontented. The combination proved on the whole irksome but ineffective.

There was another element of importance in the French system. French policy (often misunderstood in this respect) was in a very fundamental sense defensive, hence negative. Power does not consist of divisions and of economic potential alone; the willingness to use it is equally important. The question may be raised whether, for the long term, France had the power to carry the burden of maintaining the structure of Europe that had come into existence. In this connection we may cite two facts. France could not or would not—in any event certainly did not—exploit the *political* advantage gained from the German collapse that followed the occupation of the Ruhr. Within a fairly short time that episode was followed

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by Locarno, symbol of the opposite line of approach from that which the occupation of the Ruhr typified.

This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the Ruhr affair or the Locarno treaties. But this must be said about the latter: in one respect Locarno was a measure of the degree to which French policy was defensive. It was all very well to reassert in connection with Locarno itself the Polish and the Czech connections; it was in fact necessary to do this lest the arrangement with Germany be regarded by Czechs and Poles, especially the latter, as superseding their alliances. These people quite naturally looked upon the French connection as primarily a guarantee of *their* independence. For all the reassurances, at the very least an element of doubt, hence of weakness, was thus injected into the French system as early as 1925.

From another point of view Locarno was made possible by the repudiation on the part of the French electorate in 1924 of Poincaré's "tough" policy toward Germany. The reverse policy of reconciliation had many genuine advocates in France; and pacifism, then and later, if it did not go the lengths that it did in Britain, made noticeable inroads in France. Reconciliation was a defensible policy, but, good or bad as it may have been, it could be adequately tested only if wholeheartedly put into practice. What the consequences of such an attempt would have been—whether lasting peace or a mere shortening of the twenty years' truce—must of course remain speculation.

One may also contend that this was an occasion when Britain and the United States failed to make a contribution well within their means to make. However that may be, the fact is that the Locarno honeymoon was of very short duration; by 1926 Germany was champing at the slowness of the realization of expected benefits. She never felt grateful for concessions, but instead looked upon them as the measure of a weakness from which more could be extracted. Well before 1932, when his career at the foreign office and his life came to an end, Briand, the great exponent in France of peace through reconciliation, had come to the conclusion that his work had been a failure. Thus it came to pass that the net contribution of the French Left to the problem of Franco-German relations was in the end merely to weaken their own side of the equation.

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The decision in France in 1929 to embark upon the construction of the Maginot Line could be taken as additional proof of the genuineness of the country's oft-proclaimed defensive and pacific intentions. It was so understood in France; the Line was a substitute for the Rhine barrier and the manpower deficiency, since occupation of the Rhineland was about to be terminated. What may seem surprising is that very little was said in France at the time about the larger implications of the Maginot Line in terms of foreign policy. The whole system of alliances would lose its point from the day France should abandon the prospect of offensive military action on her part.[3]

We may pass on from these considerations to what may be regarded, in the context of the present discussion, as the next important, in fact crucial, development. Briefly, it may be summed up in the phrase, France's own abdication. Once this had taken place, Munich in 1938 and the military collapse of 1940 tend to appear as less sensational than they seemed at the time of their occurrence, but take on instead the semblance of ripe fruit falling off the branch.

This abdication of France deserves more detailed examination. The crucial years were those of the legislature that lasted from 1932 to 1936. This period witnessed the not uncommon phenomenon in France of a majority of the Left gradually evolving, as a consequence of economic and financial difficulties, into a government decidedly more to the Right. It was during the early term of this legislature that Hitler finally became chancellor of the German Reich, on January 30, 1933. It was exactly a year later, on February 6, 1934, that there was rioting in the Place de la Concorde in Paris.

This last event is of considerable importance for a number of reasons. The rioting was not the organized Fascist manifestation that it has often been presented to be; skilful propaganda, communist for one, helped to create this myth. But Com-

[3] One could, to be sure, think of the border fortifications as reinsurance combined with a base for offensive action. The point is that it was the defensive aspects that came to receive the greater emphasis and helped develop what has been properly described as the Maginot Line mentality or outlook in France.

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munists themselves shared in the rioting along with others, whereas the Croix de Feu, though gathered some distance away, did not join in the fray. But, unorganized though it was, the incident sufficed to unseat the government, and the feeling existed that, as on other historic occasions in Paris, the Street might rise against the Parliament and coerce it into submission to its own will. This feeling was adroitly exploited and was an important factor in bringing about the formation of the Left coalition of Radicals, Socialists and Communists known as the Popular Front.

Quite as significant as this development, or perhaps merely another aspect of the same thing, was the intensity of difference within the country, of which these developments were a manifestation and which in turn they served to crystallize and exacerbate. The tone of the contemporary press well reflects this condition, which grew out of the combined impact of economic difficulties and foreign ideologies. The further qualification should be made that, to a large degree, the stress was more on ideology than on foreign; those who admired Mussolini's work in Italy were not so much pro-Italian as admirers of the Fascist system. The slogan heard a little later, "Rather Hitler Than Blum", need not be interpreted as pro-German—it was used by many just because they felt that the Hitler alternative, in the literal sense, was out of the question—but rather as a dramatic expression of their intense detestation of the Popular Front.

Needless to say, a kindly view of Fascism or of Nazism might easily overflow into a more sympathetic approach to the locales where these views were flourishing. Yet it was among the very groups, by and large conservative, who had tended to assume a monopoly of intransigent nationalism that these ideologies found the readier response.[4] Thus the traditional Right became to a degree divided and confused. This made it easier for the Left to become in turn patriotic as it was anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi. For this there was good precedent in French history, going back to the Great Revolution. The Communists for a time could enthusiastically wave the tricolor—so long at least

[4] National socialism made some unexpected, though not very numerous, recruits in Socialist ranks as well.

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as this newly found allegiance fitted in with their prior and more lasting one to Moscow. But, again, if the Communists had never extolled the merits of pacifism, such was not the case of their political next-door neighbors, the Socialists.

Internal developments beyond the borders of France thus served to a nicety to introduce further divisions among those numerous enough that normally characterize French opinion. How conduct a consistent foreign policy, let alone an effective one, in the circumstances? The point is sometimes made that the direction of French foreign policy is not subject to the vagaries of public, or even parliamentary, opinion. This in large measure is true, but, even apart from the fact that circumstances were unusual, the weight of opinion is ever present in a democracy even if only as an indirect or negative factor. What this meant at the time was that the mass of the French people, hence their representatives and their government, thought first of all in terms of their domestic economic plight. The economic policies adopted, to preserve the gold value of the currency and to restore budgetary equilibrium through deflationary measures, had the effects of driving French prices to a higher level than world prices, impeding the revival of foreign trade, and generally retarding French recovery by comparison with others. If there was no massive unemployment in France, short work and the fear of unemployment were important psychological conderations.

The feeling of "something rotten in Denmark" was widespread if unfocused and naturally gave a further fillip to those who would look across the Rhine to Germany, or beyond Germany to Soviet Russia, for nostrums or solutions. It is significant that the new and active ideas, good or bad as they may have been, of the time issued from those countries and not from either France or Britain.

Hitlerite Germany was torn by no such dissensions. With singleness of purpose it had set about the task of restoring the nation's power. Making skilful use of other international complications,[5] Hitler chose the 6th of March 1936, while France

[5] It is in 1935 that Italy elected to launch the Abyssinian enterprise. From the point of view of Europe as a whole, the chief consequence of this adventure was to wreck the League, while Britain and France fell out with each other and were paralyzed vis-à-vis Italy as well as Germany.

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was on the eve of an election, to move his forces into the hitherto demilitarized Rhineland. Premier Sarraut of France made a brave-sounding speech on the occasion: the menace of German guns on Strasbourg would not be tolerated. But no action followed upon the words. Much has been written on that episode, and the responsible French leaders of the day have given convincing explanations for their passivity, shifting the blame among themselves and to outsiders. Allowing for all the extenuating circumstances, the fact remains that the one Power in Europe which, more than any other, might have been expected to evince a positive reaction failed to do so.

The true significance of the event was thoroughly misunderstood in Britain. Nazi methods, it was granted, were awkward, but fundamentally the German reoccupation of the Rhineland was but the righting of a wrong; Germany, after all, had a right to be mistress in her own house. There were even incorrigible optimists who saw in the redressing of a grievance a hopeful basis for the future. But the lesson was not lost on France's European allies; their doubts, already aroused by earlier French passivity, were now confirmed and some of them at least began to think of how best to come to terms with the rising German power.[6]

French foreign policy, reflecting internal disorientation, had already shown signs of floundering. Briand had died in 1932, a disillusioned man. Barthou, then Laval, followed him in succession at the Quai d'Orsay. Neither lacked ability, though Laval was definitely weak in principles. More serious was the lack of continuity. Barthou wanted to instill new life into the system of alliances; his traveling-salesman tour of Eastern European capitals was no more than a personal success. The bullets of Croatian terrorists terminated his career at the same time as that of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in October 1934. Laval set great store on the restoration of

[6] The weak French reaction to Mussolini's proposal of a Four Power Pact in 1933, the 6th February 1934, and Germany's unopposed denunciation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935 were the chief causes of these doubts on the part of France's allies. As early as January 1934, Poland, though not denouncing the French alliance, had concluded a ten-year pact with Nazi Germany.

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good relations with Italy, whose friendship he thought he had secured after his visit to Rome in January 1935, while he pursued half-heartedly the (to him) less congenial reëstablishment of the Russian connection. If France should succeed in counting among her allies Poland as well as Soviet Russia, Yugoslavia as well as Italy, the contemplation of such a congeries of friends ought perhaps to have been greater cause for concern than comfort.

It was shortly after Hitler's Rhineland coup that elections in France returned the Popular Front to power. Great hopes were derived from this victory in some quarters. The success of the Popular Front was a response to domestic rather than foreign circumstances. Accordingly, the new government's first care was to institute a large and belated program of social legislation and improvement. The addition to this of a large, and also needed, rearmament program, together with profound devotion to the defense of the franc, probably amounted to an impossible combination in any event. It was the lot of Premier Blum to devalue the franc, a devaluation so contrived moreover as not to bring France the benefits that other countries had derived from a similar operation. The French economy, by contrast with others, continued to stagnate after 1936.

There is even worse. The great Popular Front victory of 1936 was not the result of any massive shift in the traditional voting pattern of the French electorate. Rather than inaugurate a new era it made more bitter than ever the divisions of French opinion. The old mold of institutions and ways was not broken, but instead, reproducing a familiar pattern, the Popular Front after a while disintegrated and the more customary center-type government emerged from the Chamber of 1936.

In foreign policy the French Left might be expected to be anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist. So it was. But in the face of the bitter discordance of opinion it was feared that too assertive a policy might further rend the country. It was sound, in the circumstances, to draw the conclusion that the British connection should be the cornerstone of French policy. But Britain was still quite blind to the nature of the German danger, in addition to which she had never evinced great enthusiasm for what she

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tended to regard as France's embroilments in Central and Eastern Europe. Czechoslovakia was a faraway country about which Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain knew little. It was a wholly erroneous conclusion from an initially sound premise for France merely to surrender uncritically to the British lead in foreign policy. In the thinking of the time, French military power was still rated the most solid reality on the continent.

Munich in 1938 was the "logical" outcome of these circumstances and for that reason will not detain us here. If the course of events after 1936 was not inevitably foregone, in retrospect it is not unreasonable to regard their unfolding as the working out of conditions already in existence.

Much has happened since then and we may now return to the considerations that opened this discussion. If there are no current illusions about the extent of French power—if anything, the events of 1940 may be causing in this respect the reverse mistake—the position of France in Europe remains central and of crucial importance. France's difficulties before the Second World War were primarily the result of deficiencies in her domestic organization and functioning. That condition continues to prevail. Allowing for the very real factor of the high material cost of two wars, allowing even that too much was expected of her, the fact remains that France during the past two decades has not played the part that may be said to be rightly hers, has not filled the place that her position, tradition and resources could enable her to hold.

The reasons for this may be put under two heads: in the more immediate sense, they lie in the nature and the totality of the undertakings in which France finds herself currently involved; for the longer term, the difficulty is the deeper one that stems from institutions and their functioning. These two aspects of the matter, though distinct, are of course not unrelated. Both warrant some examination.

As to the first, a simple listing of these major undertakings clearly illustrates the point. They may be put under the following heads:

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1. The reconstruction of war damage;
2. A program of industrial renovation and expansion;
3. A program of social legislation and improvement;
4. The war in Indo-China;
5. The rearmament program.

The physical damage resulting from the Second World War is less concentrated than that caused by the First and therefore less spectacular, but in its aggregate it is greater. For reasons both political and social, such as the nature of rent control laws, reconstruction has been very slow; the housing situation, as a consequence, is often and rightly described as a national scandal. Statistics bear out in this respect the well-nigh universal impression of dilapidation, especially by contrast with the achievements of neighboring countries which have suffered comparable physical destruction.

To a degree, this may be regarded as deliberate choice. The railway system, for instance, was early and effectively restored, better than in some other countries, and the ambitious plans for the modernization and expansion of industry, largely associated with the name of M. Monnet, have called for very large capital outlays. Some notable results have been achieved, of which the development of water power is perhaps the most striking.[7] But then again, the French economy contrives, as it did during the thirties, to maintain French prices at a higher level than world prices. Protection, quotas, subsidies, and sundry manipulations have more appeal in many quarters than efforts at modernizing methods of production, and even more of distribution.

The level of French industrial wages and the plight of the French worker are often commented upon, in France as well as outside. It is also pointed out that, by way of compensation, rents are virtually nonexistent in France. That is true, and this (for the long term) unhealthy makeshift arrangement relates to the housing situation previously described. The French worker enjoys other advantages from the institution of a

[7] The utilization of the Rhone River is the most important of these undertakings. The Donzère-Mondragon dam, second largest in Europe, was inaugurated in 1952.

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program of social services which, though less known abroad, is comparable to that existing in Britain. One aspect of it, also previously indicated, lies in the substantial cash subsidies granted by the state for children, who have as a result become a financial asset to the worker. If the consequences of this policy may be far-reaching, more immediately they tend to accentuate the deficiencies of the housing situation.

As to the war in Indo-China, whatever may be said about the mistaken handling of the Indo-Chinese issue during the immediate aftermath of the war, the fact is that the struggle has become a substantial drain on the resources of the country estimated to be of the same order of magnitude as that of the assistance received by France from the United States. The integration of that conflict into the broader American policy of containment, if it relieves in a measure the French effort, makes the French involvement all the more inextricable and renders more complex any possible resolution of the issue. On top of all this, and especially in connecton with the launching of N.A.T.O., a program has been undertaken for the reconstruction of a substantial military establishment in France.

The point of all these considerations is that, for all that French resources are considerable, they are by no means unlimited, nor even in a category with those of the United States. Even were these resources better managed than they are, it is in the end a simple problem of arithmetic to deduct from the national income or production the amounts allotted to the various undertakings that have been enumerated. Put it another way, it may be said that France has assumed commitments the totality of which is beyond her capacity to carry.

So long as such a condition persists one can only expect poor economic and financial health. One apparently simple solution would be to curtail or eliminate some of these commitments. This, however, is easier said than done. As it is, little enough has been done with some aspects of reconstruction; curtailment of the social program would be politically impracticable. As to rearmament and Indo-China, especially the latter, reduction in these fields would have wide popular support; but here one meets difficulties of a political nature again, though

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foreign rather than domestic. It was generally felt that one of the chief obstacles of the success of Mendès-France's attempt to organize a government in June 1953 was his supposed desire to curtail, if not liquidate, the Indo-Chinese undertaking.

This brings us to the fundamentally more important difficulty that besets the French organism, what has been put under the head of institutional. This trouble goes very deep. It is not so much that French governments are unstable; their instability is but the outward manifestation of circumstances rooted in the very nature and structure of the French body politic and social.

One remarkable—some would say astonishing or distressing—phenomenon in France is precisely the durability of institutions and ways, their seeming imperviousness to change. In this context France may well be regarded, despite her large and stable Communist vote, as basically conservative—probably the most conservative country in Europe—in a sense by comparison with which the United States, for all the violent rejection of communism, appears highly revolutionary. An illustration may clarify this seeming paradox. It is enough to contemplate the fact that certain purely agricultural regions of France produce a large Communist vote alongside the fact that French agriculture has shown itself impervious to change and novelty in a way that stands in marked contrast with the British case. French agricultural interests are strongly entrenched in Parliament; they prefer the easier course of relative stagnation behind the protective shields of subsidies and tariffs. *Quieta non movere* might be their motto.

This may in reality be regarded as the motto of much more than agriculture. The impact of the Second World War and all that it meant for France might have been expected to shake the existing structure out of its traditional grooves. The curious thing is that this has not been the case. Since 1940 there have been two opportunities to embark upon a novel course, both, interestingly enough, associated with military names. The defeat of 1940 brought into power Pétain and the Vichy régime; Parliament was not dismissed but signed its own death warrant thus making the succession legal beyond

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cavil. Whatever one may think of Vichy, it did represent something markedly different from the Third Republic. Its association with defeat, its reliance on German power, and Germany's own ultimate defeat, quite apart from any other considerations, would suffice to account for its ignoble demise.

General de Gaulle enjoyed the reverse assets and could likely have capitalized on them in the confused aftermath of liberation to institute constitutional changes at least. This he declined to do. The Fourth Republic was born and, with mediocre enthusiasm, gave itself a constitution that held little, save in the form of some additional procedural complications, that was new. Thereafter the old came back to life and there is point to the quip that the Fourth Republic is already dead and has been succeeded by the Third. Not only was the old not changed, but it may be said that the very failure of the attempt to change it had the effect of consolidating the stranglehold of the past.

It is revealing to consider the extent to which the present state of France is reminiscent of that of twenty years ago. The point was made before that the basic difficulty of France during the middle thirties stemmed from the inability to resolve differences so deeply rooted and so evenly balanced that the country could only produce the stalemate of irresolute inaction. The same condition essentially continues to prevail, with the possible qualification that the events of the past two decades have had the effect of further fragmentation of an already too diversified opinion.

The ministerial crisis of June 1953, to take a recent example, illustrates this to a nicety. It was, like many others, an "unnecessary" crisis and the feeling that ranged from indifferent apathy to weary dissatisfaction with the system was widespread in the country—a feeling not to be translated, however, into active anti-parliamentarianism. It was significant that Paul Reynaud, Mendès-France and Georges Bidault, called in succession to resolve the crisis, all took the position that their tenure in office must be more secure than had hitherto been the case. All were denied investiture, though by small margins, but the composition of their support is revealing. It may be condensed in the following table:

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| | M.R.P. | Radicals | Independents and Peasants | R.P.F. | Totals |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reynaud | 38 | 46 | 93 | 68 | 245 |
| | 49 | 28 | 9 | 42 | 128 |
| Mendès-France | 52 | 68 | 15 | 26 | 161 |
| | 35 | 6 | 86 | 88 | 215 |
| Bidault | 88 | 27 | 78 | 93 | 286 |
| | — | 47 | 23 | 19 | 89 |

A look at these figures clearly brings out the factors of division and diversity.[8] If the Communists constitute a dependable bloc of opposition, the Socialists are badly split on a number of issues. The R. P. F. has largely lost its *raison d'être* and, sensing loss of support in the electorate, has largely abandoned its doctrinal horse in order to share in the more normal game of parliamentary politics. In the process it has split into two subgroups. In matters of social policy the R. P. F. and the the M. R. P. are far less conservative than the Radicals and the Independents, thereby furnishing an additional crossing of lines.

In the end, the crisis of June 1953 was resolved along classical, if disappointing, lines, bringing up the hitherto relatively unknown figure of Laniel. In some respects, the outcome is reminiscent of the earlier emergence of Pinay in 1952.

[8] For simplicity, the favorable vote is given in the first line, the opposition and the abstentions being lumped together in the second. The Communists are not listed, being in steady and solid opposition. So were the Socialists in general, with the important qualification that their support of Mendès-France was what brought him within sight of possible success.

The present French Chamber (*Assemblée Nationale*) consists of 627 members divided into six roughly equal groups. From left to right these are the Communists and the Socialists, followed in the center by the old Radical Socialists and the M.R.P. (*Mouvement Républicain Populaire*). This last group, a post-war party of Catholic inspiration, displays in general a more liberal orientation than the Radical Socialists in matters economic and social. The Right may be said to consist of the two remaining groups, the somewhat loose Independents and Peasants and the R.P.F. (*Rassemblement du Peuple Français*). The R.P.F., General de Gaulle's post-war group, calls itself a movement rather than a party in the ordinary sense; in some ways it fits ill into the traditional political spectrum, being in favor of a stronger executive and of a liberal social policy; moreover, it was the subject of a split late in 1952. This classification, it should be realized, is a rough one that does not go into the complexities of internal divisions that exist within most parties.

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Even if one leave out of the picture the normal and more or less sordid factor of purely parliamentary and personal politics—a phenomenon by no means peculiarly French—there is no possibility of denying that this fragmentation of opinion is the expression of a deep reality. To be sure, there is no abstract virtue in conformity and unanimity for their own sake. There is rather much to be said for the opposite, and we often take pride in the free West in the privilege of individual dissent. One may even go further and allow that there is no reason why the state or the nation should unquestioningly be accepted as the highest value of all. But the fact remains that the present world is organized as a world of states and that a situation such as exists in France cannot but weaken the body politic and impede the effective operation of the country as a state among states. The richness of diverse opinion is a luxury that could be afforded in the relatively stable climate of the beginning of the century, but can be no longer. Survival itself may not be the greatest good, but without life men can do nothing else, not even disagree.

This state of affairs is understood in France no less than outside. It raises as fundamental a question as that of the survival of the present system. A case could indeed be made that would point to dictatorship as the only possible solution. But the feeling, also fed on tradition, is very deep in France against dictatorship from any quarter, and it is difficult at present to perceive the direction from which the candidate for the post might emerge.

Without going so far as a dictatorial solution, there are those in France who perceive salvation in a moderate degree of constitutional reform—a stronger executive and powers of dissolution of the elected bodies being the more commonly expressed desiderata. Even to this, opposition is strong, for it might be the wedge through which dictatorship would enter. It is again a case where the weight of the past is heavy on the present. Risks there are in any course, not least in the drift of inaction; but merely to hark back to MacMahon or even to the two Napoleons is no more an adequate solution to novel conditions than are empty mouthings about the abstract virtues of democracy. What the future may bring we do not know. However, change

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will come to France in any event. It would be preferable for all if such change were the result of consciously deliberate acceptance of calculated risks on the part of those elements that constitute France rather than the unpremeditated outcome of mere failure as was the case in 1940.

The French tragedy of that year brought to the outside world with a vengeance the realization of how erroneous its calculations had been, to say nothing of the absurdity of the concern at the too great extent of French power. Whatever illusions may currently exist tend to be in the reverse direction. Yet France retains in Europe a position that is both central and crucial. However attractive the prospect of twelve German divisions, it is equally hard to conceive of a Europe without France: France cannot be either merely absorbed by some other component of free Europe, or else simply preserved as a museum piece by others.

Basically, the root of the problem lies not so much in any one specific action, such as ratification of the European Defense Community or failure to do so.[9] Such an act may be of use, but the problem is at the level of institutions—political, economic and social. To be valid, reform must come from within. Once more, as twenty years ago, France is approaching the cross-roads, vis-à-vis Germany, but vis-à-vis herself as well. The circumstances of today are very different from those of twenty years ago. Now as then, others, meaning primarily the United States and Britain (in some respects especially the latter), can make a more positive contribution than sterile bemoaning and futile berating. But in the last analysis the decision, or lack of decision, is France's and it holds implications for much more than France alone.

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[9] By the time this appears in print it is conceivable that some clarification with respect to E.D.C. may have been furnished by the French Parliament. The complexity of the E.D.C. situation cannot be overstressed where France is concerned. Apart from understandably divided feelings, the matter has been linked with the problem of the status of the Saar. Likewise, it is obviously, if unofficially, connected with the Indo-Chinese situation and this means, in turn, the whole problem of American policy.

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# SAVONAROLA, MACHIAVELLI AND GUIDO ANTONIO VESPUCCI: TOTALITARIAN AND DEMOCRAT FIVE HUNDRED YEARS AGO

CONCERNED with its immediate problems, the world of 1952 forgot Savonarola's quincentennial. He was born in Ferrara on September 21, 1452, and burned at the stake on May 22, 1498. Was he a saint? A devout Catholic? A Protestant? A prophet? A demagogue? There are subscribers to all these theories.

The Dominican friars hold him to have been a martyr, and have requested his canonization. In the oratory that was Savonarola's in the convent of San Marcos in Florence there is a painting of St. Peter by Fra Bartolomeo, and the head is that of Savonarola. For their part the Protestants consider him a forerunner of the Reformation. Pope Alexander VI excommunicated him, and sent two Apostolic commissioners to represent him at the trial that found Savonarola guilty and sentenced him to the stake. His remains were cast into the Arno. Every year on the anniversary of his death fresh flowers are placed on the spot in the Piazza della Signoria where the sentence was carried out.

Savonarola was, beyond dispute, a politician and it is in that light that we shall consider him here. The cause he championed was the struggle against the oligarchy. He advocated government by popular assembly, the Great Council of the People, comprising all citizens above the age of thirty against whom no special restrictions existed. This Council came to number as many as 2,573 citizens. It had power to propose and pass laws, it had a say in the election of public employes, and it delegated administrative matters in a council of eighty. Savonarola hoped to destroy the possibility of government by a small minority, and, specifically, to destroy the power of the Medici forever. After the Medici, who were the first target of his attack, he came out against the institution of the parliament, which was a special assembly of the people called by the Republic in cases of emergency. He said:



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> I have given thought, oh people, to your parliament, which rather than a parliament seems to me an annihilation, and must be done away with. Do it at once. Are not you, the people, the masters now? You are; therefore, see that there be no parliament, if you do not wish to lose your government. Know that the sole aim of a parliament is to wrest the reins from the hands of the people. Engrave this on your minds, and teach it to your children. The moment you hear the bell ringing to convoke parliament, arise, unsheath your sword, and say: "What are you trying to do? Has not the Council of the People authority for everything? What laws would you pass? Cannot these be drawn up by the Council of the People?"[1]

To prevent the calling of such a parliament—in which Savonarola saw the instrument of the oligarchy—he suggested measures in accord with his way of leading the people. He asked that it be made mandatory on all members of the Signory that they promise on oath not to call parliament. And he asked the gonfaloniers to order the sacking of the houses of the Signory if they convoked parliament. He advocated a system of delation: 30,000 ducats to be given to the person who informed of any attempt to call the parliament, if he was a member of the Signory; and 1,000, if not a member. "If the person who asks for a parliament is a member of the Signory, let him be beheaded."

Guido Antonio Vespucci, the uncle of Amerigo Vespucci, headed the party opposed to Savonarola. This is the right time to mention these names, too, because Amerigo was born in 1454, and we are in the year of his quincentennial. It seemed to Guido Antonio that to turn the government of the Republic over to an inexperienced mass assembly was to invite disaster. His formula, which we shall later examine in greater detail, was a representative government, in which the people should act through specialized bodies. Vespucci recognized that the city had been under a dictatorship, which he condemned, but he rejected the extreme position of Savonarola, and favored a middle-of-the-road plan. At the other extreme stood Machiavelli, who would put maximum power in the hands of the Prince, and who, on this basis, formulated the philosophy of dictatorship.

[1] "Prediche sui Salmi", in *Predica* XXVI, 28 July 1495.

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Although Florence was not ruled by a prince, the plan he drew up was one in which only the empty shell of government by the people remained; power was to be in the hands of a single ruler, with the backing of an army.

The ideological struggle engaged in by Savonarola, Vespucci and Machiavelli was a dramatic one. The atmosphere in which they moved was charged with violence, and to talk was to risk one's skin. Rarely in the history of the world have men been more sharply torn between the lure of power and the chill of fear. Many episodes of the struggle could find their counterparts in our own day, and one is inclined to repeat the reservation certain books carry: "Any resemblance to persons living or dead is purely coincidental." Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that during this prelude to modern politics two philosophies—dictatorship and democracy—were at war in Italy in an atmosphere not unlike that which laid the groundwork for the Second World War, and which hangs over us like a cloud. At that time Italy was split into many republics and one kingdom; the Pope was the head of a temporal state; and demagogues, princes, king, the Pope himself, moved in an atmosphere as turbulent and unpredictable as that in which we live.

Savonarola's unbridled attacks on the Medici, who were the target of his policies, unleashed a whirlwind in Florence. The masses, already contaminated by the turbulence of the times, took fire at his oratory, drove Piero, the son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, from Florence, and sacked his palace. Cardinal Giovanni de Medici—later Pope Leo X—fled disguised as a friar, thus saving his life. The treasures collected by two generations of Medici—Cosimo, the Father of His Country, and Lorenzo the Magnificent—were hurled through the windows by the mutinous mob, and one of the finest collections history has ever known was lost to world culture.

Time went by. Piero the Hapless thought the city would have wearied of the rule of the friar and would open its gates to him. He appeared before them, but they were not opened. Instead the five illustrious citizens who were believed to be abetting his return were condemned to death. The scenes of mob hysteria were awesome. When Savonarola preached,

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crowds began to assemble in the vast cathedral the night before. There was a clamor for general repentance. The people sang, moaned, wept. Women threw away their jewels. On the rubbish heap went perfumes, rich garments embroidered in pearls. Savonarola claimed that he spoke by direct inspiration of God. Every measure he urged upon the government of Florence was presented by him as a divine mandate. He foretold horrendous punishment if his recommendations were not carried out. When he denounced Florence for its sins, his hearers were overcome by physical terror.

For the Carnival he had a huge pyre built in the piazza of the Signory. It was nearly 200 feet high, and its base covered two thirds of the piazza. It was in the shape of a stepped-back pyramid. On the scaffolding were laid faggots and a train of powder. It was here that "the burning of the vanities" and indecent objects was to take place. All day long a throng of children paraded the city streets. Their songs and banners floated through the air. They went from house to house, requesting contributions for the purifying flames, and converged upon the piazza like flooded rivers bearing treasure on their crest. On the first step were dumped rich fabrics brought from faraway lands, embroidered with "lascivious designs". On the next went the paintings, statues, portraits of beautiful women "from the brush of the finest artists". Then came chess and checker boards, cards, dice. On another were heaped books of music, harps, guitars, lutes, tambourines, flutes. The next was piled with books of poetry, in Latin and the vernacular, "all filled with indecency"; among them were the *Morgante* of Luigi Pulci, the books of chivalry, Boccacio, Petrarch. And finally the masks, disguises, dominoes of carnival. There were portraits and sculptures of such value that Father Pacifico Burlamacchi, who enthusiastically described the spectacle his master was staging, tells how a Venetian merchant offered twenty thousand silver crowns for them. But Savonarola was not seeking money, only that they be consumed in the purifying flames.

The day of the burning was preluded by "a beautiful procession filled with mystery". Thousands of persons assembled singing

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psalms and hymns "so it seemed that the angels had taken their habitation on earth among men." There was a High Mass. People then took their places in the piazza, first the children, closest to the flames. Behind them, the most devoted of the friar's followers, bearing standards with a red cross. The trumpets sounded, and a tongue of flame rose heavenward as though to tell the Virgin that Florence had burned its vanities.

Savonarola was not a Florentine. He was born in Ferrara, and nothing linked him to the tradition of the city he first came to know when he was thirty years old. Or perhaps there was a tie. As a youth he lost his heart to a girl of the Strozzi family, then exiled from Florence, and her rejection of him may have been responsible for his taking vows. On a certain occasion—so Fra Benedetto, his friend, tells us—Girolamo fell honorably in love with the daughter of a Florentine captain of the house of Strozzi, who, in exile from Florence, resided in Ferrara. The girl was an illegitimate child. They lived in neighboring houses, and one day Girolamo spoke to her, asking her if she would marry him if he should ask her parents for her hand. Without thought for the blot of infamy her adulterous birth had laid upon her, and without any consideration, she replied: "And do you think one of the great house of Strozzi would stoop to marry a Savonarola?" Girolamo replied to the maiden's haughty words with the verses of the Scriptures: "Answer a fool according to his folly: Do you think a legitimate son of the Savonarolas would marry a bastard like you?" Whereupon the girl was covered with confusion, not knowing what to say. In this way—Fra Benedetto concludes—Girolamo's love was turned to hate, not for the maiden but for her defect.[2]

Savonarola renounced the world and spent seven years in the convent of Bologna. In the solitude of the cloister, he was the most solitary of the monks. He wrote a poem, *De ruina Ecclesiae*, in which he asked himself: "What has become of the wise men of other days, of the saints of long ago? Where is the learning, the charity, the virtue that once existed? All,

[2] A. Gherardi, *Nuovi Documenti e Studi intorno a Girolamo Savonarola* (Firenze, 1887), p. 7.

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all has departed. Rome succumbed to overweening ambition, and has infected everything. The Church is a false, haughty harlot."

His aloofness of character set him apart. He was inflexible. His ingrained severity made him difficult of approach. Toward the end of his life he had a host of fanatical supporters who offered to go to the stake for him to prove their devotion, but he had no cordial, intimate friend. He left Ferrara, unloved and unregretted, to begin his slow ascent to fame. His sermons repelled his hearers. The first time he went to Florence he was offered a golden opportunity, to preach the Lenten sermons in San Lorenzo, the church of the Medici. It was there that the humanists gathered, the great ladies, the finest congregation any city had ever seen. What Savonarola served them was a stern, chill fare. By the time he came to his final sermons he was preaching to an empty church, and Savonarola left Florence with a sense of failure.

From that time on, however, passion began to fire his words. Four years later Pico della Mirandola heard him preach in Pavia, and was deeply impressed by his burning zeal. He wrote to Lorenzo the Magnificent telling him Florence must hear the friar. Pico, the precocious genius of his day, was a great friend of Lorenzo's. The bold ideas he had expressed in his writings had brought him into conflict with the Church, and Lorenzo had defended him with all his powerful resources. In response to Pico's suggestion Lorenzo invited Savonarola to return to Florence. Once more the friar mounted the pulpit, and his first sermon in the cathedral was aimed directly at Lorenzo.

He was invited to preach in the chapel of the palace of the Signory.

> Here [he began] I do not feel myself the master of the house as in the Church. I must be more circumspect and restrained, like Christ in the house of the Pharisee. I will say to you, however, that all the good and all the ills of the city proceed from the person who is at its head, and for this reason his sins are so grave, even the venial. If he walked in the ways of righteousness, the city would be saintly. Tyrants are incorrigible, for they are proud,

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> they love adulation, they are unwilling to repair the evil they work. They allow corrupt officials a free rein, they are carried away by flattery, they turn a deaf ear to the poor, they put no restraints upon the rich, they demand that the poor and the peasants work for them, they bribe the voters, they farm out the taxes to lay a still heavier burden upon the people. . . .[3]

Savonarola had entered the political arena with a program that was clear for all to see. He ranged himself against the Medici with the same violence as against the Pope of Rome. The Dominican friars of San Marcos fell completely under his spell, and elected him prior. This convent had been endowed and rebuilt by Cosimo the Elder, the Father of His Country, who put Michelozzo, a pupil of Brunelleschi, in charge of the work and Lorenzo followed in the tradition of his grandfather. It was customary, on the election of a new prior, for him to pay a visit to the Medici. Savonarola ignored this tradition, and, when reminded of it by the friars, asked: "Who elected me, Lorenzo or God?"

"God."

"Then I owe Lorenzo nothing."

Lorenzo is said to have remarked: "It is curious. This stranger has arrived, and has not deigned to call upon me. . . ." Nevertheless, he went to the convent, as though nothing had happened, strolled through the garden, chatted with the friars. Savonarola did not come out to greet him. When the friars came to him to inform him that Lorenzo was there, he answered:

"Did he ask for me?"

"No Father Prior. . . ."

"Then I have nothing to say to him."

Through a third party, Lorenzo deposited a large sum of ducats in the convent's contribution box. When Savonarola went to open it, in the company of the other friars, he found the gold coins, which could have come from no one but Lorenzo. He put them to one side and, gathering up the rest of the money, he said: "This is sufficient for the needs of the convent; take the rest", pointing to the gold coins, "for the poor of San Martin."

Lorenzo wanted to avoid conflict, as did the leading citizens of Florence. Five of the most distinguished, among them

[3] Pasquale Villari, *La Storia di Girolamo Savonarola* (Firenze, 1930), vol. I, p. 137.

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Guido Antonio Vespucci, went to see the friar. He received them with so wrathful an air that the words fell stumbling from their lips. Savonarola cut them short.

> You are going to tell me that you have come here of your own volition. You lie. Lorenzo has sent you. Tell him to do penance for his sins, for the Lord fears no one, and is no respecter of the princes of the earth. I am a foreigner, and Lorenzo a citizen, the first citizen of the city, if you like. But I shall bide here, and Lorenzo will go. . . .[4]

When Lorenzo died and Savonarola outlived him, these words were recalled, and the friar's followers solemnly pointed out that his prophecy had been fulfilled.

It was a double-barreled shotgun Savonarola was using, one barrel aimed at Florence, the other at Rome. He had called Rome the whore that was ruining the Church; Florence was a den of thieves and sinners. His treatment of Lorenzo was matched by his treatment of the Pope, to whom he alluded as Pharaoh. Lorenzo had managed to have his young son Giovanni, later Pope Leo X, made a cardinal. Savonarola, alluding to these matters in his sermons, stated that in visions he had spoken with God. He himself called his sermon on the conduct of the affairs of the Church *terrificam predicationem*. He drew a picture of a rapacious clergy, hedged about with outer ceremony, selling benefices to the highest bidder, and forgetful of the life of the spirit. He said:

> Parents, making sacrifice to this false idol, choose an ecclesiastical career for their sons because in this way they acquire benefices and prebends. You have heard it said, Happy the house that acquires a good canonry. I say unto you the day will come when the opposite will be said: Unfortunate the house. . . . Prefer for your sons the common way of life rather than the dangers of the religious calling. It is devoid of grace; there is not a gift of the Holy Ghost that is not bought and sold. Meanwhile the poor are crushed under the burden of taxes, and when they come to explain that they are unable to pay the full amount, the rich cry: Give us the rest! Those who have an income of fifty must pay a hundred in taxes, while the rich

[4] Pacifico Burlamacchi, *La Vita di Fra Girolamo Savonarola* (Venezia, 1829), p. 49.

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> pay very little, because the taxes are arbitrarily set. When the widow comes weeping to them, they say, Get off to bed. When the poor man comes to complain, they say, Pay, Pay![5]

After the Medici had been driven into exile, Savonarola, who had precipitated their downfall, was asked to draw up the bases of a new constitution, and even to intervene actively in state affairs. Charles VIII of France had invaded Italy and was marching on Florence. Savonarola hailed him as the instrument of God who was coming to restore the health of the city. One of the prophecies he had uttered from the pulpit was being fulfilled. The city sent him as one of its envoys to greet the King, and to arrange the best possible terms for his passage through Florentine territory.

At the request of Giuliano Salvati, gonfalonier of Florence, Savonarola drew up a treatise or discourse on the government of the state, and specifically Florence. The following is a résumé of his ideas in this connection, employing, as far as possible, his own words:

There are good governments and bad governments. Even though God endowed man with intelligence and freedom of choice, this intelligence is feeble, and he needs the help of another to guide him, and laws to restrain him. Man is inclined to evil. When he is gluttonous, no animal can equal him. Lust carries him to lengths unknown to the beasts, and he exceeds them in cruelty in his wars. He is proud, ambitious and envious. Thus, for the good of all it has been necessary to establish government. Some came together and agreed to entrust to one the care of the community, and founded what is called a kingdom; others, unwilling to accept the authority of a single man, decided that the best and most prudent members of the community should ruleit: this was the government of the select, the *ottimos;* others favored entrusting affairs to the people as a whole, and this was called "civil government", because all the citizens participated in it.

In itself, one-man rule is good, but it would be bad to impose it upon a people given to dissension, because it would lead to oppression, and on the death of the prince a civil war would be

[5] "Prediche sopra Ezechielle", *Predica* XXXII.

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unleashed, and the one who seized power would make himself a tyrant. For this reason the nations who, by nature, cannot endure the rule of one man, seek that of the select. The people of Florence, for example, would not accept a king, which is a solution for servile nations. They will not tolerate even the rule of the best, the select. The solution for them lies in popular, civil government, which they have now been given, not by human hands, but by God. The divine will has bestowed it upon them, thanks to the prayers of the good, of the women.[6]

Where Savonarola says "tyrant" he means "Medici". This is the portrait he draws of the tyrant:

The tyrant is haughty and overweening. He not only wishes to out-top his equals, but his betters, to whom he should submit himself. He is envious. The glory of others casts a shadow upon him. He cannot endure to hear another praised, even though at times he dissimulates, and the belittlement of others falls pleasantly on his ears. Rarely does one encounter one who is not lascivious. He is a miser and a thief. He steals from the state and from the people. He usurps that which belongs to the commonalty and to individuals, sometimes slyly, sometimes boldly. [This is probably an allusion to the money Lorenzo took from the dowry fund.] He has virtually every sin. There is not a fiber of his soul that is not depraved. As his ends are evil, he does only evil things; and if on occasion he does a good deed, it is not for the sake of good, but for his own reputation, to win friends who will support him. The Devil is the king of the proud who think only of wicked things, and if by chance he says the truth or performs a good deed, it is all to further his wicked purposes and his pride. This is the tyrant. He is the more astute, evil and diabolical when he disguises himself as an angel to deal a more mortal blow.

The tyrant seeks to appear devout, and solicitous of the divine cult, limiting himself to outward act, such as going to church, giving alms, building churches and chapels. He speaks with men of God, and slyly selects a truly religious man as his confessor to give the impression that he is a faithful observant, but at the same time he attacks religion, usurping benefices

[6] G. Savonarola, *Trattato circa il reggimento e Governo della città di Firenze.*

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and conferring them on his followers and accomplices and seeking them out for his children, thus usurping both spiritual and temporal goods. He despoils the widow and the orphan. No appointment may be made, no truce arranged, without his intervention. He wishes to be first even in matters of no weight, such as jousting or horse racing, making off with the prizes through fraud and deceit. He cultivates the friendship of foreign potentates to strengthen himself at home. He has spies and ruffians who supply him with the wives and daughters of others. At his great festivities women are secretly introduced into certain rooms, where sodomy is also practiced, so there is no youth of goodly aspect who can be considered safe.[7]

Without ambiguity Savonarola dated all Florence's misfortunes from the year of 1434 when Cosimo de Medici, the Father of His Country, returned to the city from exile. Now, under the new laws, given the Republic by God, Florence can become a paradise, and anyone favoring the restoration of tyranny would be guilty of the most heinous of sins.

Guido Antonio Vespucci had been the ambassador of Lorenzo de Medici to the king of France at the time of the war between the Church and Florence following the attempted assassination of Lorenzo in the cathedral of Santa Maria dei Fiore, a mission on which Amerigo Vespucci served as his secretary. He had also been ambassador to the Pope during the long negotiations to reëstablish amity between the Holy See and Florence. He had been instrumental in having Lorenzo's son made cardinal. He had attempted to bring about an understanding between Savonarola and Lorenzo. After Lorenzo's death and the fall of Piero the Hapless he headed the party of the *Ottimos* who were opposed to the friar. Against Savonarola's thesis he put forward that of a government which could be described as representative. He had seen the functioning of popular government in Siena, and he considered it absurd. Only by putting authority in the hands of the select could a stable government be achieved. The mass assemblies of Savonarola, in his opinion, could lead only to demagoguery and anarchy. He was a jurist with a

[7] *Ibid.*, Trattato II, cap. II.

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rare firmness in his convictions. All Florence respected him. The city had chosen him gonfalonier once, and was to do so again after Savonarola's fall. The friends of the friar hated him but were afraid to take steps against him. He had served the Republic and its artists and merchants with great skill. Guicciardini, in his *History of Italy*, has reconstructed in a great speech the arguments Guido Antonio put forward against those of Savonarola when the change of the Florentine constitution was under discussion. When Savonarola's proposals were defended by Paolo Antonio Soderini, Guido Antonio answered him as follows:

> If the government, ordered along the lines proposed by Pagolantonio Soderini, were to produce with such ease the desired fruits, in the form in which he paints them, anyone who desired a different thing for our nation would have a corrupted taste. He would be a bad citizen who did not love with overwhelming fervor a republic in which the merits and value of men were recognized and honored above every other consideration. But I fail to see how it can be hoped that a government wholly entrusted to the popular will can be the source of all this good. Indeed I know very well what reason teaches, experience proves, and the authority of great men confims: that there is not to be found in the masses that prudence, that experience, that control which makes it impossible to put the ignorant above the wise, the wicked above the good, those who have never managed affairs above those who have experience.
>
> Just as from a maladroit, incompetent judge it is impossible to expect wise decisions, by the same token an ignorant, easily swayed populace cannot be expected to show prudence or reason in its elections or deliberations other than by exception. If in those matters of public government in which wise men, who have devoted themselves to nothing else, can only dimly see their way, can we believe than an inexperienced multitude, unschooled in such matters, made up of the most varied elements, shaped by the most varied habits, wholly concerned with its private affairs, will discern and know better?
>
> And this without taking into account the fact that the immoderate opinion each will have of his own merits will lead them all to an unbridled race to secure honors. The members of the popular government will not be content to enjoy the legitimate fruits of liberty, but each will aspire to the highest rank, to a share in the deliberation of

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> the most important and difficult problems. We lack the quality that prevails in certain other cities: the modesty to defer to those who know more, to those who possess greater qualifications.
>
> If we agree that the opinion of all, on all matters, should be equal and without distinction, what place will be reserved to virtue and worth at the hands of the multitude? An immoderate desire, extended to the mass, will give power to those who lack knowledge and capacity. These constitute the majority. And they will have more power in a state in which opinions are counted but not weighed. Therefore, what certainty have you, if you approve the plan that has been introduced, that the judgments prudently arrived at will not be overturned at once by new inventions and unwise laws. And to this wise men will no longer be able to oppose themselves.[8]

He thought that the members of the popular government would let their personal ambitions run away with them. At the same time he did not think that the multitude had enough knowledge of the government, but being the many they would constitute the majority and run the government. Guido Antonio expressed fears about the people who emerged from tyranny. Unless held in check, they would fling themselves into license, another form of tyranny. Tyranny also comes from rewarding those who do not deserve to be rewarded, that is to say, stripping authority from those who merit it. He said that there had never been absolute rule of the people that had not ended in dissension, discord, and changes of the state. Rome and Athens, with popular governments, lost their power for that particular reason. Therefore, liberty could be restored by the method established by parliament. That is to say, in that body serious matters would be brought under the scrutiny and dissection of the wisest, most practical, most responsible men.[9]

Savonarola's initial efforts to impose his system were successful. What with his followers in the streets and his sermons from the pulpit, his power was irresistible. But the experiment led nowhere. Florence allied itself with the king of France who invaded Italy, it broke off its old alliances in Italy without gaining anything, and lost the power it had acquired as the

[8] Francesco Guicciardini. *Storia d'Italia* (*Scrittori d'Italia*, vol. 120, 1929), p. 127.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

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result of the Medici's supremely skillful diplomacy. The death sentence pronounced on the five outstanding Florentines suspected of favoring the return of Piero de Medici left an ineradicable blot on the popular government. And, finally, Savonarola's clash with the Pope, his refusal to accept the invitation to go to Rome, and his bitter invectives against Rome gave the pontiff justification for forbidding him to preach, and, later, for excommunicating him. Savonarola's fate was thus left in the hands of his political adversaries. It was Guido Antonio Vespucci who tipped the balance against him. But it must be borne in mind that the decision was Rome's, and if Savonarola had been tried in Rome, as the Pope at first demanded, instead of Florence, the outcome would have been the same.

Savonarola left behind him such a legacy of anarchy in Florence that the old system of gonfaloniers elected to terms of short duration no longer worked, and it was made a lifetime office. Guido Antonio's warnings had proved only too true. He was a better prophet than Savonarola.

Machiavelli had been a spectator of the whole conflict. From 1494 to 1498 he had occupied an insignificant post as clerk in the Signory. His friend and fellow worker during all this time was Agostino Vespucci, probably a relative of Guido Antonio. Machiavelli was twenty-five years old. One of his cousins was an ardent supporter of Savonarola, but Machiavelli had followed the pronouncements of the friar with attention and skepticism. He found him both opportunistic and cowardly. He noted that he had left the pulpit of the cathedral to occupy that of San Marcos, fearful that his enemies might prevail in the new Signory. In a letter to Ricciardo Bechi, Machiavelli made a shrewd analysis of Savonarola's last sermons. He wrote:

> The friar has divided the Florentines into two classes: those who militate under the standard of God, which are himself and his followers; and those on the side of the Devil, which are his adversaries. The good men are those who follow him; the wicked and stiff-necked, his adversaries. . . . Anyone who suggests that the friar should be arrested, excommunicated or silenced wishes only to make himself a tyrant.[10]

[10] Nicolo Machiavelli, *Lettere* (Firenze, 1929), p. 5.

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After Savonarola has fulminated invectives and threats against the Signory to arouse the people, Machiavelli went on, the Signory intervened with the Pope on behalf of the friar. Whereupon the friar turned coat, and endeavored to unite everyone against the Pope. "In my opinion, he shifts like the wind, giving his deceits the color that best suits the moment."

In the new government that took charge after the friar's death, Guido Antonio Vespucci, elected gonfalonier, did everything in his power to bring order out of chaos. But he was opposed by the adherents of popular government. If Piero Soderini, when he was elected gonfalonier for life, had had the cunning of the fox, and the claws of the lion, the virtues Machiavelli recommended in a ruler, he might have solved the situation. But he proved a nonentity. There is an epigram of Machiavelli's that runs:

> Pier Soderini, he passed away
> And went to Hell, boo-hoo!
> Hell, fool? cries Pluto. Nay Nay,
> The limbo of babies for you.[11]

It was in the nature of things that the Medici should return. This time they not only reassumed their rule of Florence, but the Cardinal son of Lorenzo became Pope. Lorenzo, the son of Piero the Hapless, was now in charge of the destinies of the city.

Machiavelli, from his lower rung on the social ladder, to ingratiate himself with this favorite of fortune, wrote a book for him, *The Prince*, the perfect manual showing how to govern rationally, unscrupulously, playing the fox or the lion, as the situation demanded. Had this grandson of Lorenzo the Magnificent followed Machiavelli's precepts, Florence might have become a great monarchy. Unlike Savonarola, Machiavelli did not believe the mission of the state was to save souls through repentance, but to protect itself. Laws should proceed from the state, not by divine inspiration. God provides the means, but leaves the rest to free will. "God does not wish to do everything in order not to take from us our freedom of choice, and our

[11] Prezzolini, *Nicolo Machiavelli* (New York, 1928), p. 130.

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share of glory." The foundations of the state are good laws and strength. "All the armed prophets triumphed, and the unarmed were destroyed. This is what happened to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, whose new order came to nothing, because the multitude began to lose faith in him, and he lacked the means to keep those who had believed in him under control, and to make the unbelievers believe." Savonarola, in his tract on government, set down a series of moral precepts based on the sins he saw in the Medici. This, in Machiavelli's opinion, was puerile. The only thing that matters is the ends of the state. It is not necessary for the ruler to be completely good, for he must deal with men who are more inclined to vice than to virtue. What matters is that he appear to be that which satisfies the majority. There are princes today, says Machiavelli, who talk of nothing but peace and the faith, and they believe neither in the one nor in the other. If they had practiced what they preached, they would have lost either their reputation or their power.

What has not always been pointed out about *The Prince* is the degree to which it is a rebuttal of Savonarola, not because of the friar's doctrines, but because of the revolution he brought about in Florence. Machiavelli employed every resource of his keen intelligence to impress upon the Medici who had returned to power the ultimate aim of government which could be achieved only by laying aside scruple, but doing this skillfully. It was necessary to be cruel, but to adjust the cruelty to the requirements. There is well-employed and badly-employed cruelty. Caesar Borgia was cruel in order to prove that he could do as he liked, and this did not seem altogether bad to Machiavelli. On the other hand, without alluding directly to the sacrifice of the five Florentines who were thought to favor the return of Piero de Medici during Savonarola's domination, this is presented as an instance of badly-employed cruelty. Ferdinand the Catholic merited Machiavelli's admiration because he used religion as a pretext to war against the Moors, by which he won his fame, and "with pious cruelty to expel the Jews from his kingdom and confiscate their goods, an example that could not be more admirable nor more unusual." It is

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thus a prince must triumph, and his triumph is the greatness of his country.

*The Prince* availed Lorenzo de Medici nothing. He promised much, but he turned out to be but a poor twig from an illustrious tree. He did not know how to win the affection of the Florentines, and he departed this life unmourned and unsung. Pope Leo X then commissioned Machiavelli to draw up a new treatise on government.[12] This little work should always be read in conjunction with *The Prince*. It is the Machiavellian technique applied, not to government by one man, but to that of the republic. In the last analysis, a prince is not for Florence. Now the question was how to rule a republic. The republic must give the outward impression of a representative government, but in reality be ruled by one man, a Medici, specifically Pope Leo, acting through Cardinal Julius Medici in the city. This essay is an exceptional work of political strategy that was designed to remain in the hands of the Medici. Pope Leo would appoint the Eight of the Guard, the two military commanders, the election officials who would see that the right side polled the most ballots, and so on. "The army and justice would then be in their hands, the laws would serve their ends, and the high officials would be members of their party." In this way the republic would be like a monarchy.

The totalitarian governments of our own day have used certain of Machiavelli's theories with a seasoning of Savonarola's technique, combining political calculation and rabble-rousing in suitable proportions. There has been much use made of the word "mystic" in connection with the masses. But the moral quality that imbued Savonarola's theories has been counteracted by Machiavelli's reflections. The third position, that of Guido Antonio Vespucci, has been forgotten. Historians classify it under the head of "oligarchic government". But in reality it was a formula for representative government.

However, the ideas of these three men are as pertinent today as when they were formulated, and, as for the systems they

[12] Nicolo Machiavelli, *Discorso sopra il riformare lo Stato di Firenze* in *Opere* (1813), vol. IV, p. 105.

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advocated, they are still in force. The expulsion of the Jews by Ferdinand the Catholic, which aroused Machiavelli's admiration; the bonfires of Savonarola in which books and art were burned; the aggressive organization of the children; political assassinations for the purpose of ruling by fear; confessions secured by torture, like Savonarola's; the Prince who calls for peace without believing in it; the networks of espionage—all seem as much a part of the twentieth century as of the fifteenth or sixteenth. We are still talking the same language.

GERMAN ARCINIEGAS

NEW YORK, N. Y.

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# AMERICAN IMPACT UPON MIDDLE EAST LEADERSHIP

## I

IT is seldom realized that American missionary schools and colleges have played a dominant rôle in molding the thinking of the Middle East. Yet the work of American colleges at Beirut, Cairo, Damascus and Istanbul dates back a whole century and comprises an impressive record of achievement and service. In addition to this there has been a steady flow of students from the Middle East to American colleges and universities, particularly since 1939 and World War II.[1] These intellectuals, professional and nonprofessional, who are trained in American universities, provide the link between the ancient East and the Westernized world. In a significant sense they pave the way for future coöperation and understanding between the peoples of the East and West. The question as to how effectively these modern intellectuals, trained in Western ways, face the social problems in their own countries remains to be examined.

The impact and rôle of American schools located within the Middle East and the effect of education offered within the United States require some differentiation and analysis. The early work of private missionaries was a pioneering effort. A rotary press in 1834 introduced the printing of books in Arabic. With this step began the revival of literary interests and a diffusion of knowledge unsurpassed in any previous epoch. Not only did Arab culture revive and flourish with renewed vigor, but the introduction of Western culture stimulated new ideas and developed new vistas of thought.[2] The center of this revival

[1] A total of 3,149 students came from the Middle East area in 1951–1952. On the statistics see *Education for One World 1951–1952*, Institute of International Education, pp. 15–16. The impact of the post-war influx is reflected in the figures for the years between 1923 and 1951–1952 (pp. 45–46). A list of students distributed according to country of origin and institution attended in the United States was prepared by the Research Division of the Near East College Association, Inc., *Register of Near Eastern Students Studying in the United States*, Sept. 30, 1946 (mimeo).

[2] For a discerning account of the impact of the early missionary movement in Syria see George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London, 1938), pp. 35–60.



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was the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, which was founded in 1866.[3] Its prestige and sound program attracted students from widely scattered portions of the Ottoman world. In turn as graduates trickled outward they formed in their respective areas small nuclei of Western-oriented intellectuals. The important feature is that, though the number of graduates from American colleges remained small according to American standards, they represented all parts of the Arab and non-Arab world.[4] In time the educational system established a record of excellence in training and scholastic achievements which still endures.[5]

It was in the field of political ideas rather than in practical arts that the Near East colleges contributed most. Two streams of influence emerged. One centered on the study of political ideals of democracy which were reflected in the writings of Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson and Bentham. As a result, out of the dissemination of popular thought on government, inspired intellectuals carried the fire of national ideals and independence back to their homelands.[6] Westernization stirred the Islamic community out of its ancient lethargy. Application of Western political concepts speeded the disintegration of Ottoman power. In the vortex of two world wars the ideal of independence not only survived the aftermath but forcefully challenged the imperialism of the Great Powers. Some observers, viewing the scene after 1945 with its turbulent nationalism, are apt to conclude that Middle Easterners learned their lessons too thoroughly.[7]

Of even greater import was the degree to which American education imparted the reform spirit to the East. Under its

[3] The name of the college was changed to the American University of Beirut after World War I.

[4] The contribution of the Near East Colleges toward training for leadership is assessed in *An Appraisal of America's Investment in Six Near East Colleges*, Executive Committee of the Five Year Stabilization Fund of the Near East Colleges (New York, 1937), pp. 7–24.

[5] See the *Annual Report*, 1950–1951 of Dr. Stephen Penrose, Jr., on the activities of the American University of Beirut.

[6] Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–125.

[7] In a pessimistic vein is the view of nationalism in the Islamic world by Robert Montagne, "Modern Nations and Islam", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 30 (July 1952), pp. 580–592.

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inspiration there developed a critical habit of mind which in time evolved into a critical approach to social institutions. This spirit struck a blow at the established order, stirred an interest in a better life and ended the stagnation of Islam. The reform movement introduced an element of liberalism into the operation of newly established constitutions and parliamentary systems which had only begun to take root in the twentieth century. Although tension and instability have marked the political scene, no one can ignore the stirrings of change and the gropings toward a concept of public welfare. The twin ideals of national independence and governmental reform are juxtaposed in modern states of the Middle East. Despite the obsession with the ousting of British power and the ensuing international complications in Egypt and Iran, both countries are striving to put democratic ideals into practice. The confusions and disturbances are unavoidable, even if inexcusable in some instances.

The question in the mid-twentieth century is whether Middle East leadership can provide the inspiration, organizational skill and direction needed to revolutionize Eastern society from a semifeudal basis to a modernized standard of statecraft. In this task the Middle East needs assistance from the West, and the United States consequently must face its responsibilities critically and with circumspection.[8] Perhaps a key rôle in this problem will be played by the students who are being trained within the United States and who in time will return to the Middle East as prospective leaders in their respective communities.

There is a mistaken notion that the emergence of the United States as a world Power in 1945 will inevitably inspire Middle East peoples to follow American patterns of political thought and economic progress. It is assumed that the influx of foreign students will automatically spread democracy, liberalism and technical skills in the benighted countries. No attention to guidance, it is believed, is required; for the educational process

[8] A provocative analysis of the meeting of the East and West on a spiritual plane is treated by Charles Malik in "The Near East: The Search for Truth", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 30 (January 1952), pp. 231–264.

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itself, unhampered by outside interference, will do its work. Such thinking is basically false and shortsighted. Careful reflection upon the conditions and limitations within which the educational process operates will suggest the observation that no automatic osmosis process will transmit Western concepts to the Middle East.

The United States no longer holds the position of disinterested source of inspiration for the Arab world that it enjoyed in the era before 1939. World conditions have changed and the prestige and influence of the United States have changed accordingly. With the shifts in the balance of power, the American government has acquired definite political, economic and strategic stakes in the Middle East.[9] National interest, rather than idealistic principles, has guided American policy in the Palestine question, the Iranian oil dispute and the Suez Canal controversy. The disinterested work of private missionaries, philanthropic organizations and educational institutions has been overshadowed by international issues. To the degree that Middle East countries have resented Western domination and have failed to enlist active American support for their anti-imperialist cause, American standing has in their estimation diminished. In several urban centers anti-American outbreaks have occurred regularly since the Palestine conflict of 1947. Significantly for the future, however, Middle East people still distinguish between the activities of private American citizens and the acts of the United States government.

A second transformation concerns the United States itself. Within the American educational system, there is a marked shift of emphasis from political ideas to technical training. Americans are no longer, if ever so, the zealous advocates of popular revolutions or the exporters of revolutionary techniques that romanticists generally imagine them to be. Officially the United States government is concerned primarily with world stability and the preservation of the *status quo*. It is certainly clear that foreign students will hardly be inculcated with revolutionary fervor or steeped in any missionary spirit to do good.

[9] For a brief survey see H. P. Hall and C. H. Voss, *American Interests in the Middle East*, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 72, Nov.–Dec. 1948.

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In fact statistics show that the vast majority of Middle East students seek technical training, not political or social wisdom. It is in engineering, medicine, public health and business training that American institutions attract the Middle East.[10] No one can quarrel with the tendency of Middle East students to favor the disciplines of science, medicine or agriculture. There is a great need in non-industrialized countries for greater technical skills but it is rather questionable whether, despite this need, the net result of American training will be beneficial.

## II

The rôle of Western-trained intellectuals in the Middle East is far from effective. Freya Stark's faith in the rising star of the young effendi has not materialized.[11] Western-oriented intellectuals fail to provide the effective leadership that is expected of them. In a sense Western education has been a disturbing element and, to some degree, nonconstructive in its results.[12] Some of the reasons for this state of affairs must be explored if any improvements are to be expected. The major obstacle to the effective functioning of the intellectual is connected with the impact of the Westernization process itself. More specifically, Western orientation adds to the intellectual's equipment a new conceptual framework and develops an outlook that can no longer be reconciled with the realities of Eastern society. There are two facets to this problem of Westernization. Those trained abroad tend to import and adopt Western forms without the substance of Westernization. This type of borrowing, such as the importation of Western standards of the good life, is futile and mistaken in that it displays a basic misunderstanding of the socio-economic foundations of Western forms. One could not, for example, successfully transplant the industrial complex of Detroit into the desert of the Middle East. The operation of the automotive industry in Detroit involves more

[10] The predominance of the professional categories of training is well illustrated in the *Register of Near Eastern Students Studying in the United States*. See also *Education for One World 1950–1951*, pp. 21–30.

[11] Freya Stark, *The Arab Island* (New York, 1945).

[12] "Youth and Politics in the Near East", in *World Today*, vol. VII, No. 3 (March 1951), pp. 102–109.

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than the cataloging of raw materials and human resources. It is rooted in a particular socio-economic pattern that is termed an integrated urban community. The existence of a technically trained labor force is one aspect to the social pattern. The pervading economic philosophy of the middle class acts as an integrating force among several competing segments of the social structure. Furthermore, the government, as an institution, regulates the social process in conformity with a prevailing social concept of public welfare that insures stability for the whole community. It is substantially this integrated foundation of Westernization that the Middle Easterner misses completely.

The wholesale transference of Western forms out of context is impossible for another reason. Eastern society, with its primitive social forms and semidevelopment of economic resources, exhibits a low degree of receptivity to modernization. Because of the great gap between the industrial West and the primitive East, the latter's society cannot absorb or reward its intellectuals in Western style. Rather, under these circumstances, society confines and isolates the intellectuals in highly self-centered urban communities. There, cut off from the stream of national life, the conscientious intellectuals react to their environment in characteristic patterns. The case of civil servants may be cited as one typical category. A significant ambition of the government employee is to imitate American standards of comfort. This entails the maintenance of an expensive residence and the added burden of high costs for services, food and clothes. With the low rate of government pay and high costs of living, a disparity in the ratio of one to seven, this experiment soon ends in frustration. Only an independent and supplementary income permits the continuance of a luxurious existence. Moreover the youthful and ambitious public servant soon discovers that none of his plans for social service or expansion of public works or public building projects ever materialize. Plans and blueprints quietly collect dust on his desk. The timelessness of the Orient reigns supreme; nothing emerges according to plan or schedule. In fact, the superior official in such instances seems to gauge the capacities for social progress within the realistic

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limitations of Middle East society more judiciously than the impulsive, youthful worker. Faced with insuperable obstacles and daily frustrations, the intellectual soon gives up hope, confines his associations to others of his élite circle, and reverts to a life of stagnation.

Not all Western-trained individuals fade into the background. Some react more violently to their environment and display decidedly unsocial patterns of behavior. A few examples will illustrate the point. In the case of one prominent family, the son of a wealthy landlord returned to manage his father's estate after studying irrigation and farming abroad. One would have therefore expected him to be concerned with production matters, new techniques of agriculture and modern management. What in fact did set the goal of the Western-trained entrepreneur? His single purpose, as he himself stated it, was to amass a sufficient fortune so as to retire as expeditiously as possible, to a life of ease outside his country. No concern for social improvement or the betterment of the fellaheen or national advancement motivated the neophyte. The adoption of the American standard in his case involved a somewhat negative solution in terms of the national environment. This particular case reflects the unexpressed desires of countless other American-educated Arabs.

Still another type of reaction can be discovered at the intellectual level. A young history professor, trained at the American University of Beirut, advanced the view that the West had nothing to teach Easterners for the reason that Islamic civilization possessed, within it, all the moral standards and values necessary to it. While the assertion of cultural egocentricism is to some degree valid for any civilization, the statement reflected a basic failure to recognize the inextricable problems which Westernization had already posed for the Middle East. From this type of intellectual exclusivism it is but a step to the escapist activities of various extremist social and religious movements.

What these and other cases prove is the ineffectiveness of the Western-trained intellectual as the leader and exponent of the new Middle East. Basically little or no distinction is made between adoption and adaptation. The former involves

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the importation of Western forms; the latter implies a selective process of integrating the new into the matrix of the old. Where insight, introspection and originality are lacking, where individual horizons are focused on the self, nothing but frustration and confusion can ensue.

The troubles in the Middle East go beyond personal experiences. Some of the most disturbing elements are rooted in the customs, mores and values of society, factors which can scarcely be uprooted overnight and matters which the intellectuals themselves are not able to transform or control. One limiting factor is the prestige value placed on college training. Society judges success among the educated, whether in the professional or technical occupations, by certain forms. The college-trained man is destined to be a white-collar office worker and, regardless of the emolument or opportunities, he must live up to his family's expectations. Needless to say, in an agricultural society this limits the educated group to the city and in most instances confines its outlet to government service. In the case of the technicians the practice has a disastrous effect upon their service to the community. Engineers, doctors and medical officers see little future in the outlying towns or districts to which they may be assigned. Their objective in such cases is always to return to the city. There the standard of living, of course, is more congenial to their social status or professional aspirations. There is no need to cite specific cases; any investigator who has done field work in the East will be able to footnote this point with his own examples.

An even greater handicap is the prevailing notion that the college-educated man should not work with his hands. The stigma against manual labor, in a society which requires the application of scientific techniques, renders the technician less than effective as a medium of reform. Yet how can the agricultural agent be expected to aid the fellaheen with soil improvement or crop production if he is loath to dirty his hands? The same might be said about the function of a public works engineer whose single ambition is to hold a desk job in the capital rather than to build roads in the provinces. The thirst for advancement is one thing; the failure to see the social implications of specialized training is quite another matter.

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What is most disastrous, however, is the absence of any concept of social welfare at the governmental level. The officialdom operates within its own environment and quite independent of the people. Within the Islamic world the idea of popular government or social service has never taken root. The people have been conditioned to obey the regulations of the government as a matter of habit and necessity. Within more modern times the development of a national state has not produced the corresponding degree of national cohesion in terms of which the government could provide effective social services. Society is seriously fragmented into minority groups on the one hand and split between the urban-and-village differentiation on the other. In such a schizophrenic community there is at the governmental level no recognizable symbol of public welfare, no constructive leadership to integrate social reforms, and no zeal or devotion to the masses. It is not unusual, for example, to find hospitals newly constructed but practically empty in many provinces of the Middle East. The reason for this anomaly is the cold unconcern which the medical staff exhibits toward the welfare of individual patients. Without this functional relationship hospitals become useless.

The absence of a philosophy of public welfare at the top levels renders government ineffective and purposeless. General disorganization, corruption and nepotism destroy whatever seed of reform the more intelligent officials may nourish. Of course various cliques and vested interests oppose any extensive innovations or reforms. Wealthy landlords, merchants and reactionary religious groups bitterly defend the *status quo* wherever parliamentary instruments permit the defense of vested interests. One finds many talented young men in departments of health, agriculture or social welfare but they rarely hold influential positions, or their titles exist merely on paper. What is most discouraging is that the socially-minded intellectuals are scattered thinly and are rarely organized into any effective pressure group. Family ties are a powerful link in official appointments. Top posts do not go to the most competent intellectuals. All these factors explain why constructive leadership is lacking and why Western-trained intellectuals do

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not represent or speak for the masses. The influx of trained administrators, technicians and professional men is yet dangerous in another sense. Given the limited resources of most states, very few states can absorb or provide employment for the increasing number of graduates. Unless the output of graduates is carefully regulated or planned, Western training is less a constructive force than it is a potential source of danger for the Middle East.

## III

The paramount question is, to what extent can American institutions provide the necessary inspiration for leadership and organization among their visitors from the Middle East countries? One thing is clear. It is not enough to open the bars to foreign students in the hope that they will magically absorb the American process and translate its meaning or impart its spirit to their own communities.[13] Such benefits do not flow automatically as a result of foreign contacts. Indeed the adoption of false standards and the evocation of unrequited hopes may in fact do irreparable harm. It would be unwise and unrealistic, also, to believe that American educational authorities can provide meaningful standards or impart clear-cut formulas for the solution of basic Eastern problems. Yet it must be admitted that interaction between cultures is an inevitable law of history and that some facets of Western patterns are bound to find reception in the East. American responsibility is limited to the possibility of providing effective guidance and the tools and concepts with which Middle Easterners can integrate their disparate communities.

Several improvements in the accommodation of foreign students may be suggested. More attention should be focused upon the initial stages of the selection process. There is, in the selection procedures of many Eastern countries, little correlation between demonstrated competence and the opportunity for students to study abroad. Native educational practices tend to favor the selection of sons of wealthy or influential

[13] For an excellent analysis of the education process in its general aspects see John W. Gardner, "The Foreign Student in America", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 30 (July 1952), pp. 637–650.

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families, candidates who are not always the best products in the field. One case will illustrate this point. A young Kurdish teacher who had expressed a strong desire to study politics in the United States indicated in a rather brusque manner that he expected his American interviewer to find him a position in a university. To this his American friend replied that the request was quite impossible and asked whether there were not government-sponsored exchange programs which would finance his studies. Very bitterly the young man pointed out that his poverty and lack of influence precluded the possibility of ever being selected for a scholarship. It would be desirable if representatives of the United States could take part in the selection process and perhaps impress upon native educational authorities the importance of adopting more liberal policies. This would, perforce, be limited to student-exchange programs financed by the United States government. The salutary effect of this technique upon the whole selection process should not be underestimated. Educational authorities in the Middle East must eventually realize that their prestige abroad will depend on the degree to which they adopt elementary principles of justice and equality.

Once the student is placed in the proper educational institution it is an error to allow him to "sink or swim". Such reception into American life rarely builds good will or contributes to an understanding of American society. If neglected, the foreign student will tend to live on the campus, confine his associations to his compatriots, and concentrate on his chosen specialty in school. Since the engineering, medical and agricultural schools can be demanding in time and energy, the foreigner may never comprehend the vital forces of the American social system.[14] He should know the United States as a geographic area of great natural resources, as a homogeneous unit of diverse nationalities and religions, as a political community founded on the principle of majority rule and the art of compromises. Above all the student should see the intricate correlation between technological skills and social organization. To orient the student properly

[14] The foreign student's adjustment to American life is aptly described by Gardner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 641–648.

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along these lines requires two programs. One would allow foreign students, through some form of subsidy, to travel extensively over a regional segment or two of the country. Travel in this sense is of critical importance in understanding the realities of the American scene. To be meaningful it must be purposeful and planned with certain objectives in mind. The visitor should acquaint himself with the functional aspects of several levels of organized community life: the local governments, church associations, voluntary clubs, judicial system, and the rural society. How these units blend into a pattern of community life that is founded on principles of voluntary associations, competitiveness and orderliness is the secret to the American system. The significant point is that foreign students must be exposed to the social process and observe it in action. The realities of America cannot be absorbed from books. Of course, the institution of orientation sessions, particularly during the summer term, is an excellent academic approach to the main objective but it can never be a substitute for personal samplings of American life.[15] A second and even more instructive educational step would be the development of a program which would permit foreign students to work in American communities. Temporary employment in the subject's professional line of interest might well be combined with his academic curriculum so that it would not constitute a complete departure from his professional objectives in a higher institution of learning. Only in this experiential fashion can one accurately gauge the American temper.

One vital need American training fails to meet altogether. Most of our professional training is designed for American consumption. Thus, no attention is given to the specific conditions which the Eastern student will encounter in his country. For the foreigner, not only may the technical problems—whether in engineering, irrigation or agriculture—be essentially different, but the social consequences of the application of new techniques may present uniquely new questions. To translate complicated technical skills into a rather primitive agricultural background

[15] The University of Michigan has conducted orientation sessions for foreign students under the auspices of its English Language Institute.

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requires a selective program of study and orientation. Above all serious attention must be focused on the element of leadership. Here American universities, foundations and research societies might well combine their efforts and resources to work out seminar projects on the science of leadership. Under proper direction selected graduate students in the seminars would then assess the range of their acquired technical skills, examine the socio-economic requirements of their home country, and explore the methodological techniques and avenues by which a higher degree of social integration might be achieved at home. To aim at leadership would be most appropriate, provided it were fully recognized that there are various levels of community services. Political leadership at a high policy level would not exclude the significant rôle played by the doctor, social worker, teacher and health inspector. Of course, the screening process should select only those candidates who show promise of leadership. They must be personalities who possess ideals and practical judgment. This critical sense of what is attainable and what is not is the most distinctive characteristic of leadership. The whole problem of leadership training could be organized under the aegis of the leading universities. There the departments of Middle East studies would properly coördinate the resources of technical colleges, the pyschological research institutes, and other institutes as well. Moreover, such academic orientation would emphasize the nonpartisan, experimental character of the enterprise. As a matter of procedure several programs might be instituted in various universities. One of these would center on the theoretical and general problems of leadership; others in turn would concentrate on specific countries or areas of the Middle East. The division would depend on available personnel, resources or established preferences in the area of Middle East studies.

There is reason to believe that special public administration programs could further the evolution of administrative organization in government. Not only would such efforts result in practical benefits to the countries adopting them, but public administration projects could develop the symbols of social integration which would transform the Middle East into effective

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political units. It is at this level that trained leaders—in social welfare, education, agriculture and irrigation—would undertake the delicate task of outlining and executing social planning. The gap between theory and practice would be bridged. Western ideas would be tested against the pattern of Eastern social values. The new administrators, if properly inspired and motivated, would be in a position to develop new lines of application and devise new concepts as well. The best that public administration projects in the United States could do is to provide their members with the critical mental resources required for sound judgment and realistic appraisal of the total problem. Public administration takes on added significance in view of various Middle East development schemes that have been devised in the period after 1945. Whether one considers Iran's Seven Year Plan, the pilot demonstration projects of the Clapp Mission report or Point Four programs, the need for a careful appraisal of the social changes implicit in each project is urgent. Such centers of coördinated research and planning should be established in some educational center in the Middle East—Beirut, Cairo, Damascus or Baghdad.

One other undertaking might be associated with the development of administrative training centers. There is a crying need for the establishment of an institute of social sciences in the Middle East area. At present American knowledge of the contemporary thinking of the Middle East is handicapped by the dearth of data, documents and scholarly materials available within the United States. Of greatest importance is the need for a systematic publication of parliamentary debates, official statements on foreign policy, and statutory enactments in the field of social welfare. An adequate understanding of the area also requires as a *sine qua non* free-flowing channels of communication between the scholars of the East and West. A center of the social sciences could collect materials that are significant for the economist, the sociologist and the political scientist. The publication of a professional journal would make available important data and serve as a medium for a mutual exchange of ideas.

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## IV

The above-mentioned suggestions on American contribution to the training of Middle East students indicate that the case is not hopeless, that something can be achieved in the field of organization and leadership. Whether the tendency toward drifting with the tide of events can be overcome depends not on the United States but principally on the Eastern community as a whole. We can accept more responsibility for the orientation in accordance with American patterns of action. We can establish orientation seminars, and leadership programs and also inspire the initiation of social science research centers. We can even push research into the field of symbols of leadership and patterns of social integration in Middle East society. All this, however, would remain sterile and academic unless the people within the area respond to the challenge of Westernization and meet their responsibilities realistically and constructively.

A change in basic attitudes, particularly in the case of the intellectual, is required if any political stability or social equilibrium is to be attained. Only a brief listing of the *desiderata* can be outlined at this point. There must be an inversion of the pyramid of social values that are current in the Arab portions of the Middle East. Intellectuals should not be equated with white-collar status nor should the symbol of the élite be confined to the higher echelons of government service. Leadership at the community-service level should be recognized and rewarded in salary rating and status. Greater incentive and rewards might be instituted for the agricultural agent, village teacher and health inspector. A certain amount of pioneering effort, zeal and sacrifice on the part of the social welfare worker might motivate this revolutionary trend in social outlook.

Another critical need is for decentralization of effort and leadership. The central government should encourage local leadership and experimentation rather than exercise strict control from the capital. Self-assertion and self-reliance are virtues which have not been permitted to flourish extensively in the Arab world. Without local initiative and inspiration the dead hand of bureaucracy can never lead the people out of

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the past. Activism is the key to progress in the Middle East. This requires a grass-roots approach at all levels of society; all must be actively involved in the process of change and evolution. Nothing demonstrates this need more clearly than the pattern of military leadership in Syria and Egypt within the post-war period. Leadership, without popular understanding or support, it would seem, offers no solutions.

Three elements in particular should assert their position in the changing Middle East. The business leaders could, if properly oriented, provide a solid backing for democratic experimentation and form the nucleus of more effective party organization. Business elements, thus far, have failed to rationalize their specific activities with the larger concept of national welfare. Secondly, there is room for the powerful landlords. These groups of power and influence must, if they are to survive, readapt themselves to a rapidly shifting scale of values. Failure to do so would mean their ultimate extinction as a functional unit of society. Thirdly, the religious-minded leaders bear a responsibility in guiding the masses through a difficult process of transition. They can, if they avoid the dangers of extremism, be a source of needed guidance for the people. Here, too, the intellectuals face a danger in repudiating Islam and its traditions. While the espousal of secular causes is the hallmark of modernization, it cuts off in a significant sense any communication with the masses. It is, perhaps, through Islam that modern ideas can be interpreted meaningfully throughout the greater part of the Middle East.

One other responsibility rests upon the shoulders of the intellectuals in the area. Too often the best brains from the Middle East gravitate toward Europe or the United States. There they find a more congenial atmosphere and a better recognition than in their homeland. The net result is a continuous drain of the intellectual resources of the needy countries. This tendency must definitely be reversed by the youthful intellectuals of the present generation, if the balance is to favor the intellectual advancement of the Middle East society.

It is clear that the United States can at best recognize the impact of its educational system upon foreign students from the

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Middle East world. It cannot, despite best intentions, provide solutions. It cannot transform Middle East society. On this point the Easterners must meet their American friends more than halfway.

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# THE HISTORIAN AND HIS DAY

FOR a good while now a fairly strenuous contest has been in progress between two opposed schools of historical thought. Accepting a classification proposed by one of the keenest though most courteous of the riders in the lists, the division lies roughly between the "present-minded" and the "history-minded" historians. In the course of time many historians have joined one side or the other in the controversy with the natural consequence that there has been some sense and a good deal of nonsense talked on both sides. In general, for some subtle psychological reason that I am unable to fathom, the kind of scholar who, distrustful of "ideas" and "theories", believes that history is all "facts" has tended to take the side of the "history-minded" historians. For more obvious reasons the chronic "do-gooder", who believes that knowledge justifies itself only by a capacity to solve current problems, lines up with the "present-minded" position.

This peculiar aligment has frequently obscured the issues at stake. It is easy to expose the feebleness and absurdity of those who want only "facts" and of those who want only current problem-solving; and it is fun, too. Consequently the attacks on both sides have often been directed mainly against these vulnerable positions, and it has sometimes seemed as if the main bodies were too busy assaulting their opponents' camp followers to come to grips with one another. For, of course, there is nothing intrinsic to the history-minded position that precludes "ideas" or "theories" or, if you prefer, generalization. Nor is there anything in present-mindedness that demands an optimism as to the efficacy of history as a panacea for current social ills.

Obviously it is not fair to judge either the history-minded or the present-minded historians by the vagaries of their respective lunatic fringes. Casting off the eccentric on both sides, there remains a real and serious divergence of opinion, as yet apparently irreconcilable, maintained on both sides by scholars whose achievements entitle their views to respectful consideration. The divergence is connected at least ostensibly with a funda-



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mental difference in general outlook between the two parties to the argument. In a sense the present-minded are realists in the field of history, the history-minded are idealists.

The approach of the latter to the problem is essentially apodictic. They say we *ought* not to intrude our contemporary value systems and preconceptions and notions into our reconstruction of the past. They insist that it is our *duty* as historians to understand the past in its terms, not in our own; and they document their thesis with some undeniably horrible examples of what has happened in the last century to historians who looked at the past with the dubious prepossessions, current in their own day, but since invalidated or replaced by other prepossessions equally dubious. Truly there is nothing quite so passé as the intellectual fashions of yesteryear. We find them at once especially ludicrous and especially disturbing when they are worn by men of high talents. We do not like to see the nineteenth-century present-mindedness of so perceptive a man as J. R. Green transforming the roughneck barons of Runnymede into harbingers of nineteenth-century democracy and nationalism. Our embarrassment is even more acute when the victim of present-mindedness is a great historian. We are unhappy when we watch Bishop Stubbs adding Victorian liberalism to the cargo that the Anglo-Saxons brought with them to England from their North German forests. And as the conviction of sin is brought home to us we are warned, "There but for the grace of history-mindedness go you."

Convinced by the dreadful examples arrayed before us we resolve to eschew the wickedness of modernism and thenceforth hew to our obligation to be history-minded. And then a clear and chilly voice says: "But my dear fellows, you can't be history-minded. It might be nice if you could, or it might not, but in any case it is impossible. So all this pother about the obligation to be history-minded is rather silly. Only a particularly repulsive sort of Deity would bind men to do what in the very nature of things they are unable to do." So an almost medieval emphasis on the *duty* to be history-minded is deflected by a rather Machiavellian observation as to the *facts* of life. Medieval assertions about what statesmen *ought* to do Machiavelli met with assertions about what statesmen—the human animal being

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what it is—are *sure* to do. History-minded assertions about what historians ought to do are met with present-minded assertions of what—the history-writing animal being what he is—the historian is certain to do. The harsh fact of life is that, willy-nilly, the present-day historian lives not in the past but in the present, and this harsh fact cannot be altered by any pious resolve to be history-minded.

What we say about any historical epoch in some way reflects our experience and that experience was accumulated not in the fifteenth, in the sixteenth, or in any other century than the twentieth. When we look back on the past, we do so from the present. We are present-minded just as all earlier historians were present-minded in their day because for better or worse we happen to live in our own day. Indeed the very horrid examples cited by the proponents of history-mindedness afford irrefutable evidence that the best of former historians were in their day present-minded, and we can hardly hope to be different. So the best thing for us to do is to recognize that every generation reinterprets the past in terms of the exigencies of its own day. We can then cast aside our futile history-minded yearnings and qualms and deal with the past in terms of our day, only mildly regretting that, like all the words of man, our own words will be writ on water. By this intellectual stratagem the present-minded turn—or seek to turn—the flank of the history-minded.

We must admit, I believe, that some points in the argument of the present-minded are true beyond dispute. It is certainly true, for example, that all that we think is related to our experience somehow, and that all our experience is of our own day. But though this be true, it is also trivial. It is a plea in avoidance dressed up as an argument. Granting that we can have no experience beyond what we have acquired in the course of our own lives, the question is, does anything in that experience enable us to understand the past in its own terms rather than in terms of the prepossessions of our own day? Banal statements about the origin of our ideas in our own experience do not answer this question; they merely beg it.

In the second place, I think we must admit that in some respects all historians are present-minded, even the most de-

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termined proponents of history-mindedness. All historians are indeed engaged in rewriting past history in the light of at least one aspect of present experience, that aspect which has to do with the increments to our positive knowledge that are the fruit of scientific investigation. Consider a single example. Up to a few decades ago the Dark Ages before the twelfth century were considered an era of total regression, technological as well as political, social and cultural. Then Lefebvre de Noëttes described results of certain experiments he had made with animal power. He had reproduced antique harnesses for draft horses. In such harness the pulling power of the horse proved to be less than a quarter of what it is in modern harness. But "modern" harness, involving the use of a rigid horse collar, makes its appearance in Europe in the tenth century. So in the Dark Ages a horse could deliver about four times the tractive force that it could in antiquity. Now I am sure that no historian would suggest that we disregard Lefebvre de Noëttes' experiments in our consideration of medieval agrarian history; a fourfold increase in the efficiency of a very important source of power is something that no economic historian can afford to overlook. Yet when we do apply the results of Lefebvre's experiments to medieval agriculture we are being present-minded in at least two ways. In the first and more simple way we are rewriting the history of the Middle Ages in the light of the present because until the present the particular bit of light that was the work of Lefebvre did not exist. But we must go further. It was not pure accident that such work had not been done in earlier ages. Historians in earlier ages would not have thought of going about the investigation of medieval agriculture as Lefebvre did. In making his historical investigations by the scientific, positivist method of experiment and measurement, Lefebvre was distinctly reflecting the preoccupations of his own age and of no earlier one. Scientific-mindedness in this particular area of study at any rate is present-mindedness.

It seems to me that the proponents of history-mindedness must, and in most cases probably do, concede the validity of this kind of present-mindedness in the writing of history; and if this is all that present-mindedness means, then every historian

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worth his salt is present-minded. No sane contemporary scientist in his investigations of the physical world would disregard nineteenth-century advances in field theory, and no sane historian in his work would rule out of consideration insights achieved in the past century concerning the connection of class conflict with historical occurrences. But this is only to say that all men who are professionally committed to the quest of that elusive entity—the Truth—use all the tracking devices available to them at the time, and in the nature of things cannot use any device before it exists. And of course the adequacy of the historical search at any time is in some degree limited by the adequacy of the tracking devices. In this, too, the historian's situation is no different from that of the scientist. Adequate investigation of optical isomers in organic chemistry, for example, had to wait on the development of the techniques of spectroscopy. If this is what present-mindedness means, then present-mindedness is not just the condition of historical knowledge. For *all* knowledge at any time is obviously limited by the limits of the means of gaining knowledge at that time; and historians are simply in the same boat as all others whose business it is to know.

Now I do not believe that the proponents of present-mindedness mean anything as bland and innocuous as this. On the contrary I am fairly sure they mean that the historian's boat is different from, and a great deal more leaky than, let us say, the physicist's or the geologist's boat. What then is supposed to be the *specific* trouble with the historian's boat? The trouble, as the present-minded see it, can be described fairly simply. The present-minded contend that in writing history no historian can free himself of his total experience and that that experience is inextricably involved not only in the limits of knowledge but also in the passions, prejudices, assumptions and prepossessions, in the events, crises and tensions of his own day. Therefore those passions, prejudices, assumptions, prepossessions, events, crises and tensions of the historian's own day inevitably permeate what he writes about the past. This is the crucial allegation of the present-minded, and if it is wholly correct, the issue must be settled in their favor and the history-minded

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pack up their apodictic and categorical-imperative baggage and depart in silence. Frequently discussions of this crucial issue have got bogged down because the history-minded keep trying to prove that the historian can counteract the influence of his own day, while the present-minded keep saying that this is utterly impossible. And of course on this question the latter are quite right. A historian has no day but his own, so what is he going to counteract it with? He is in the situation of Archimedes who could find no fulcrum for the lever with which to move the Earth. Clearly if the historian is to be history-minded rather than present-minded he must find the means of being so in his own day, not outside it. And thus at last we come up against the crucial question—what *is* the historian's own day?

As soon as we put the question this way we realize that there is no ideal Historian's Day; there are many days, all different, and each with a particular historian attached to it. Now since in actuality there is no such thing as The Historian's Day, no one can be qualified to say what it actually consists of. Indeed, although I know a good number of individual historians on terms of greater or less intimacy, I would feel ill-qualified to describe with certainty what any of their days are. There is, however, one historian about whose day I can speak with assurance. For I myself am a historian at least in the technical sense of the word; I have possessed for a considerable time the parchment inscribed with the appropriate phrases to indicate that I have served my apprenticeship and am out of my indentures. So I will describe as briefly as I can my own day. I do so out of no appetite for self-revelation or self-expression, but simply because the subject is germane to our inquiry and because it is the one matter on which I happen to be the world's leading authority. Let us then hurry through this dreary journal.

I rise early and have breakfast. While eating, I glance through the morning paper and read the editorial page. I then go to the college that employs me and teach for two to four hours five days a week. Most of the time the subject matter I deal with in class is cobwebbed with age. Three fourths of

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it dates back from a century and a quarter to three millennia; all of it happened at least thirty years ago. Then comes lunch with a few of my colleagues. Conversation at lunch ranges widely through professional shoptalk, politics, high and ghostly matters like religion, the nature of art or the universe, and the problems of child rearing, and finally academic scuttle butt. At present there is considerable discussion of the peculiar incongruence between the social importance of the academic and his economic reward. This topic has the merit of revealing the profound like-mindedness, transcending all occasional conflicts, of our little community. From noon to bedtime my day is grimly uniform. There are of course occasional and casual variations—preparation of the ancient material above mentioned for the next day's classes, a ride in the country with the family, a committee meeting at college, a movie, a play, a novel, or a book by some self-anointed Deep Thinker. Still by and large from one in the afternoon to midnight with time out for dinner and domestic matters, I read things written between 1450 and 1650 or books written by historians on the basis of things written between 1450 and 1650. I vary the routine on certain days by writing about what I have read on the other days. On Saturdays and in the summer I start my reading or writing at nine instead of at noon. It is only fair to add that most days I turn on a news broadcast or two at dinnertime, and that I spend an hour or two with the Sunday paper.

Now I am sure that many people will consider so many days so spent to be a frightful waste of precious time; and indeed, as most of the days of most men, it does seem a bit trivial. Be that as it may, it remains one historian's own day. It is his own day in the only sense that phrase can be used without its being pretentious, pompous and meaningless. For a man's own days are not everything that happens in the world while he lives and breathes. As I write, portentous and momentous things are no doubt being done in Peiping, Teheran, Bonn, and Lost Nation, Iowa. But these things are no part of my day; they are outside of my experience, and though one or two of them may faintly impinge on my consciousness tomorrow via the headlines in the morning paper, that is probably as far as

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they will get. At best they are likely to remain fluttering fragments on the fringe of my experience, not well-ordered parts of it. I must insist emphatically that the history I write is, as the present-minded say, intimately connected with my own day and inextricably linked with my own experience; but I must insist with even stronger emphasis that my day is not someone else's day, or the ideal Day of Contemporary Man; it is just the way I happen to dispose of twenty-four hours. By the same token the experience that is inextricably linked to any history I may happen to write is not the ideal Experience of Twentieth-Century Man in World Chaos, but just the way I happen to put in my time over the series of my days.

Now it may seem immodest or perhaps simply fantastic to take days spent as are mine—days so little attuned to the great harmonies, discords and issues of the present—and hold them up for contemplation. Yet I will dare to suggest that in this historian's own humdrum days there is one peculiarity that merits thought. The peculiarity lies in the curious relation that days so squandered seem to establish between the present and a rather remote sector of the past. I do not pretend that I am wholly unconcerned by the larger public issues and catastrophes of the present. After all I will never be called upon to testify to the purity of my doctrine before the Papal Inquisition of the sixteenth century; but I might be required to do so by less powerfully armed inquests of 1954. Nor am I without opinions on a large number of contemporary issues. On some of them I am vigorously dogmatic as, indeed, are most of the historians I know. Yet my knowledge about such issues, although occasionally fairly extensive, tends to be haphazard, vague, unsystematic and disorderly. And the brute fact of the matter is that even if I had the inclination, I do not have the time to straighten that knowledge out, at least except at the cost of alterations in the ordering of my days that I am not in the least inclined to undertake.

So for a small part of my day I live under a comfortable rule of bland intellectual irresponsibility vis-à-vis the Great Issues of the Contemporary World, a rule that permits me to go off half-cocked with only slight and occasional compunction. But during most of my day—that portion of it that I spend in dealing

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with the Great and Not-So-Great Issues of the World between 1450 and 1650—I live under an altogether different rule. The commandments of that rule are:

1. Do not go off half cocked.
2. Get the story straight.
3. Keep prejudices about present-day issues out of this area.

The commandments are counsels of perfection, but they are not merely that; they are enforced by sanctions, both external and internal. The serried array of historical trade journals equipped with extensive book review columns provides the most powerful external sanction. The columns are often at the disposal of cantankerous cranks ever ready to expose to obloquy "pamphleteers" who think that Clio is an "easy bought mistress bound to suit her ways to the intellectual appetites of the current customer."[1] On more than one occasion I have been a cantankerous crank. When I write about the period between 1450 and 1650 I am well aware of a desire to give unto others no occasion to do unto me as I have done unto some of them.

The reviewing host seems largely to have lined up with the history-minded. This seems to be a consequence of their training. Whatever the theoretical biases of their individual members, the better departments of graduate study in history do not encourage those undergoing their novitiate to resolve research problems by reference to current ideological conflicts. Consequently most of us have been conditioned to feel that it is not quite proper to characterize John Pym as a liberal, or Thomas More as a socialist, or Niccolò Macchiavelli as a proto-Fascist, and we tend to regard this sort of characterization as at best a risky pedagogic device. Not only the characterization but the thought process that leads to it lie under a psychological ban; and thus to the external sanction of the review columns is added the internal sanction of the still small voice that keeps saying, "We really shouldn't do it that way."[2]

[1] *American Historical Review*, LI (1946), 487.

[2] I do not for a moment intend to suggest that current dilemmas have not suggested *problems* for historical investigation. It is obvious that such dilemmas are among the numerous and entirely legitimate points of origin of historical study. The actual issue, however, has nothing to do with the point of origin of historical studies, but with the mode of treatment of historical problems.

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The austere rule we live under as historians has some curious consequences. In my case one of the consequences is that my knowledge of the period around the sixteenth century in Europe is of a rather different order than my knowledge about current happenings. Those preponderant segments of my own day spent in the discussion, investigation and contemplation of that remote era may not be profitably spent but at least they are spent in an orderly, systematic, purposeful way. The contrast can be pointed up by a few details. I have never read the Social Security Act, but I have read the Elizabethan Poor Law in all its successive versions and moreover I have made some study of its application. I have never read the work of a single existentialist but I have read Calvin's *Institutes of the Christian Religion* from cover to cover. I know practically nothing for sure about the relation of the institutions of higher education in America to the social structure, but I know a fair bit about the relation between the two in France, England and the Netherlands in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. I have never studied the Economic Reports to the President that would enable me to appraise the state of the American nation in 1950, but I have studied closely Hales's *Discourse of the Commonwealth of England* and derived from it some reasonable coherent notions about the condition of England around 1550. Now the consequence of all this is inevitable. Instead of the passions, prejudices, assumptions and prepossessions, the events, crises and tensions of the present dominating my view of the past, *it is the other way about.* The passions, prejudices, assumptions and prepossessions, the events, crises and tensions of early modern Europe to a very considerable extent lend precision to my rather haphazard notions about the present. I make sense of present-day welfare-state policy by thinking of it in connection with the "commonwealth" policies of Elizabeth. I do the like with respect to the contemporary struggle for power and conflict of ideologies by throwing on them such light as I find in the Catholic-Calvinist struggle of the sixteenth century.

I am frequently made aware of the peculiarities of my perspective when I teach. The days of my students are very different from mine. They have spent little time indeed in

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contemplating the events of the sixteenth century. So when I tell them that the Christian Humanists, in their optimistic aspiration to reform the world by means of education, were rather like our own progressive educators, I help them understand the Christian Humanists. But my teaching strategy moves in the opposite direction from my own intellectual experience. The comparison first suggested itself to me as a means for understanding not Christian Humanism but progressive education. There is no need to labor this point. After all, ordinarily the process of thought is from the better known to the worse known, and in some respects I know a good bit more about the sixteenth century than I do about the twentieth. Perhaps there is nothing to be said for this peculiar way of thinking; it may be altogether silly; but in the immediate context I am not obliged to defend it. I present it simply as one of those brute facts of life dear to the heart of the present-minded. It is in fact one way that one historian's day affects his judgment.

In the controversy that provided the starting point of this rambling essay, the essential question is sometimes posed with respect to the relation of the historian to his own *day*. In other instances it is posed with respect to his relation to his own *time*. Having discovered how idiosyncratic was the day of one historian we may inquire whether his time is also peculiar. The answer is, "Yes, his time *is* a bit odd." And here it is possible to take a welcome leave of the first person singular. For, although my day is peculiar to me, my time, as a historian, is like the time of other historians.

For our purposes the crucial fact about the ordinary time of all men, even of historians in their personal as against their professional capacity, is that in no man's time is he *really* sure what is going to happen next. This is true, obviously, not only of men of the present time but also of all men of all past times. Of course there are large routine areas of existence in which we can make pretty good guesses; and if this were not so, life would be unbearable. Thus, my guess, five evenings a week in term time, that I will be getting up the following morning to teach classes at my place of employment provides me with a useful operating rule; yet it has been wrong occasion-

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ally, and will be wrong again. With respect to many matters more important, all is uncertain. Will there be war or peace next year? Will my children turn out well or ill? Will I be alive or dead thirty years hence? three years hence? tomorrow?

The saddest words of tongue or pen may be, "It might have been." The most human are, "If I had only known." But it is precisely characteristic of the historian that he does know. He is really sure what is going to happen next, not in his time as a pilgrim here below, but in his own time as a historian. The public servant Conyers Read, for example, when he worked high in the councils of the Office of Strategic Services did not know what the outcome of the maneuvers he helped plan would be. But for all the years from 1568 during which he painstakingly investigated the career of Francis Walsingham, the eminent Tudor historian Conyers Read knew that the Spanish Armada would come against England and that the diplomatic maneuvers of Mr. Secretary Walsingham would assist in its defeat. Somewhat inaccurately we might say that while man's time ordinarily is oriented to the future, the historian's time is oriented to the past. It might be better to say that while men are ordinarily trying to connect the present with a future that is to be, the historian connects his present with a future that has already been.

The professional historian does not have a monopoly of his peculiar time, or rather, as Carl Becker once put it, every man is on occasion his own historian. But the historian alone lives systematically in the historian's own time. And from what we have been saying it is clear that this time has a unique dimension. Each man in his own time tries to discover the motives and the causes of the actions of those people he has to deal with; and the historian does the like with varying degrees of success. But, as other men do not and cannot, the historian knows something of the results of the acts of those he deals with: this is the unique dimension of the historian's time. If, in saying that the historian cannot escape his own time, the present-minded meant this peculiarly historical time—which they do not—they would be on solid ground. For the circumstances are rare indeed in which the historian has no notion whatever

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of the outcome of the events with which he is dealing. The very fact that he is a historian and that he has interested himself in a particular set of events fairly assures that at the outset he will have some knowledge of what happened afterward.

This knowledge makes it impossible for the historian to do merely what the history-minded say he should do—consider the past in its own terms, and envisage events as the men who lived through them did. Surely he should try to do that; just as certainly he must do more than that simply because he knows about those events what none of the men contemporary with them knew; he knows what their consequences were. To see the events surrounding the obscure monk Luther as Leo X saw them—as another "monks' quarrel" and a possible danger to the perquisites of the Curia—may help us understand the peculiar inefficacy of Papal policy at the time; but that does not preclude the historian from seeing the same events as the decisive step toward the final breach of the religious unity of Western Civilization. We may be quite sure however that nobody at the time, not even Luther himself, saw those events that way. The historian who resolutely refused to use the insight that his own peculiar time gave him would not be superior to his fellows; he would be merely foolish, betraying a singular failure to grasp what history is. For history is a becoming, an ongoing, and it is to be understood not only in terms of what comes before but also of what comes after.

What conclusions can we draw from our cursory examination of the historian's own time and his own day? What of the necessity, alleged by the present-minded, of rewriting history anew each generation? In some respects the estimate is overgenerous, in one respect too niggardly. The necessity will in part be a function of the lapsed time between the events written about and the present. The history of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 may indeed need to be written over a number of times in the next few generations as its consequences more completely unfold. But this is not true of the Treaty of Madrid of 1527. Its consequences for better or worse pretty well finished their unfolding a good while back. The need for rewriting history is also a function of the increase in actual data on the thing to be

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written about. Obviously any general estimate of the rate of increase of such data would be meaningless. History also must be rewritten as the relevant and usable knowledge about man, about his ways and his waywardness, increases. Here again there has been a tendency to exaggerate the speed with which that knowledge is increasing. The hosannahs that have greeted many "master ideas" about man during the past fifty years seem more often than not to be a reflection of an urge toward secular salvation in a shaky world rather than a precise estimate of the cognitive value of the ideas in question. Frequently such "master ideas" have turned out to be plain old notions in new fancy dress, or simply wrong. Perhaps the imperative, felt by the present-minded, to rewrite history every generation is less the fruit of a real necessity than of their own attempts to write it always in conformity with the latest intellectual mode. A little less haste might mean a little more speed. For the person engaged in the operation it is all too easy to mistake for progress a process that only involves skipping from recent to current errors.

If, instead of asking how often history *must* or ought to be rewritten, we ask how often it *will* be rewritten, the answer is that it will be rewritten, as it always has been, from day to day. This is so because the rewriting of history is inescapably what each working historian in fact does in his own day. That is precisely how he puts in his time. We seek new data. We reëxamine old data to discover in them relations and connections that our honored predecessors may have missed. Onto these data we seek to bring to bear whatever may seem enlightening and relevant out of our own day. And what may be relevant is as wide as the full range of our own daily experience, intellectual, aesthetic, political, social, personal. Some current event may, of course, afford a historian an understanding of what men meant five hundred years ago when they said that a prince must rule through *amour et cremeur*, love and fear. But then so might his perusal of a socio-psychological investigation into the ambivalence of authority in Papua. So might his reading of Shakespeare's *Richard II*. And so might his relations with his own children.

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For each historian brings to the rewriting of history the full range of the remembered experience of his own days, that unique array that he alone possesses and is. For some historians that sector of their experience which impinges on the Great Crises of the Contemporary World sets up the vibrations that attune them to the part of the past that is the object of their professional attention. Some of us, however, vibrate less readily to those crises. We feel our way toward the goals of our historic quest by lines of experience having precious little to do with the Great Crises of the Contemporary World. He would be bold indeed who would insist that all historians should follow one and the same line of experience in their quest, or who would venture to say what this single line is that all should follow. He would not only be bold; he would almost certainly be wrong. History does not thrive in measure as the experience of each historian differs from that of his fellows. It is indeed the wide and varied range of experience covered by all the days of all historians that makes the rewriting of history—not in each generation but for each historian—at once necessary and inevitable.

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## LEVEL OF INFORMATION AND OPINION CONTENT

MANY students of political behavior as well as individuals actively engaged in practical politics have been concerned with the relation between level of information and the nature of political opinions.[1] It is probably true that some individuals would still contend that the opinions of highly informed persons necessarily tend to differ in content (if not in value) from those held by people whose information level is comparatively low. The necessity for a continuing refinement of the relationship between information and opinion is apparent as we continue to examine the problem empirically. The central purpose of this paper is to present empirical evidence supporting one refinement of the relationship between general level of acquired information and the content of opinion.

The three hypotheses listed below were examined as part of a detailed community study conducted in 1952 in Pittsfield, Massachusetts.[2] Within the limits of the Pittsfield Project, the following relationships were demonstrated:

1. If, regarding a specific political issue, there exists a generally known body of facts, or a widely accepted stereotype, and if the facts and stereotype are in agreement in terms of content, there will be little or no difference in the expressed opinions of individuals varying in level of information.[3]

[1] T. M. Newcomb, "Determinants of Opinion", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1937, No. 4, pp. 71–78; *id.*, *Personality and Social Change* (New York, 1943). G. H. Smith, "A Note on Information and Attitudes", *Journal of General Psychology*, 1947, vol. 37, pp. 193–198; *id.*, "Liberalism and Level of Information", *Journal of Educational Psychology*, 1948, vol. 39, pp. 66–81. F. Williams, "Information as a Determinant of Opinion", in H. Cantril, *Gauging Public Opinion* (Princeton, 1944).

[2] See P. K. Hastings, "Politics Laboratory—1952", *Journal of Higher Education*, 1953, vol. 24, pp. 12–17.

[3] In cases of this type, it might be argued that, although there is uniformity in opinion, it is probable that the bases for the opinion are different. The writer would assume that those individuals who are generally more informed are more likely to base their opinions on factual information while the opinions of people who are relatively less well informed are likely to be rooted in their acceptance of an existing stereotype. The Pittsfield Project data provide no clue as to which and how many respondents were aware, in a literal sense, of the existing factual informa-



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2. If, with regard to a specific political issue, the relevant facts are not readily accessible and, hence, not generally known, or if it is unlikely that there exists a prevailing and widely accepted stereotype, there is apt to be a significant difference in the expressed opinions of individuals varying in level of information.

3. Level of information is related to the fact of having any opinion at all on political issues.

The data leading to these conclusions were gathered in the first of four public opinion surveys conducted in Pittsfield between April and November 1952. The polls represented one phase of a community study carried out under the co-direction of the author and James M. Burns, Professor of Political Science at Williams College.

The ballot used in the first survey[4] contained thirteen items designed as an index of the respondent's level of political information. Ten questions, grouped together as parts of a single item, required the respondent to identify particular individuals in terms of their vocations. The ten people to be identified included both local and national leaders. This procedure seemed to have the advantages of holding question-type constant, and, since the items were presented as parts of a single question, of protecting the respondent's self-confidence should he not be able to answer all parts correctly. In the remaining three items, the respondents were asked the population of Pittsfield, the number of delegate votes necessary to nominate the Republican presidential candidate in 1952, and the number of United States Senators from each state. Table 1 contains a list of the above questions indicating in rank order the percentage of the sample answering each one correctly. Of the 362 respondents interviewed in the survey[5], 12 per cent answered

tion regarding the voting behavior of various traditionally politically stereotyped groups (see Table 2). Granting the validity of the information index used in the Pittsfield study, it would seem probable that the low information respondents were depending on something other than factual information in forming their opinions.

[4] The first survey was conducted at the time of the Massachusetts primary.

[5] A probability sampling technique was employed (completion percentage: 88 per cent).

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TABLE 1

INFORMATION QUESTIONS WITH PERCENTAGE ANSWERING EACH CORRECTLY

N = 362

Confidence limits:
0.99 — 14%
0.95 — 11%

| *Question* | *Per Cent Correct* |
|---|---|
| Dwight Eisenhower | 92 |
| Robert Taft | 91 |
| Robert Capeless* | 90 |
| John Callahan† | 84 |
| Estes Kefauver | 84 |
| Matthew Ridgway | 80 |
| Population of Pittsfield | 76 |
| Lawrence Miller‡ | 57 |
| Walter Reuther | 55 |
| Number of United States Senators from each state | 43 |
| Benjamin Fairless | 34 |
| Number of delegate votes necessary to nominate Republican presidential candidate | 23 |

* Mayor of Pittsfield.

† President of the local chapter of the IUE (the largest labor union in Pittsfield).

‡ Editor of *The Berkshire Evening Eagle* (the only local newspaper).

between 0 and 5 items correctly, 55 per cent knew the right answers to 6 through 10 of the questions, while 33 per cent were able to answer successfully from 11 through 13 of the items.[6]

The ballot also included questions dealing with issues of both local and national concern. The particular items to be examined with reference to the thesis of this paper are shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

The percentages in the "a" columns of Tables 2, 3 and 4

[6] As would be expected, a number of descriptive variables were found to be related to level of information. For example, positive correlations existed between level of information and level of formal education, occupation, and economic status. The following table contains illustrative data:

| *Level of information* | 0—5 (N = 43) | 6—10 (N = 199) | 11—13 (N = 120) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Grades 1–8 | 53% | 27% | 20% |
| Grades 9–12 | 37 | 49 | 43 |
| Part or all college | — | 18 | 30 |
| Other | 10 | 6 | 7 |

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would lead one to conclude that opinion content or direction consistently varies significantly with level of information. These results also reveal that as one moves toward the higher information levels, the number of individuals expressing no opinion decreases. Because of the considerable variability in the "no opinion" percentages, however, it would be fallacious to interpret the statistics in the "a" columns as necessarily indicating any real difference in opinion content between the level of information groups. It will be noted in the "b" columns of Table 2 that, after dropping out the "don't know" group, the apparent difference in opinion between the three levels of information disappears. In the "b" columns of Tables 3 and 4, however, there remains a significant difference in opinion content between the most highly informed respondents and those individuals less well informed.

The stereotypes (as well as the facts) involved in the first question (Table 2) are that the political behavior of immigrants, the wealthy, the poor, and Roman Catholics traditionally follows a particular direction in each case. Few would question either the prevalence of these stereotypes and/or the factual bases for them. It is probably a reasonable inference, however, that the individuals who scored comparatively low on the political information index used in the Pittsfield study did not have at their command the historical facts which lie at the roots of these commonly held stereotypes. The point at issue, however, is that essential agreement existed between all respondents regardless of information score. In the writer's judgment, the determining factor as level of information decreased was not knowledge of factual data, but rather the generally known and widely accepted stereotypes evoked by the question asked.

The second question under consideration (Table 3) dealt with a comparatively new issue regarding which relevant facts were probably not easily accessible, and in regard to which stereotypes had probably not yet developed.[7] The relation between

[7] It is possible that this item evoked some esoteric stereotype that prevailed primarily among the individuals composing the upper information group. The decision as to whether this is true is to a degree subjectively made. In the writer's opinion, it seemed unlikely that the comparatively recent, novel, and specific issue dealt with in the second question could have been stereotype-bound among a sub-sample of the Pittsfield population.

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level of information and the size of the "no opinion" percentages persists, but analysis of the respondents who express an opinion reveals a significant difference in opinion content or direction between the low and middle information groups in comparison to the most highly informed respondents. The individuals who constitute the former groups split about evenly on the issue

TABLE 2

"We would like to know whether, in your opinion, the following groups of Pittsfield people tend to vote Democratic, Republican, or Independent."

(a) Including the no opinion group
(b) Excluding the no opinion group

PART "A"

*People Earning Less Than $45 a Week*

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) | | 6–10 (N = 199) | | 11–13 (N = 120) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | |
| Democratic | 42 | 75 | 52 | 69 | 68 | 78 |
| Republican | 14 | 25 | 13 | 18 | 8 | 10 |
| Independent | — | — | 10 | 13 | 10 | 12 |
| Don't know | 44 | | 25 | | 14 | |

PART "B"

*Members of the Roman Catholic Church*

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) | | 6–10 (N = 199) | | 11–13 (N = 120) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | |
| Democratic | 33 | 74 | 45 | 69 | 58 | 73 |
| Republican | 2 | 5 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 9 |
| Independent | 9 | 21 | 13 | 20 | 14 | 18 |
| Don't know | 56 | | 34 | | 21 | |

PART "C"

*People of Italian Descent*

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) | | 6–10 (N = 199) | | 11–13 (N = 120) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) | (a) | (b) |
| | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | | *Per Cent* | |
| Democratic | 21 | 50 | 34 | 56 | 45 | 56 |
| Republican | 14 | 33 | 14 | 24 | 16 | 20 |
| Independent | 7 | 17 | 12 | 20 | 19 | 24 |
| Don't know | 58 | | 40 | | 20 | |

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PART "D"

*People Living in Ward 4 (for example Pomeroy or Crofut Streets)**

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 6–10 (N = 199) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 11–13 (N = 120) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Democratic | 2 | 7 | 7 | 10 | — | — |
| Republican | 33 | 93 | 64 | 88 | 93 | 98 |
| Independent | — | — | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Don't know | 65 | | 27 | | 5 | |

* A predominantly economic group "A" residential area of Pittsfield (known locally as the "silk stocking" ward).

TABLE 3

"To your way of thinking has the nonpartisan charter kept politics out of Pittsfield's city government?"

(a) Including the no opinion group
(b) Excluding the no opinion group

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 6–10 (N = 199) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 11–13 (N = 120) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 14 | 43 | 24 | 42* | 53 | 65* |
| No | 19 | 57 | 33 | 58 | 29 | 35 |
| Don't know | 67 | | 43 | | 18 | |

* Difference significant at the 0.99 probability level.

TABLE 4

"Would you say that labor unions, the IUE for example, in any way affect the way their members vote in elections?"

(a) Including the no opinion group
(b) Excluding the no opinion group

| Level of information | 0–5 (N = 43) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 6–10 (N = 199) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | | 11–13 (N = 120) (a) - (b) *Per Cent* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | 26 | 42* | 42 | 54 | 48 | 63* |
| No | 35 | 58 | 35 | 46 | 27 | 37 |
| Don't know | 39 | | 23 | | 25 | |

* Difference significant at the 0.99 probability level.

while the members of the latter group divided approximately two to one.

In the third item (Table 4), after dropping the "no opinion" respondents from all information groups, a significant difference

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in opinion content remained. In line with the thesis of this paper, the writer would interpret this finding as indicating that the information or facts relevant to the issue were not uniformly known and/or accepted by all respondents. In addition, it is unlikely that there accrues to this issue a widely accepted stereotype that fits what facts there are, and governs opinion content. It would seem reasonable to conclude that, in part, the obtained result reflects the differences in general level of political information represented in the three respondent groups.

It might be argued that the obtained differences in opinion are due to any one or a combination of basic causes: for example, difference in intelligence, ego-involvement with the particular issues under study, and differences in social and economic values. One would certainly have to look in many directions in searching for the "why" of an opinion. The writer's aim, however, is not to provide an analysis of the probable reasons for the specific answers given, but, rather, to present evidence in support of the thesis that information level is related to the content or direction of opinion only under certain specific conditions. In this instance, it is suggested that lack of a commonly held stereotype and/or relative nonaccessibility of factual information may be two such conditions.

In summary, the following conclusions would appear to be valid within the limits of the data gathered in the study of Pittsfield, Massachusetts:

1. If the issue about which individuals are asked to express an opinion evokes either a widely held stereotype or factual information, and if the facts and stereotype are not in contradiction to each other, level of information is irrelevant as a determinant of opinion.

2. Level of information is likely to be related to opinion content when neither a widely known body of facts nor a generally accepted stereotype is available.

3. Level of information is related to the fact of having an opinion of some kind, no matter what the nature of and basis for the opinion may be.

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# THE "CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS" AND CHANGING ALLIED-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

THE status of the Allies in Germany since the fateful day of surrender in May 1945 has undergone a number of significant changes. The first major phase in this development was characterized by absolute occupational control under military government, founded upon unconditional surrender and the complete absence of central German government.[1] The second phase was launched by the economic merger of the United States and United Kingdom zones of occupation on December 2, 1946, accompanied by the emergence of bizonal German governmental machinery possessing limited responsibility.[2]

The third phase, which formally came into existence on September 21, 1949, involved the complete amalgamation of the three Western occupation zones under the Allied High Commission, and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany enjoying substantial governmental powers based upon its own "national constitution" entitled the "Basic Law" (*Grundgesetz*). At the commencement of this period, military government came to an end in Western Germany. It was superseded by civil occupation, with the exercise by the Western Allies of only limited reserved authority, whereas all remaining governmental powers were turned over to the newly born West German government, as described more fully below.

The fourth major phase will come into existence when the Allied-West German agreements, signed in May 1952, come into effect.[3] By these undertakings the occupation of Western

[1] Integration of certain functions in the four occupation zones was sought to be achieved by the Allied Control Council—the ranking quadripartite organ established in Berlin by the four occupying Powers in 1945—which was subverted by the Soviet walkout in March 1948.

[2] This United States-United Kingdom amalgamation was consummated in the Washington Bizonal Fusion Agreement, also known as the Byrnes-Bevin Agreement.

[3] The state of war with Germany was separately terminated by certain of the Allies. "Termination of the State of War with Germany", Office of the U. S. High Commissioner for Germany (hereinafter referred to as HICOG), *8th Quarterly*



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Germany will be terminated and the Federal Republic will be integrated into the Western defense system. This congeries of agreements embraces two series, namely, the so-called contractual arrangements,[4] or the Allied-West German conventions, on the one hand, and the European Defense Community Treaty and supplementary agreements, on the other.

On May 26, 1952, the contractual agreements were signed in the *Bundesrat* chamber (the upper house of the West German Parliament) at Bonn, the West German capital, by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, and Chancellor-Foreign Minister Konrad Adenauer.[5] According to these conventions, when ratified, the West German Federal Republic is to acquire virtual independent status. Without purporting to constitute a final peace treaty either for the Federal Republic or for a unified Germany, the conventions seek to effect a basic modification in the fundamentals of Allied-West German relations as founded upon earlier undertakings. The following paragraphs briefly outline the changes in the nature of these relations, presenting both a survey of Allied reserved authority under the Allied High Commission and an analysis of the new relationship under the conventions of 1952.

## I. *Allied Authority under the Allied High Commission*

The authority of the quadripartite Allied Control Council was virtually all-inclusive. When the Allied High Commission came into existence for Western Germany in 1949, however, the allocation and exercise of governmental powers were changed markedly. Substantial functions were returned to German governmental institutions, and only a minimum of authority was retained by the occupying Powers.

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*Report on Germany*, July 1–Sept. 30, 1951, pp. 33–36; Josef L. Kunz, "Ending the War with Germany", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 46 (January 1952), pp. 114–119; Quincy Wright, "The Status of Germany and the Peace Proclamation", *ibid.* (April 1952), pp. 299–308.

[4] For a time, at Allied High Commission headquarters, these undertakings were not referred to either as "conventions" or "contractual agreements", but they rather were identified by the nebulous expression "contractual arrangements".

[5] Documents comprising the complex were signed in each of the official languages —English, French and German—there being a total of some 80 signatures applied to the agreements and supplementary instruments.

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The functions retained by the Allies in Western Germany under this arrangement were defined in a constitutive act called the Occupation Statute for Germany. It is a brief, general document negotiated by the three Western occupying Powers, which came into effect on September 21, 1949.[6] An interesting division of powers was thereby established, according to which all authority not expressly reserved to the occupying Allies was rendered exercisable by the German government according to its own constitutional arrangements.[7]

Briefly, the authority reserved to the Allies embraced the following general fields: foreign affairs, control over foreign trade and exchange, disarmament and demilitarization programs, civil aviation, restitution and reparations, decartelization and deconcentration of industry, control over foreign interests in Germany and claims against Germany, displaced persons and the admission of refugees, preservation of respect for the West German national and state constitutions, and maintaining the prestige and security of the Allied forces.[8]

Aside from the enjoyment of direct authority in these reserved fields, the Allies retained the power to review and approve German constitutional provisions, legislation and treaties.

[6] September 21, 1949, also marked the date on which the West German Federal Republic officially came into existence under its Basic Law. For the German text and an English translation of the Basic Law, see HICOG, *Basic Law and Occupation Statute* (1950), pp. 13–77; and for the German text with parallel coordinated English and French versions, Allied High Commission for Germany, Allied General Secretariat, *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany* (1951). Analyses of the negotiation of the Basic Law are found in Elmer Plischke, *The West German Federal Government* (Bad Godesberg-Mehlen, 1952), chap. 1; Carl J. Friedrich, "Rebuilding the German Constitution", *American Political Science Review*, vol. XLIII (June and August 1949), pp. 461–482, 704–720.

[7] Actually, the combined effect of the Basic Law, providing for a federal system involving an internal division of powers, and the Occupation Statute was to create a dual division of powers with total governmental authority divided among the Allies, the West German Federal government, and the West German state governments.

[8] The text of the Occupation Statute is given in HICOG, *Basic Law and Occupation Statute*, pp. 5–7; Elmer Plischke, *History of the Allied High Commission for Germany: Its Establishment, Structure, and Procedures* (Frankfurt am Main, 1950), Appendix 1, pp. 101–103; and *id.*, *Allied High Commission for Germany* (Bad Godesberg-Mehlen, 1953), Appendix 1, pp. 174–177, which also contains a more detailed discussion of the negotiation and nature of the Occupation Statute in chapters ii and v.

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Amendments to the Basic Law have required the express approval of the occupying Powers before becoming effective, whereas state constitutions, amendments thereof, federal and state legislation, and agreements made between the Federal Republic and foreign governments became effective twenty-one days after official receipt by the occupation authorities, unless previously disapproved by them.

Although the Allies retained only minimal authority, special provision has been made in the Occupation Statute to enable them to deal with an emergency. Thus, in cases where it is essential for purposes of maintaining security or preserving democratic government in Germany, or for the fulfilment of international obligations, the occupying Powers reserved to themselves the prerogative "to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise of full authority" in Western Germany.[9]

Subsequent to the establishment of this division of authority in September 1949, certain formal modifications of fundamental Allied-West German relations were put into effect. These were embodied in the Petersberg Protocol of November 1949,[10] the instruments formally revising the Occupation Statute of March 1951,[11] and several subsequent changes.[12] By and large, these increased West German powers by the negative process of further limiting Allied prerogatives.

[9] There is a brief, descriptive account of this phase of the occupation in "The Change from Military to Civilian Government", HICOG, *1st Quarterly Report on Germany*, Sept. 21–Dec. 31, 1949, pp. 1–2.

[10] The text of the Petersberg Protocol is given in HICOG, *1st Quarterly Report on Germany*, Appendix VII, pp. 69–71; Plischke, *Allied High Commission for Germany*, Appendix 3, pp. 179–183. There is a brief interpretation of the Petersberg Protocol in the Statement of General Sir Brian Robertson, United Kingdom High Commissioner, November 25, 1949, in Allied High Commission, Press Release No. 28 (November 25, 1949).

[11] For a more extended consideration of the negotiation and substance of these revision instruments, see Plischke, *Allied High Commission for Germany*, chaps. ii and v. A general account of the changed relationship is given in "The Federal Government Assumes Wider Powers", HICOG, *6th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 1951, pp. 35–39. The final texts of these revision documents were issued in Allied High Commission, Press Release No. 282 (March 6, 1951). The texts of the major instruments are found in Allied High Commission, *Official Gazette*, No. 49 (March 6, 1951), pp. 792–797; and Plischke, *Allied High Commission for Germany*, Appendices 4–7, pp. 184–191.

[12] Allied High Commission, Press Release No. 364 (October 19, 1951).

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## II. *Negotiation of the Allied-German Agreements*[13]

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Foreign Ministers of the three occupying Powers met simultaneously in Brussels on December 18 and 19, 1950.[14] Among other matters, they explored the question of associating Germany in the common defense effort of the West and the changes in occupation relationship which logically would flow from such an association. Because a peace treaty was not deemed to be possible at that time, in view of the Soviet position, it was their belief that the new relationships should be worked out between the Western occupation Powers and the Federal Republic as a series of "contracts".

Preliminary work on the contractual agreements was commenced on the Allied side in January 1951. Discussions were extended to include representatives of the German government by May 10, 1951. These consultations, largely of an exploratory character, resulted in the preparation of a fairly comprehensive report. On the basis of this report, the Foreign Ministers at their next meeting in Washington, September 10 to 14, 1951, directed the Allied High Commission to commence actual negotiations of mutually acceptable agreements with the West German government. They declared their purpose to transform the relationship completely between the Allies and Western Germany, and to include a democratic Germany as an equal and free partner in a continental European community, which

[13] The negotiation of the contractual agreements is briefly described in "The Contractual Agreements", HICOG, *10th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 29–34; and "Negotiations for the Contractual Agreements", HICOG, *Report on Germany*, Sept. 21, 1949–July 31, 1952, pp. 13–15.

[14] The communiqué on the Brussels meeting of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, issued on December 19, 1950, announced that, among other things, the North Atlantic Council reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the establishment of common defense, that German participation would strengthen the defense of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France were being invited to explore this matter with the German Federal government. For the text of the communiqué, see HICOG, *5th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Oct. 1–Dec. 31, 1950, Appendix VI, p. 114.

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itself would constitute a part of a constantly developing Atlantic community.[15]

A second report, evidencing a considerable measure of progress, was filed by the Allied High Commission in November 1951. It was reviewed by the Foreign Ministers at their session on November 22, 1951, at Paris, which meeting also was attended by Chancellor Adenauer in his capacity as the West German Foreign Minister.[16] At this conference the draft text of the Convention on Relations was agreed upon, which, as noted below, defines the fundamental principles upon which the network of contracts is founded.[17]

A subsequent meeting of the Foreign Ministers and the Chancellor was held in London on February 18 and 19, 1952. They reviewed the position reached in the parallel negotiations at Bonn (on the conventions) and at Paris (on the European Defense Community Treaty), and they reached agreement on outstanding issues arising from the negotiations in Germany. One of the principal problems was the working out of an acceptable German financial contribution, to be governed by a separate convention forming a part of the contractual agreements, but which also was designed to play an important rôle in Germany's participation in the European Defense Community. At this time the Foreign Ministers also announced that the conventions and the European Defense Community Treaty would constitute an integrated treaty structure, and they discussed the relationship between the European Defense Community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[18] Thereafter followed

[15] The text of the communiqué and an appended declaration issued by the Foreign Ministers on September 14, 1951 are given in HICOG, *8th Quarterly Report on Germany*, July 1–Sept. 30, 1951, Appendix I, pp. 85–87. Also see "New Phase of Allied Policy in Germany", *ibid.*, pp. 13–22.

[16] "Adenauer Joins the Western Foreign Ministers", HICOG, *9th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Oct. 1–Dec. 31, 1951, pp. 19–24.

[17] Signature and publication of this convention were deferred, however, pending the completion of the negotiation of the complementary conventions. Portions of the text of this general convention were described in the Foreign Ministers' communiqué, however. For its text, November 22, 1951, see *ibid.*, Appendix II, pp. 109–110.

[18] The text of the communiqué of the Foreign Ministers, February 19, 1952, is in HICOG, *10th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 1952, Appendix III, pp. 89–90.

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three months of virtually continuous negotiations, until the texts of all of the conventions and supplementary instruments ultimately were signed on May 26, 1952, as noted above.

The contractual agreements enter into force immediately upon (1) the deposit with the West German government by all four signatories of instruments of ratification of the four contractual conventions, and (2) the entry into force of the European Defense Community Treaty.[19] The latter, in turn, requires the ratification of its six signatories in order to become effective. The implementation of the contractual agreements therefore is contingent upon the prior—or at least simultaneous—effectuation of the European Defense Community Treaty.[20]

Delay in achieving ratification and implementation of the contractual agreements has been due primarily to procrastination on the part of France and Italy, although a number of serious issues also have arisen in Western Germany. The problem in the latter has concerned primarily the question whether the West German national government could constitutionally undertake the creation of a military establishment. French reluctance has been occasioned by a number of factors, principally internal political instability, desire to couple ratification of these treaties with a settlement of the Saar question with Western Germany, fear of eventual domination of the European Defense Community by Germany, and reluctance to commit France to a Western European system at the expense of altering the French position as a flexible global Power. The difficulty in Italy has been owing to delay in awaiting French action, desire to have the Trieste issue settled to Italy's advantage, and internal political instability.

As of April 15, 1954, the United States,[21] the United Kingdom,[22] and the West German Republic had ratified the con-

[19] Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 11.

[20] Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community, Art. 132.

[21] The Senate gave its approval on July 1, 1952 and the President ratified on August 2, 1952.

[22] The House of Lords approved on July 31, 1952, and the House of Commons did likewise on August 1; the ratification instrument was dated September 15, 1952.

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tractual agreements. Both chambers of the West German Parliament had given their approval by May 1953, but President Theodor Heuss withheld formal ratification until the spring of 1954 for reasons described below.[23] No ratification action has been taken by the French government.

A similar situation prevails concerning the European Defense Community Treaty. The Netherlands,[24] Belgium,[25] and Luxembourg[26] Parliaments have given their approval.

Both chambers of the West German Parliament have given their approval to the European Defense Community Treaty. Each of the parliamentary chambers acted upon this treaty and the contractual agreements simultaneously. But President Heuss deferred ratification pending the decision of the Constitutional Court concerning its constitutionality, a matter that is still undecided. Alternatively, action was initiated to amend the Basic Law, which was consummated by March 29, 1954. Consequently President Heuss deposited Western Germany's ratification instruments in Bonn and Paris on March 30. This may vitiate the necessity of the decision of the Constitutional Court.[27]

[23] The *Bundestag* (lower chamber) approved on March 19, 1953, and the *Bundesrat* (upper chamber) approved on May 15, 1953.

[24] The lower house approved on July 23, 1953, and the upper chamber acted favorably on January 20, 1954.

[25] The lower house approved on November 26, 1953, and the Senate gave its approval on March 12, 1954.

[26] The unicameral parliamentary chamber approved on April 7, 1954. The Luxembourg government, whose foreign policy generally follows that of Belgium in these matters, took no formal action until both chambers of the Belgian Parliament had acted favorably.

[27] Inasmuch as, prior to the 1953 elections, the Adenauer coalition lacked the political power to amend the Basic Law, which failed to delegate the defense authority to the central government, the political opposition (i.e., the Social Democratic party) challenged the constitutionality of the European Defense Community Treaty and submitted the question to the Constitutional Court. However, following the national election of 1953, when the Adenauer coalition increased its parliamentary strength and gained control of both legislative chambers, action was initiated to amend the Basic Law in order to eliminate this question of constitutionality. It is possible that, despite formal amendment of the Constitution, the Social Democrats nevertheless may press for a decision of the Constitutional Court on the validity of an action taken prior to the effectuation of the amendment.

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The greatest problem is that of achieving French and Italian ratification. The failure of the Soviet government to lure France from the Western "grand alliance" at the Berlin Conference of January-February 1954 may tend to hasten French approval, although additional negotiations may be necessary with respect to both France and Italy before they submit their ratifications. It is anticipated that the treaty will be debated in the parliaments of both countries in the spring or summer of 1954.

### III. *General Nature of the Agreements*

The contractual agreements are comprised of a general convention, three supplementary conventions, twelve annexes to the conventions, and twenty-four complementary letters—or a total of forty separate instruments.[28]

The first of these, the core of this complex of arrangements, is the "Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany", hereinafter referred to as the Convention on Relations. It is supplemented by two annexes, embodying a "Declaration of the Federal Republic on Aid to Berlin" and the "Charter of the Arbitration Tribunal".

The accompanying conventions include the "Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising out of the War and the Occupation", or the Convention on Settlement; the "Convention on the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the Federal Republic of Germany", or the Forces Convention; and the "Finance Convention".

The Convention on Relations, in brief, constituting the basic agreement, establishes the principles on which the new Allied-West German relationships are founded, and provides for the retention by the three Powers, by reason of the existing international situation, of certain limited rights, described below. It provides that disagreements arising under the conventions are to be submitted to the Arbitration Tribunal, to be located in the Federal Republic. The Charter of the Tribunal, which

[28] For the full texts of these documents, see Senate Executives Q and R, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, June 2, 1952, pp. 9-165; and HICOG, Office of the Executive Secretary, *Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany and Related Conventions* (Bonn, Germany, no date).

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establishes this agency's procedures and jurisdiction, as noted, is annexed to the convention.

The Convention on Settlement is designed to facilitate the transition from Allied to German control. Allied programs in Germany previously were governed not only by the national policy of each of the three Allied Powers toward Germany, but also by the provisions of certain international agreements to which the three Powers were signatories. In providing for the return to the Germans of autonomy over their internal and external affairs, the Allies found it necessary to incorporate contractual provisions for the completion of such programs. Eventual responsibility for such completion thus is handed over to the Federal Republic, which will act in accordance with its constitutional prerogatives (as far as internal governmental responsibility under the West German division of powers is concerned) and the contractual agreements. In addition, in this convention, the Federal Republic agrees to accept the validity of Allied actions taken in the implementation of their occupation responsibilities. Certain phases of these responsibilities, turned over to the German government, are described below.

The Forces Convention furnishes the legal basis for the modification of the Allied-German relationship from one of occupation to one of mutual defense, as far as the presence of foreign military forces in Western Germany, together with their logistic support, is concerned. It deals with such matters as civil and criminal jurisdiction over members of the forces, the applicability to them of German taxation, the protection of their security by German authorities, the procedures governing their procurement of necessary goods, services and accommodations, and the like.

The Finance Convention comprises the understanding reached relative to the global sum to be contributed by the Federal Republic to Western defense, and the procedures by which the sum is to be allocated and utilized. The dual responsibility of the Federal Republic for contributing toward the support of the United States and United Kingdom forces stationed in Western Germany and for the fulfilment of its obligations as a member of the European Defense Community was recognized

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by all parties and was duly taken into account in determining the provisions of this agreement.[29]

These conventions are supplemented by, and integrated with, the "Treaty Constituting the European Defense Community"—or the EDC Treaty—negotiated in Paris. It was signed there on May 27, 1952—the day following the signing ceremony at Bonn—by the representatives of six Western European continental states, including Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the West German Federal Republic. It is accompanied by a series of protocols, conventions, and exchanges of notes, comprising some sixteen instruments.[30]

The EDC Treaty is designed, according to former Secretary Acheson, primarily to strengthen Western defense and to safeguard the peace. It represents a far-reaching step toward the consolidation of the free nations of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic. It makes possible a German military contribution to the common defense without the creation of a national German military establishment. In it the member states agree to merge their armed forces under common supranational institutions and to place the European defense forces thus created at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.[31]

## IV. *Modification of Authority in Allied-German Relations under the Conventions*

According to Article 2 of the Convention on Relations, the three Western Allies "retain, in view of the international situation, the rights heretofore exercised or held by them, relating to (a) the stationing of armed forces in Germany and the protection of their security, (b) Berlin, and (c) Germany as a whole, including the unification of Germany and a peace settlement."

By this general convention, supplemented by the lengthy Forces Convention, the three Western Powers retain authority to maintain armed forces in Western Germany beyond the date

[29] A brief description of these undertakings is given in "The Contractual Agreements", HICOG, *10th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 1952, pp. 29–34.

[30] For the full texts, see Senate Executives Q and R, pp. 167–251.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

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on which the contractual agreements come into effect. But they agree that the mission of these forces in the federal territory "will be the defense of the free world, of which the Federal Republic and Berlin form part." They undertake to "consult with the Federal Republic, insofar as the military situation permits, regarding the stationing of such armed forces in the Federal territory."[32]

Berlin is not an integral part of the West German Federal Republic. It is governed by the Berlin government and the Allied Kommandatura; the latter remains theoretically quadripartite, although *de facto* it has been tripartite since the Soviet representatives walked out in 1948.[33] The contractual arrangements with Western Germany do not directly modify the basic position of the Western Allies in Berlin, and they consequently continue to exercise greater fundamental authority there than they do in Western Germany. Furthermore, the existence of Allied authority with respect to this city is founded upon the original surrender and Allied agreements, rather than upon negotiated contracts.

Because of the division of Germany, and the original agreements with the Soviet Union concerning the occupation of all of Germany, the Western Allies have not surrendered their right by the conventions of May 1952 with respect to the reunification question and the matter of negotiating, together with the Soviet government, of a final peace settlement for all of Germany.[34]

The Convention on Relations provides that an essential aim of Allied-West German policy "is a peace settlement for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace." However, pending such a settlement, the three Allied Powers and the Federal Republic agree to "cooperate to achieve,

[32] Convention on Relations, Arts. 4, 5.

[33] A detailed analysis of the post-war government of Berlin is provided in Elmer Plischke, *Berlin: Development of Its Government and Administration* (Bad Godesberg-Mehlen, 1952).

[34] It is of significance, perhaps, to recall that in Paragraph 2 of the United Nations Declaration, January 1, 1942, it was multilaterally agreed that "Each Government pledges itself . . . not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies."

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by peaceful means, their common aim of a unified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic," and that the reunited Germany be "integrated within the European Community."

In the event of reunification, the three Allied Powers agree, subject to such adjustments as may be decided upon, to extend to a unified Germany the rights which the Federal Republic acquires under the 1952 conventions. The Allied governments further assure the Federal Republic that, for their part, the rights of Western Germany under the treaties for the formation of an integrated European Community "should be similarly extended, upon the assumption by such a unified Germany of the obligations of the Federal Republic toward the Three Powers or to any of them" under these conventions and treaties.[35]

The three Western Powers therefore commit themselves to seek the extension of the system provided by these conventions for Western Germany to the whole of Germany upon reunification. The Federal Republic, in turn, agrees that, except by common consent of all of the signatory states, it "will not conclude any agreement or enter into any arrangement which would impair the rights of the Three Powers under those Conventions and Treaties or lessen the obligations of the Federal Republic thereunder."[36]

As far as the Allied reserved powers are concerned, certain of the functions provided for in the Occupation Statute are terminated completely by the conventions. Among these are disarmament and demilitarization, as explained below; controls in regard to the Ruhr;[37] and the foreign affairs of Germany, except as certain aspects of the latter are governed by new provisions embodied in the conventions.[38]

[35] For additional comment on the reunification question, see "Obstacles to German Unity", HICOG, *3rd Quarterly Report on Germany*, Apr. 1–June 30, 1950, pp. 39–43; "Germany's Unification", HICOG, *6th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Jan. 1–Mar. 31, 1951, pp. 19–28; "German Unity", HICOG, *9th Quarterly Report on Germany*, Oct. 1–Dec. 31, 1951, pp. 33–36.

[36] Convention on Relations, Art. 7.

[37] This matter was resolved to a considerable extent by West German joining of the International Authority for the Ruhr and subsequently of the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan).

[38] Occupation Statute, Pars. 2 (a), 2 (b), and 2 (c), respectively.

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The continuing aspects of other functions reserved to the Allies under the Occupation Statute are dealt with in various ways in the contractual agreements. In the case of some of these, the Allies relinquish authority, and the functions are reconstituted as commitments undertaken by the Federal government, of which the following are among the more important.

For example, authority in civil aviation matters[39] is released to the Federal Republic, subject to a number of limitations specified in the Convention on Settlement.[40]

The Allies also transfer authority concerning restitution matters. The Federal Republic accepts responsibility for internal restitution by assuming "the obligation to implement fully and expeditiously and by every means in its power" existing Allied legislation to restitute identifiable property to victims of Nazi oppression, and it also "acknowledges the obligation to assure . . . adequate compensation" to victims of Nazi persecution. In providing such compensation the Federal Republic undertakes "that legislation in this field . . . shall in the future be not less favorable to claimants than the legislation now in force" under the Allied High Commission.[41] As far as external restitution is concerned, on the other hand, the Federal government agrees to establish an administrative agency to "search for, recover, and restitute" various types of property which, during the occupation of any territory, were removed by the forces or authorities of Germany or its allies.[42]

Former Allied functions relative to decartelization and deconcentration of industry will be relinquished when effective German federal legislation is enacted. In the meantime, pending the implementing of German enactments, specified Allied legislation remains in effect and continues to be implemented by agencies of the Allied Powers. Such Allied legislation pertains to former Reich-owned motion-picture property, large banking and credit institutions (*Grossbanken*), coal mining, the iron and steel industries, and the I. G. Farben Company.[43]

[39] *Ibid.*, Par. 2 (a).
[40] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 12.
[41] *Ibid.*, Chaps. 3, 4.
[42] *Ibid.*, Chap. 5.
[43] *Ibid.*, Chap. 2.

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With respect to "foreign interests in Germany", the Federal Republic assumes various responsibilities, including the maintenance in force of prescribed Allied and West German legislation concerning such matters as nondiscrimination against foreign property, rights or interests, and exemption of foreign interests from certain exceptional taxes.[44]

The Allies also yield authority to the Federal Republic in the field of displaced persons and refugees. The Federal government undertakes commitments in the conventions to continue existing Allied and German programs, embracing the enforcement of existing German legislation, the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the International Status of Refugees, and the enactment of legislation to provide for asylum to political refugees.[45]

In dealing with the question of claims, the Allies relinquish their former blanket authority. But, in the contractual agreements the Federal government accepts responsibility for the orderly settlement of claims against Germany.[46] On the other hand, it assumes the assurance not to take any action in conflict with existing Allied legislation regarding the matter except with the approval of the Allies.[47]

The provisions of the Occupation Statute[48] which reserve to the Allies authority to control the care and treatment in German prisons of persons charged before or sentenced by the courts or tribunals of the occupying Powers are revised in the conventions. Thus, it is provided that all judgments and decisions in both criminal and noncriminal matters rendered in Germany by any judicial authority of the Allied Powers "shall remain final and valid for all purposes under German law" and "shall be treated as such by German courts and authorities." Furthermore,

[44] *Ibid.*, Chap. 10.

[45] *Ibid.*, Chap. 7.

[46] In this connection, the Federal government reaffirms its agreement with the Allies on the matter of external debts embodied in an exchange of letters of March 6, 1951. For the text of these letters, see the Convention on Settlement, Annex to Chap. 8.

[47] *Ibid.*, Chap. 8. In addition, the Federal Republic agrees that no governmental claims will be asserted on behalf of Germans prior to the peace settlement; *ibid.*, Chap. 9, Art. 2.

[48] Occupation Statute, Par. 2 (i).

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"German authorities will confine in German institutions until the termination of their sentences persons, other than members of the [Allied] Forces . . ., who have been or shall be sentenced by" any Allied tribunal.

Clemency in the future becomes a joint matter, however, to be handled by a Mixed Clemency Advisory Board comprised of an equal number of Allied and German members for purposes of recommending clemency to the Power concerned, but the Federal Republic "shall have the exclusive right to make final decisions" in matters of clemency "regarding German nationals."[49] Furthermore, a Mixed Board, comprised of three Allied and three German members, is created to make recommendations for clemency with respect to persons convicted by an Allied tribunal of "crimes against humanity or against the laws and usages of war or crimes committed during the war, commonly referred to as 'war crimes'," and who are confined in German prisons.[50]

The final Allied reserved power, concerned with the protection, prestige and security of the Allied forces and personnel, and their immunities,[51] is retained in the contractual agreements. But, whereas it formerly was prescribed by the Allies under their authority as occupants, it now is rewritten in substantial detail in the jointly negotiated Forces Convention.

The authority of the Allies under the Occupation Statute to approve German constitutional provisions, legislation and new treaties[52] is deleted from the contractual agreements. Retention of this function by the Allies would be inconsistent with the new relationship of the Allies and the Federal Republic.

Certain provisions regarding the future treatment of existing Allied legislation are made in the conventions, however. Both federal and state authorities are empowered to repeal or amend enactments of the occupation authorities except as otherwise provided in the conventions. But legislation enacted by the

[49] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 1, Arts. 5, 7.

[50] *Ibid.*, Chap. 1, Art. 6.

[51] Occupation Statute, Par. 2 (e).

[52] *Ibid.*, Par. 5. These *new* treaties must not be confused with *former* Reich treaties rendered applicable to the West German Federal Republic, to which reference is made in the final section of this article.

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Control Council—the quadripartite agency functioning in Berlin for all of Germany until the Soviet walkout in 1948—is not subject to *repeal* or *amendment*. However, in the conventions the three Allied Powers delegate to the Federal Republic the right to *deprive of effect* within its territory, after consultation in each case with the three Powers, all such Control Council legislation as is not required to be maintained in force by other provisions of the conventions.[53]

In addition to the commitments reviewed above, the Federal Republic agrees in the conventions "to conduct its policy in accordance with the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and with the aims defined in the Statute of the Council of Europe."[54] Furthermore, it undertakes to "associate itself fully with the community of free nations through membership in international organizations contributing to the common aims of the free world."[55]

A number of Allied-German practices with respect to diplomatic representation are defined in the Convention on Relations, prescribing commitments for Allied assistance to Western Germany. For example, the three Allied Powers agree to support the applications of the Federal Republic to join international organizations. This, in effect, simply continues a practice that had been established during the Allied High Commission period.[56]

Again, in their negotiations with states with which the Federal Republic maintains no formal relations, the three Allied Powers

[53] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 1, Art. 1.

[54] Convention on Relations, Art. 3, Par. 1.

[55] *Ibid.*, Art. 3, Par. 2.

[56] During the Allied High Commission period, to the time of the signing of the conventions, the Federal Republic joined some 20 to 25 international organizations. Among the more important are the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan), the International Authority for the Ruhr (subsequently disestablished), the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, and the European Payments Union, as well as various United Nations specialized agencies, including the International Labor Organization, the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organization. For more detailed information see Elmer Plischke, "Reactivation of Prewar German Treaties", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 48 (April 1954), and *id.*, *Allied High Commission for Germany*, chap. x.

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undertake to "consult with the Federal Republic concerning matters directly involving its political interests." At the request of the Federal government, the three Western Powers agree to represent the interests of the Federal Republic in relations with other states and in various international organizations and conferences, whenever the Federal Republic is not in a position to do so itself.[57]

Finally, as pointed out above, the Occupation Statute contains the resumption-of-authority provision, enabling the occupation Powers, acting under instructions from their governments, to resume the exercise of full authority under certain limited circumstances. This principle per se is not retained in the contractual agreements, but it is superseded by a qualified right of the Allies to exercise emergency powers within German territory.

Thus, it is provided that, "in the exercise of their right to protect the security of the armed forces stationed in the Federal territory," in case the Federal Republic and the European Defense Community are unable to deal with a security emergency, the three Allied Powers may, "after consultation to the fullest extent possible with the Federal Government, proclaim a state of emergency in the whole or any part of the Federal Republic." Thereupon they "may take such measures as are necessary to maintain or restore order and to ensure the security of the Forces." But the three Powers agree to "consult the Federal Government to the fullest extent possible while the state of emergency continues."[58]

## V. *Significance of the Agreements*

Former United States High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy, made the following comment in evaluating the conventions in his final report to the Secretary of State:

> The Contractual Agreements signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, are perhaps without precedent in international life. They serve most of the purposes of a peace treaty and yet are not a peace treaty. While they liquidate the war and end the Occupation, they provide

[57] Convention on Relations, Art. 3, Par. 4.
[58] *Ibid.*, Art. 5, Pars. 1–5.

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> for the continuance of large bodies of foreign troops on German soil in a defense capacity. They change a great nation overnight from the position of a defeated and occupied enemy to that of friend and partner.[59]

That this complex of understandings is not intended to constitute a final peace settlement is clearly indicated in the text of the conventions.[60] As a matter of fact, several important questions normally dealt with in a peace treaty are not provided for in these agreements. In the first place, the determination of the boundaries of Germany is deferred until a final settlement is achieved.[61] Secondly, the question of reparations, usually constituting a vital element of a peace settlement, is similarly deferred.[62]

Thirdly, whereas it has been customary for a victor to disarm the vanquished Power by specific arms limitation provisions embodied in its peace treaty, no such provision is incorporated into the conventions of 1952. Although authority to effect demilitarization and disarmament was provided for under the Occupation Statute,[63] in view of the cold war situation, one of the very purposes of the 1952 agreements is quite the opposite, namely, to provide for German military as well as financial and

[59] HICOG, *Report on Germany*, Sept. 21, 1949–July 31, 1952, p. 15.

[60] Convention on Relations, Art. 7, Par. 1; also see Convention on Settlement, Chap. 6, Art. 1, Par. 1, and Chap. 9, Arts. 1, 2, and 3. For additional comment on the general question, see Hans Kelsen, "Is a Peace Treaty with Germany Legally Possible and Politically Desirable?", *American Political Science Review*, vol. XLI (December 1947), pp. 1188–1193.

[61] Convention on Relations, Art. 7, Par. 1. Furthermore, Allied approval is rendered necessary to modify the legislation fixing the provisional boundaries of the Federal Republic; see the Convention on Settlement, Chap. 1, Art. 1, Par. 1. The territory of the Federal Republic is not defined in its Basic Law, except in that the latter is deemed provisionally to apply to nine (originally eleven) specified states (Art. 23), and provision is made for internal territorial reorganization (Art. 29).

[62] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 6. In making this stipulation, the three Allied Powers guarantee "that they will at no time assert any claim for reparation against the current production of the Federal Republic" (Chap. 6, Art. 1). Certain provisional arrangements are included in the Convention on Settlement pending final treaty settlement (Chap. 6, Art. 2), and a number of assurances are required of the German government regarding Allied treatment of external German assets (Chap. 6, Arts. 3, 4).

[63] Par. 2 (a).

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economic contributions to the joint European military establishment and in assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Fourthly, it has been customary in the recent past to incorporate into peace treaties provisions requiring the compulsory revival of specified former multipartite treaties and empowering each of the victorious Powers to determine unilaterally the bilateral agreements with the defeated Power it wishes to have revived. No clear-cut provision to this effect has been incorporated into the conventions, nor is there any stipulated reservation of this subject for eventual determination in the final settlement. The principal reason for this, perhaps, is that a procedure had been launched during the Allied High Commission period for the application to Western Germany of former Reich treaties and agreements, which program was well under way by the time that the conventions were signed.[64] The question of the reapplication of former German treaties to a reunited Germany may very well need to be reopened at the time of the final peace settlement, however.

Another major point of interest in the conventions, perhaps, evidencing the joint character of the future relations of Western Germany and the Allies, is the relatively large number of joint Allied-German tribunals and boards created by the conventions. Seven of these are of a purely administrative nature. These include a "Board of Review", to consider certain petitions in effecting the decartelization and deconcentration programs with respect to coal mining and the iron and steel industries;[65] a "Mixed Committee", to consider applications for extensions of the final deadline for the disposition of securities in connection with particular decartelization and deconcentration programs;[66] a "Standing Commission", to guarantee effective coördination between civil and military air activities in Western Germany;[67] a "Joint Supply Board", responsible for establishing by agreement periodical programs for the procurement of the require-

[64] For a more extended account on this subject, see Plischke "Reactivation of Prewar German Treaties", *loc. cit.*

[65] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 2, Art. 4, Par. 6 (a).

[66] *Ibid.*, Chap. 2, Art. 5.

[67] Forces Convention, Art. 17, Par. 8.

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ments of military forces stationed in Germany and of the European Defense Community, and for resolving differences in implementing supply and service programs;[68] two "Mixed Commissions", concerned respectively with investigating the compatibility of German labor law and the military needs of the forces stationed in Germany and with investigating the validity of dismissals of employees of such military forces;[69] and a "Coordinating Committee", to reconcile procedures for auditing accounts involved in German contributions under the Finance Convention.[70]

Again, as noted above, two joint boards are established to deal with clemency matters—a "Mixed Board", responsible for recommending clemency with regard to persons convicted by Allied tribunals in Western Germany of war crimes or crimes against humanity,[71] and a "Mixed Clemency Advisory Board", empowered to recommend clemency with respect to persons convicted in other criminal matters by Allied judicial agencies in Germany.[72]

In addition, three major judicial and arbitral agencies are provided for in the contractual agreements, each of which is based upon its own constitutive act annexed to the conventions. These embrace a "Supreme Restitution Court", to replace the three Allied zonal restitution tribunals;[73] an "Arbitral Commission on Property, Rights and Interests in Germany", to exercise appeals jurisdiction in certain disputes involving external restitution or foreign interests in Germany;[74] and the general "Arbitration Tribunal". The last-named is the highest-level joint judicial agency created by the contractual agreements, and it possesses final judicial jurisdiction. It is competent to decide all disputes arising between the three Allied Powers and the Federal Republic under the provisions of the conventions

[68] *Ibid.*, Art. 39, Par. 2.

[69] *Ibid.*, Art. 44, Pars. 3, 8, and 10.

[70] Finance Convention, Art. 6, Par. 3.

[71] Convention on Settlement, Chap. 1, Art. 6.

[72] *Ibid.*, Chap. 1, Art. 7, Par. 5.

[73] *Ibid.*, Chap. 3, Art. 6, and Annex to Chap. 3.

[74] *Ibid.*, Chap. 5, Art. 7; Chap. 10, Art. 12; and Annex to Convention on Settlement.

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which the parties are unable to settle by negotiation (except for disputes specifically excluded from its jurisdiction by the conventions).[75]

The legal status of the West German Federal Republic under the conventions is an interesting one.[76] It clearly is not identical with the former German Reich. It is a new state, not by virtue solely of the contractual agreements, but as a result of a combination of documents, embracing the Basic Law and the whole series of instruments whereby authority was released by the Allies to the German government. As described above, the latter include the Occupation Statute, the Petersberg Protocol, the documents revising the Occupation Statute, and eventually the conventions of 1952—all of which have contributed to the establishment and modification of Allied authority under the complex division of powers existing in Western Germany.

As a new state, the Federal Republic is a successor state to the German Reich, but not the sole or complete successor. It is not a fully sovereign state in view of the powers which continue to be reserved to the Allies, particularly the right to declare a state of emergency, but these reserved rights cease to be occupation powers, and become contractual concessions.

The conventions of 1952 do not pretend to create a definitive post-war settlement. They provide the basis for the current phase in the relations of the Allies and Western Germany. Future revision therefore is provided for in the Convention on Relations. The presumption of revision exists, of course, in the event of the negotiation of a final peace settlement for the whole of Germany.[77] More specifically, however, the Western Powers and the Federal Republic agree to review the terms of the conventions either "upon the request of any one of them, in the event of the unification of Germany or the creation of a European federation; or upon the occurrence of any other event

[75] Convention on Relations, Art. 9, and Annex B to Convention on Relations.

[76] For additional comment on the status of Germany, see Kurt v. Laun, "The Legal Status of Germany", *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 45 (April 1951), pp. 267–285; also Josef L. Kunz, "The Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany", *ibid.*, vol. 47 (January 1953), pp. 112–114.

[77] Convention on Relations, Art. 7.

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which all of the Signatory States recognize to be of a similarly fundamental character."[78]

In addition, separate clauses concerned with revision are incorporated into the Forces and Finance Conventions. In the first of these, it is stipulated that, without prejudice to the revision provisions of the Convention on Relations, the Forces Convention "may be reviewed at the request of one of the Signatory States at any time after two years after its entry into force."[79] The Finance Convention, on the other hand, provides that "at the request of any of the Signatory States discussions may be opened to amend or abrogate any of the Articles of the present Convention, especially if agreements between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defense Community make such modification necessary or desirable."[80]

In conclusion, when the contractual agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty come into effect, the legal status and political situation of Western Germany will be transformed considerably. Its status as a quasi-independent republic under limited but imposed post-war civilian occupation, with limited reserved authority exercised—or at least exercisable—by the occupying Powers on the basis of a legal relationship founded upon unconditional surrender, will terminate. The Federal Republic will exercise full governmental authority, except as restricted only by the conventions, which are mutually negotiated rather than unilaterally imposed. Legally speaking, the Federal Republic therefore emerges virtually as an equal partner of the West. This creates a *de jure* status which, as a matter of international politics, it will be very difficult to undo by an eventual peace treaty with a reunited Germany.

Furthermore, should the final peace settlement be deferred indefinitely, or at least for an extended period, the present conventions will tend more and more to serve as a final peace settlement for Western Germany. Only a very few matters normally dealt with in a peace treaty are not already taken care of or provided for by legal commitment. The principal re-

[78] *Ibid.*, Art. 10.

[79] Forces Convention, Art. 51.

[80] Finance Convention, Art. 16.

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maining issues include boundary settlements and reparations. Except for the Saar issue with France, the boundary problem is with the Soviet Union and Poland and concerns Eastern Germany, and therefore it is not a problem which can, or need be, resolved between the Western Allies and the Federal Republic. The more intense the East-West struggle becomes, and the more intimately Western Germany is integrated into the Western system, the more embarrassing will be the levying of reparations demands upon Western Germany. In the absence of a final peace settlement with a united Germany, the question of reparations consequently is likely to recede more and more into oblivion.

* * *

The situation that would ensue in the event of the failure to ratify and implement the contractual agreements, together with the European Defense Community Treaty, is difficult to hypothesize. The United States government has repeatedly indicated that it considers such effectuation to be imperative, and it has asserted that if ratification is not forthcoming it will need to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of its policy.

Should it be impossible to achieve French acquiescence to these undertakings, it nevertheless appears unlikely that the preëxisting *status quo* of the occupation Powers in Western Germany, based upon the Occupation Statute system, can be continued indefinitely. It is arguable that a *fait accompli*—psychological and moral, if not legal and political—has been achieved, from which retreat will be difficult and, perhaps, undesirable.

Joint implementation, on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom, of the principles contained in the contractual agreements by separate understanding with Western Germany, in the absence of French concurrence—or, alternatively, French refusal to permit the progress envisaged by the Allied-West German negotiations and embodied in the contractual agreements and the European Defense Community Treaty ultimately to be consummated—may very well endanger the entire Western security system in Europe. Reasonable and

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mutually acceptable alternatives, therefore, appear to be far less readily available than is often conceived to be the case.

Continued procrastination or the time-consuming negotiation of a completely new arrangement runs the frequently uncalculated risk of engendering the demand for a more independent policy on the part of an increasingly powerful Western Germany.

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# HUMAN NATURE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT

## Reconciliation of the Ages of Reason and Science*

MAN'S belief in reason, science and himself has been seriously shaken, of late, by organized mass brutality in the world. His resulting despair and embrace of authoritarianism are painful to many students of the social sciences. However, a reversal of the trend can hardly be expected unless we offer a scientific theory of human values, morality and behavior which is persuasive enough to convince man that greatest progress is forthcoming through reason and science. It is not enough to warn men that despair will result in the loss of higher values still cherished. This begs the question, which is, in fact, whether or not any higher values actually exist other than in a relativistic sense. In searching for an acceptable, convincing theory let us start with this very question: Is there a scientific higher value?

If there is no absolute human value in nature, then our search has ended with the necessary admission that all is relative; there is no scientific truth in this field. In answer are we not adequately certain that one absolute human value does exist in nature to rest our reliance upon, that is, life-preservation? We must confess that we do not know all that we should know about this value; for, though it is most definitely composed of the element, self-preservation, it is also modified or enhanced in some uncertain way by the closely related factor, species—or offspring-preservation. Limited by this subtle uncertainty, we can safely say that man like any other biological organism values, first and foremost in nature, his life. Faced with a choice between life and anything else he will impulsively choose the former. Man may kill himself; he may choose death in preference to a life of hardship or dishonor; but this is a conscious choice, not a natural one. The natural preference to live will voice itself even in the death struggle of the suicide. This

* This brief article was occasioned by the reading of the article by Merle Curti, "Human Nature in American Thought: Retreat from Reason in the Age of Science", in this Quarterly, December 1953.



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apparently is the nature of man in spite of environment, culture or any possible desire to be otherwise. If so, then we have taken the first step successfully. Man *does* have an absolute value; all is not relative.

More than this about absolute human values it is impossible to say with much hope of agreement. However, we have additional and closely related knowledge regarding the nature of man, revealing the existence of certain mechanistic or unconscious drives. It appears that we cannot agree whether these mechanistic factors should be called instincts, drives, characteristics or something else; nor can we agree upon the number of them; but we are sufficiently certain that they do exist and are of apparently two different types: the hate and fear type on one side, the love-sympathy type on the other.

Summarizing to this point, we have noted, first, that man has an absolute value in nature, self-species-preservation; and, second, that he has certain innate, mechanistic drives. Let us now add two related and relevant social-scientific facts of which we are all generally aware but to which we have devoted inadequate attention. First, our mechanistic drives are not fixed, unalterable quantities, but are, on the contrary, highly sensitive to stimulation and development. Second, these drives are the source of many, if not most, of our sub-values, and, in turn, of morality in human relations.

William James revealed deep appreciation of both of these points in his vivid story of the little boy and the toad. The little boy sees a fat hopping toad. He takes a stone and smashes the little creature. As he watches it die something in the expression of the dying toad's clasped hands suggests the meanness of the act, and reminds him of remarks he has heard about the sufferings of animals being like his own. This thought stimulates the child's sympathy instincts and may affect not only his future toad relations but also the total pattern of his future conduct and personality.[2]

This story illustrates well both bits of knowledge: human drives are the foundation of human values, and they are easily stimulated and developed to a degree that will have significant

[2] William James, *The Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1896), vol. 2, pp. 390 *et seq.*, 410, 422, 426.

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influence upon human behavior. Add to these key facts the one which inspired the age of reason, that is, that man has reason, and our factual picture is almost complete. We need now to analyze and synthesize our knowledge into a complete theory and realize enough to justify action upon it.

Darwin showed that man's natural value, life, is protected by his natural drives. Hate and fear obviously serve this purpose in wild animals. It is the same in man. The more primitive the society we visualize, the more easily we can grasp the validity of this phenomenon. Contemplate, for instance, the virtue of hate-fear resultant values and actions for our knuckle-dragging ancestors in their grim, sabre-tooth tiger surroundings. It is undoubtedly quite fortunate for us that they did not all develop completely controlling love-sympathy, pacifistic values. We must confess, however, that in the case of man the hate-fear drives and their resultant values and actions seem to have outlasted their proper environment and become destructive of human life, rather than supporting. This is the nature and source of man's present problem.

Love-sympathy type drives are also highly capable of contributing to life-preservation—greater mental and physical health. If scientific proof is needed, refer to the brilliant work of Dr. Ashley-Montagu, or to the declarations of medical groups which declare in essence that the need for love in human relations is biological and psychological truth which is irrefutable.[3] Some of Dr. Ashley-Montagu's widely publicized experiments indicate that the mere presence of one animal in close proximity to another dying one is life sustaining.[4] It is important to note carefully, however, that it is conceivable that the love-sympathy type drives could also be overly stimulated, resulting in values and behavior which would be life destructive. The pacifist might stand idly by while the maniac destroyed all humanity or a part of it (one man).

Hence, in conclusion it is submitted that in our one (known) natural or absolute value, life, we have the ultimate measure of all sub-values, of morality and of human behavior.

[3] Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior* (Boston, 1950), pp. 91, 118.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

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A critic might ask one final question: If this is a satisfactory and complete natural-law explanation of human values and behavior, how is it that nature would provide man with life-protecting drives which can get out of hand and work in complete opposition to their purpose? For the answer to this question we must refer back to the knowledge of the age of reason and reconcile it with the findings of the age of science.

Men in the age of reason possessed the inspiring knowledge of man's ability to reason. Correct analysis of this final significant fact will complete the theory of the scientific natural law of human values and behavior. The significance is this: reason is the sovereign in the system. It is the overseer, the controller, when employed. It is in its use, however, that man is a free agent. He cannot rely upon the mere existence of his reasoning ability to insure values and behavior in harmony with the good, the true, with the law of nature, with life; he must exercise this reasoning ability. This, at times, requires great mental effort. Reliance upon the mere capacity to reason is the key, perhaps, to the partially unjustified disillusionment with the age of reason: justified only where the reliance was in the mere capacity; unjustified where the reliance was in the use of reason. For it is through careful exercise of his reasoning ability that man can ascertain the existence of the basic value, the mechanistic drives, the rôle of the latter in the scheme of things, and learn to stimulate them skillfully in order to develop sub-values which will insure his survival in the given physical situation.

The given situation presently is, of course, one where man needs no longer to deal with the sabre-tooth but rather with himself primarily. Therefore, the type stimulation called for is that which will develop their neglected love-sympathy drives to a much higher degree and which will allow their hate-fear drives to remain as dormant as possible. This, of course, calls for a complete re-orientation of our educational institutions so that primary emphasis is placed upon making men kind, gentle, sympathetic and humane rather than "smart".

This completes the thread of logic. It completes the theory of scientific natural law of human values, morality and behavior.

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If it is sound, its greatest practical value to mankind is this: it provides a scientific, natural need for and means of moral education, and thereby removes it from the exclusive jurisdiction of the highly controversial fields of religion and relativistic philosophy. Its importance, needless to comment, is equal to that of life and species.

Robert L. Humphrey

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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## REVIEWS

*The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics, 1918–1945.* By JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1953.—xvi, 829 pp. $12.00.

In a letter of July 1943 to General von Kluge, Carl Goerdeler, one of the leaders of the resistance to Hitler, wrote: "For many years I have been looked upon as a militarist, an admirer of the military. . . . I have had many an unpleasant moment in my life because of that . . . for many in Germany expected nothing of the Generals from the start. But I always took their part, saying that one could rely on their character and their sense of responsibility. Now it has come to this that I feel myself ridiculed."

Goerdeler was doing what many others did during the Hitler period: trying to convince the soldiers to show *Zivilcourage.* Neither he nor they succeeded. It is true that in the end some of the generals struck out at Hitler in a hesitant and ill-prepared plot in July 1944; but that attempt failed, not only because of its bungling execution but also because, even with the war lost, the soldiers had neither the character nor the sense of responsibility that Goerdeler ascribed to them. And this should have surprised no one, for at no time after 1918 had they shown any trace of those qualities. In 1918, 1920 and 1923 they revealed themselves to be political trimmers who were prepared to abandon the republic at the first favorable moment; in the early 1930's they displayed a frantic desire to climb on the Hitler bandwagon; once Hitler was in power, they showed, in 1934 and 1938, that they were willing to sacrifice both honor and reputation to stay in his good graces; and from 1938 to 1945 they deplored their master's policies in silence, while publicly associating themselves with them.

This sorry story has now been superbly told by John W. Wheeler-Bennett in a very detailed and highly exciting book. Taking the German defeat of 1918 as his starting point, the author devotes two long chapters to the period 1918–1926, two more to the army's relations with Hitler down to 1933 and seven chapters (totaling some 400 pages) to the events of the period after 1933. He has gone through all of the existing documentary collections bearing on his subject (with the exception of the Stresemann papers, which were opened after this book was finished, and the Groener and Seeckt archives, which were, until recently, located in



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Washington) and has made excellent use of the enormously large number of memoirs and secondary works. He has also consulted many of the participants in the events he describes. His book, therefore, from the standpoint of scholarship, is the most thorough and authoritative work we have for the period.

This is not to say, of course, that all of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's judgments will meet with general approval. In the present reviewer's opinion, the first two chapters in particular suffer from a rather uncritical admiration for Hans von Seeckt. Few students of this period would deny that Seeckt was a superb technician or that his rebuilding of the German army was a remarkable achievement. But it is surprising to find Mr. Wheeler-Bennett so silent about the political shiftiness which was as much a part of Seeckt's character as it was of that of Kurt von Schleicher (of whose activities the author is devastatingly critical). Both in 1920 and in 1923, Seeckt's behavior was so devious that one is forced to conclude that he was interested principally in protecting himself against all possible contingencies. There certainly is nothing admirable about his conduct during the Kapp *Putsch;* and one wonders whether, if Hitler had been successful in 1923, Seeckt would not have been his most loyal paladin.

Too much should not be made of this, in view of the many fine things in this book: the description of the Beer Hall *Putsch* of 1923, the incisive discussion of the army's rôle in politics in January 1933 (in which Mr. Wheeler-Bennett demonstrates that the army leaders were not, as is popularly supposed, afraid that Hitler *would* come to power but afraid that he might *not*), the description of the sorry complicity of the army in the events of June 1934 and the sorrier capitulation to the decisive military reorganization of 1938, and the dozens of perceptive portraits of army leaders and Nazi hierarchs. Finally, it must be said that the author's account of the long-prepared conspiracy against Hitler is the most complete, the most lucid and the most brilliantly written account that we possess of that ill-starred adventure. The author tells us that General von Hammerstein warned the conspirators not to try another Kapp *Putsch*. The warning fell on deaf ears, and the reader of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's description of the two ill-conceived military risings cannot help but be impressed by their fateful similarities.

GORDON A. CRAIG

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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*The World Between the Wars: From the 1918 Armistice to the Munich Agreement.* By QUINCY HOWE. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1953.—xiii, 784 pp. $7.50.

*Prelude to World War II.* By GAETANO SALVEMINI. Garden City, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1954.—519 pp. $7.50.

The second instalment of Quincy Howe's planned three-volume *A World History of Our Time* is the story of the long armistice; it records the failure of "The Search for Normalcy" ending up in "Destination: Disaster". Mr. Howe sketches on an ambitious canvas; not confined to any one particular aspect of history, he seeks instead to weave into a comprehensive pattern the multiplicity of threads that go to make the total picture of an epoch.

The vastness of the undertaking may be reason for condoning minor inaccuracies if not the mispelling of foreign phrases. The attempt to bring into the picture the totality of its components makes at times for inclusiveness rather than depth, but the treatment brings out the rôle and the relationship of factors often dealt with in wholly distinct categories. The result is, on the whole, a successful and balanced synthesis whose style, if occasionally verging on the journalistic, has the asset of consistent readability.

The book appropriately opens with a description of the "Shell-Shocked Europe" of 1918 and of the effort to restore peace. Less emphasis is placed on the details of the peace settlements, their merits and shortcomings, than on the fundamental factor of disintegration of the order that, outwardly at least, had prevailed until 1914. The fumbling search for a new equilibrium after 1919 prolonged disorder far beyond the formal cessation of hostilities on the western front. Wilson and Lenin, different as they were in their persons and in the things they stood for, had this in common that they served as symbols and foci of the same search for a new order. The fundamental novelty, however, was Ortega y Gasset's aptly named *Revolt of the Masses*, or the emergence of mass man; no sudden new phenomenon to be sure, but one to which the war gave sharp and added impulse.

The groping was reflected in the culture of the time as much as in its politics. Dada is mentioned at this point, but more fundamental was the superseding of Marx by Freud, despite the fact that communism came to prevail in Russia and secured a large following elsewhere. Marx after all stood for a rational view of man while Freud put stress on the darker forces that lay in the deeper recesses beneath or beyond consciousness and reason. In the end Wilson as well as Lenin failed as universal

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panaceas; the false and brief illusion of Coolidge "normalcy" in the United States and its equivalent abroad was finally dissipated in the renewed stresses that accompanied the world economic crisis.

Interestingly enough, Roosevelt in a sense took over where Wilson had left off. The American New Deal is soberly appraised as the masterly salvage operation that it was, while the confusion of its opportunistic improvisation and superficial thinking, combined with great sensitivity to the existing temper, is fully recognized. Abroad, the counterpart of Roosevelt was Hitler whose tenure of power chronologically coincides with Roosevelt's. Hitler, like Dali, meant madness, a further step along the road of disintegration of which the renewal of conflict was the logical outcome.

Balanced, comprehensive and fair, this presentation will be at once a useful introduction to the story of the time for some, and an interesting recall for those who lived through it in their maturity.

If Howe's failure to indicate the sources of his citations is on occasion irksome, no such complaint may be aimed at Salvemini whose book deals with a very limited segment of the same story. That the Ethiopian episode was an important one none will gainsay, and it is well that Italy's often underrated rôle on the international stage should be put in proper perspective. Professor Salvemini pleads against the loose and misleading use of collective national entities, preferring to speak of more concrete ones such as the British Foreign Office. He also would disclaim the one-man explanation of history, even though, having berated Churchill for this sin in Mussolini's case, he himself comes close to being guilty of the same offense (compare pp. 7 and 36). In his customary manner, Professor Salvemini gives us a densely documented account, relying heavily on the contemporary press; his full awareness of the pitfalls of this last source does not perhaps always prevent him from falling into them.

After 1919, Italy was essentially a *malade imaginaire*, her grievances devoid of real substance. That she, or Mussolini, bears the chief responsibility for the aggression against Abyssinia can be no subject for debate. But what is new in this account is the appraisal of the British rôle. Briefly, the responsibilities of France and Britain are reversed. The notorious Hoare-Laval plan was no bamboozling of an innocent and ailing British minister by his crafty and unscrupulous French counterpart, but rather the expression of what had always been acceptable to Britain. Even that Sir Galahad into which Anthony Eden had been built up was party to the plot, his reputation for untainted virtue being a useful shield behind which the Conservatives could weather the storm of an aroused opinion. In this context, France and Laval were convenient

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scapegoats and the British Foreign Office and Eden become Salvemini's especial *bêtes noires*. We come close to a devil theory of history.

As to the proper assessment of the respective rôles of Britain and France in this particular imbroglio, this reviewer, having gradually been forced to the same general conclusion as Professor Salvemini, will naturally agree with him. But beyond that he must differ, or at least remain unconvinced by the "plot" explanation. The case here made for it seems more a lawyer's brief, polemics, than cool historical assessment. One is led to suspect that Salvemini's approach is in the nature of *qui bene amat bene castigat*. Feeling doubly deceived because of his deep admiration for many aspects of the British scene, the castigation becomes disproportionate. It may perhaps be appropriate to point out that two phrases, "an Englishman's word is as good as his bond" and "perfidious Albion", have equally wide currency.

The explanation of a *coup monté* in Abysssinia, coupled with the encouragement of Germany to turn to the East, does indeed make it possible to fit into a structure that has the attraction of logical consistency the record of British policy during the Prelude to World War II. Else "British foreign policy after 1934 becomes a succession of absurd muddles" (p. 509). To one reader at least the case has not been proved conclusively that it was not precisely that.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

BARNARD COLLEGE
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*The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–1941: With Special Reference to the United States and the Northern Neutrals.* By NILS ÖRVIK. Oslo, Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953.—294 pp. $3.25.

This important contribution to the literature on neutrality was recently published in Norway. As the title of the book indicates, the author's thesis is that neutrality as a vital force in the relations among nations has not only lost its original meaning but has actually become meaningless in the world of today.

To prove his thesis Dr. Örvik begins with a survey of how the concept of neutrality was first understood and formulated by the earliest writers and commentators on international law. The body of the book, however, deals chiefly with neutrality as it has been applied by the United States and the Scandinavian countries. The author shows how the concept grew in importance and greatly influenced the foreign relations of the

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young American Republic, how it finally reached maturity during the Napoleonic Wars and the comparatively peaceful nineteenth century. It reached its zenith of importance at the time of the Hague Conference in 1907, but then passed rapidly into decline. In Dr. Örvik's opinion, the First World War was the first event of major importance to show how faulty the concept of neutrality really is, and how it is bound to become more and more of an anachronism in a world fused into one by our modern communications. The author also brings out that it was unavoidable that the concept of neutrality was interpreted and applied in different ways by a Great Power like the United States and the smaller Scandinavian states. Dr. Örvik points out that although the United States and Norway thought of themselves as traditional neutrals, they were not able to maintain their position as such: the United States was too powerful to refrain from playing an important rôle in world affairs, while Norway was too weak, both militarily and economically, to be able to make her neutrality policy effective.

The book offers a succinct account of the events of the twenties and the thirties, and how they impinged on the various nations' conception of their rôle as neutrals. The fate of the concept is pursued through the inter-war or League period of 1919–1939, with the Pact of Paris, the search for security through alliances, and the implications for neutrality of the repudiation of Article 16 dealt with in detail. The relationship between the League and the smaller states of Europe is discussed, a relationship which was given final expression in the Declaration of Copenhagen of 1938.

The chapter on neutrality during World War II contains an illuminating interpretation of events as well as a serious and thoughtful critical analysis of the shifting attitudes toward neutrality by the belligerents and those Powers which succeeded in preserving their neutrality, at least for a while. The author traces the road taken by the United States, leading from "Cash-and-Carry" through "All Help Short of War" to "Dynamic Non-Belligerency" and eventually full participation. The same chapter presents a sober account of Norway's efforts to maintain her neutral status during the early part of the war, with a discussion of the iron ore shipments, the *Altmark* affair, and the other events that led up to the German attack. This particular phase of World War II and the deeper complexities attendant to it are now being dealt with extensively in a new and important work by Dr. Örvik published under the title *Norge i Brennpunktet.* There is also a final chapter on neutrality as it applies today to the United Nations and membership in that organization.

This able study in international law and relations is an abbreviated and condensed version of a doctor's thesis originally written at the Uni-

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versity of Wisconsin. It has now been published in book form, in English, by an enterprising Norwegian publisher. Dr. Örvik has indeed made a good case for his thesis that neutrality is declining into virtual desuetude, and his book will be read with profit by any one interested in world affairs. It is, however, for the present reviewer a source for regret that the chapter dealing with Swedish neutrality during World War II was deleted from the printed text. A discussion of the Swedish viewpoints, demonstrating that perhaps neutrality is not quite dead, would have made a valuable part of the book. It is also regrettable that more pains were not taken with the proofreading, as too many misprints of names and words keep cropping up in the text.

ERIK J. FRIIS

THE AMERICAN-SCANDINAVIAN FOUNDATION
NEW YORK, N. Y.

*Stemming the Tide: Speeches, 1951 and 1952, by Winston S. Churchill.* Edited by RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1954.—x, 379 pp. $5.00.

A visiting friend leafed through this book and said, in a curiously disappointed tone, "Oh, he means the tide of *socialism!*" The title summons up Mr. Churchill as the symbol of defiance to the Nazis, and its transference seems somehow anticlimactic. It is quite a drop from buzz-bombs to steel nationalization: the country cared about buzz-bombs; not many cared about steel.

The first half of the book is devoted to Churchill in opposition and in the campaign of 1951; it is by far the weaker half. Parliamentary speeches often stand up to later reading, political speeches rarely do; and in this period the parliamentary speeches were part of the campaign about the length of which Churchill complained so loudly. The eloquence for which it is customary to praise him is neither in place nor much in evidence, and the wit is rare, though, when it comes, it is usually good, as in the translation of *deus ex machina* "for the benefit of any Wykehamists who may be present. . . ." The election speeches are by no means inspired, and they certainly do not display "the integrity of political thought" to which the introduction refers. Perhaps they should not. English politics is an affair not of the intellect but of opportunism, and the reader of these speeches needs neither a knowledge of Churchill's career nor hindsight on his second government to realize that he is a bold and magnificent opportunist.

The speeches in the second half of the book, if uneven, are better. One may be uneasy when he deals with economic questions or embarrassed

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when he scolds the House like so many schoolboys, but it is a considerable gain to be largely rid of complaints about the loss of "our Oriental empire". Reasonably secure, defending his own government's policies, and, one may guess, vindicated, he can argue—particularly on defense—with great cogency and conviction. Once in a while he rises to real literary distinction: special mention must be made of his beautiful broadcast tribute to the late King George VI.

One wonders, though, why the speeches should be published. The parliamentary speeches are readily available in *Hansard* and most of the rest in the press, so that scholars would not be deprived in future. And it is hard to imagine that even the grumblers in a Kensington food queue could still work up enthusiasm about charges and denunciations that are—and this is not criticism—unquestionably stale. Presumably they are published because there is a Churchill legend; but, on the whole, the speeches of any good politician—say, Mr. Attlee, though Americans do not realize it—would be just as readable, cogent and witty, and perhaps more so.

There is, however, one great virtue to this book. Because it includes many parliamentary speeches, it also includes the interruptions, questions and debates; and the speeches on foreign affairs of February 26, 1952, and on defense of March 5, 1952, deserve close attention because they are still exciting. They are made so, not by the issues, but by the context. Because these are only Churchill's speeches, it is inevitable, to paraphrase Dr. Johnson, that the Labor dogs should not have the best of it. But the House of Commons is the true hero of this book, and I am certain that Sir Winston Churchill believes that it should be so.

R. K. WEBB

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*The Dynamics of Soviet Society.* By W. W. ROSTOW, in collaboration with ALFRED LEVIN, and with the assistance of others at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1953.—xvi, 282 pp. $3.95.

Without any notable originality, this book presents a summary of what is already commonly known in the field of Russian studies about the Soviet state and society. Of the two main parts, the first and longer one—on "The Evolution of Soviet Rule"—is a useful historical analysis. The second part, on "Cohesive Forces, Instabilities, and Tensions in Contemporary Soviet Society", unfolds a familiar yet interesting picture

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of the status and problems of Soviet bureaucracy and executive power, as well as a survey of general and group dissatisfactions. The third and shortest part gives the reader certain conclusions on the post-Stalin era. A select annotated bibliography at the book's end is good, except for some injudicious enthusiasm for Isaac Deutscher's works.

Still, the book could have been planned far better. The historical part is too long; it could have been cut in favor of a more expanded and deeper-reaching contemporary section. The institutions and classes should have emerged in a clearer and more logical sequence, without so much back-tracking and recrossing of territory already covered—and without so many omissions. The language of the book is too often unnecessarily heavy, concealing rather than elucidating the book's essentially simple ideas.

Among the latter, relatively well put is the assertion that "the New Soviet Man is, after all, a version of the ideal tsarist subject, placing loyalty to the state above any other standard for action" (p. 125). But on other occasions this connection between the tsarist past and the Soviet present is quite strained. Thus we cannot agree with the authors when they trace the "tolerance" (?) of the Soviet people for the Soviet secret police to the very nature of the Russians—to a historic "general failure of Russian culture to share fully the presuppositions of Western life" (p. 200). Nazi Germany was a Western state, and still had its Gestapo.

The low standard of living in the Soviet Union is explained by the authors in a number of ways, all true, but the main root of the causes is not mentioned. This is the over-bureaucratization of the state and its economy, resulting in a situation where too many unproductive members of Soviet society have to be supported by those who work and produce.

The word "dynamics" in the book's title leads us to expect an account of current change in Soviet society, but we find little (if anything) about the transformation now occurring in the upper and middle classes of Russia, particularly among their youth, whose "ideal" is increasingly that of money, comforts, luxury—and Westernization. It is a significant phenomenon indeed, worth a sizable part of a book such as this but getting hardly a paragraph.

Quite correctly the authors point out that the leaders in the Kremlin, no matter what their present or potential disagreements may be among themselves, do agree on the larger issues of Soviet strategy. Nevertheless, say the authors, a fight in the Kremlin is still possible on issues of tactics bound up with personal jealousies.

But it is in speaking of these personal-power relationships that the book makes its outstanding mistake of judgment. Venturing a predic-

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tion on Beria, it announces on page 186 that "his vigorous reassertion after Stalin's death of his authority, over both the secret police and other elements of political power, appears to indicate that he is not likely to permit himself to be disposed of as easily as his two predecessors, Yagoda and Yezhov." Thus the volume went to press, and all its authors could do in expiation was to insert a last-minute footnote on page 241 telling of Beria's downfall.

On balance, this is a well-meaning and painstaking book, but somehow its focus is too artificial and thus blurred. It hits outside the life-center of Soviet society, not directly at that center. Thus it misses that society's real blood and flesh and nervous system.

Albert Parry

Colgate University

*The Threat of Soviet Imperialism.* Edited by C. Grove Haines. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954.—xvi, 402 pp. $5.00.

The conference on "The Problem of Soviet Imperialism", organized in August 1953 by the School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University brought together some of the most informed analysts of Soviet affairs in this country. The twenty-odd addresses presented in this volume therefore amount to a useful stock-taking on current interpretations of Soviet imperialism. If, for good reasons, the philosopher cannot be statesman, at least contemporary government can have the benefit of expert judgment as it appears in this collection.

The conference provided a comprehensive coverage of the many facets of Soviet imperialism: underlying historical and doctrinal factors; weapons and media of policy; Soviet capabilities; and case studies of Soviet efforts in various areas of the globe. Perhaps a more thorough inquiry into Soviet domestic affairs in terms of their impact on foreign intentions and capabilities, and an analysis of the process of Soviet decision-making, would not have been amiss.

The papers reveal a considerable measure of agreement among the speakers. The "old Russia hands" and academic contributors (such as George Kennan, Mose L. Harvey, and George A. Morgan) concur, with some variation, on the continued Bolshevik essence of the Kremlin's outlook and motivation (with particular stress on the shift toward "ersatz Bolshevism", as Frederick C. Barghoorn sees it, and on the abandonment of proletarian internationalism, as Nicholas S. Timasheff perceives Soviet conduct). The recognition of the continued presence of Communist

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elements affirms, by implication, that (1) ideas continue to play a part in the formulation of Soviet goals, which are not motivated purely by opportunism or power hunger; (2) Soviet policy is neither quantitatively nor qualitatively similar to that of other imperialist Powers; (3) Soviet conduct cannot be adequately interpreted as a mere reversion to "traditional Russian" aims and methods. These findings, solidly buttressed within the limits of the papers' length, are challenged primarily by those participants of the conference whose major interest lies either in day-to-day operational problems or in the coverage of news events, which they prefer to interpret without reference to past pronouncements by the apostles of Stalinism. Though not crucial in terms of conclusions for the present, this divergency in approach may bear the kernels of future differences of wider scope.

On Soviet capabilities, Vice-Admiral Leslie C. Stevens presents an impressive picture of the formidable Soviet military potential. Harry Schwartz, on the other hand, warns against overestimating Soviet economic might; he turns in particular against recent attempts to forecast an early prospect of the U.S.S.R. outdistancing the West in basic branches of production by projecting present output data—a tendency Mr. Schwartz labels "a new school of economic defeatism". The problem, interestingly presented, needs further and more thorough analysis than was possible at this conference. Professor Cyril Black competently surveys the rôle of diplomacy as a means of Soviet imperialism. Robert N. Carew Hunt provides a comprehensive interpretation of the major phases in international Communist tactics. Professor Conway Zirkle, in surveying Soviet scientific capabilities, arrives at a less sanguine estimate (from the Soviet viewpoint) than is held by other observers.

The caliber of the papers, their publication, and the welcome collaboration between men in government service, university life, and public affairs, as shown at this conference, are all a measure of the progress which has been made in recent years in following and understanding Soviet affairs. To expect a gathering of this sort to produce novel approaches or syntheses would be too much. Thus, without breaking virgin soil, the present volume represents a fair and encouraging distillation of current thinking here and—as exemplified by Angelo Rossi and Mr. Carew Hunt—in Western Europe. And such closely reasoned and eminently balanced summations as Mr. Kennan's are particularly welcome in an age in which public addresses of this sort take the place of the vanishing genre of the political essay.

ALEXANDER DALLIN

ALEXANDRIA, VA.

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*Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944–1951.* By Max Beloff. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1953.—viii, 278 pp. $4.00.

Professor Beloff's present volume is the extension of a shorter study on the same subject prepared for an Institute of Pacific Relations conference at Lucknow, India, in 1950; this was made available in mimeograph under the title "Soviet Far Eastern Policy since Yalta". It may be argued that Professor Beloff came close to exhausting his topic in the earlier study and might have spared himself further effort. From the point of view of scholarship, any will agree who have explored Moscow's policy in Asia since the war that the field is a particularly barren one. The question here then is not whether recent Soviet Far Eastern policy should be studied at all—it of course is in Foreign Offices throughout the world—but whether so senior a scholar as Professor Beloff has expended his energies profitably in pursuing his subject at such length.

He has uncovered little that is new, through no fault of his own, and that is not, in any case, readily available to the average student of Far Eastern affairs. His sources, on the Soviet side, are mainly news dispatches and commentaries in the daily press, supplemented by an occasional monograph. Some American and United Nations documentation has cast an oblique light on his problem. Eye-witness accounts appearing in the non-Communist press have furnished marginal information, but notably less than eye-witness accounts before and during the war which despite their frequent partisanship do much to enliven any study of earlier Soviet Far Eastern policy. Purely Asian sources have to date been singularly unrevealing. It is a measure of the handicap Professor Beloff has worked against, for instance, that with a part of his story hanging in the balance he has been unable to prove or disprove this crucial Soviet assertion in the autumn of 1945: that the scheduled withdrawal from Manchuria was being delayed several months solely at the request of the Chinese government (pp. 42–43).

Despite the poverty of his sources Professor Beloff has nonetheless produced a readable and, given the limitations noted, a plausible account of Moscow's policy in the Far East. China, quite appropriately, occupies more than half the book. There are also chapters on Soviet policy in Japan and Korea, the latter of background rather than current interest inasmuch as it reviews matters only through the first year of the fighting in Korea. An associate of the author, Mr. J. Frankel, has contributed an informative chapter on communism in Southeast Asia.

Noting the gaps in reliable documentation covering his subject, Pro-

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fessor Beloff emphasizes the tentative character of any conclusions he reaches. This caution is commendable. It has enabled him to avoid difficulties which many of his predecessors have encountered in assessing Soviet motives—for instance, in Manchuria after the war. He rejects any rigid formula that would explain the seeming contradictions in Moscow's policies here: the strenuous efforts to ensure Communist supremacy over the Nationalists at the same time that the factories were being systematically stripped, presumably on the assumption that the Communists would not, in the end, succeed. Soviet policy, he remarks, was "the result of experiment in a field in which many of the principal factors were genuinely unknown quantities" (p. 247). When these factors *did* become known, Moscow was not so far committed to one course of action that a readjustment of its policies could not easily be made.

Professor Beloff's book brings together widely scattered evidence bearing on Moscow's post-war policy in the Far East which will serve as a convenient beacon to his successors. Its chief value will undoubtedly be as a reference work for scholars, pending the discovery of richer materials. As far as the author's reputation is concerned, as one of the foremost authorities on Soviet foreign affairs, this volume appears to have confirmed it, without, however, having greatly enhanced it.

CHARLES B. MCLANE

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

*Yo Fui un Ministro de Stalin.* By JESUS HERNANDEZ. Mexico, D. F., Editorial America, 1953.—

This volume by a founder of the Spanish Communist party, who for many years represented that party on the Executive Committee of the Communist International, shows something of what history has been missed because the principal totalitarians could not or would not write their memoirs.

The book is particularly useful for the insights which it throws on the political events on the Loyalist side during the Spanish Civil War. With the exception of Mexico, the Soviet Union was virtually the only country which was supplying arms to the Loyalists in any appreciable quantity. Although these arms were late in coming and were by no means sufficient to enable the Republicans to win the war, they were enough to keep the war dragging on for almost three years. And they gave the Communists inside and outside of Spain a weapon with which to engage in what amounted to blackmail on the Spanish government. Ultimatums to the Spanish government concerning its military policy or its internal political

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policies were accompanied by threats to cut off immediately all further aid to the Republican forces. This blackmail was almost always effective.

Within Republican Spain, the aims of Soviet policy were many. There were Russian military "advisers" with virtually all important units of the armed forces. The dreaded Russian secret police, the GPU, had its "apparatus" in Spain, complete with jails which were outside of the control of the Spanish Republican Minister of Justice. The Communist International also had its corps of "advisers", who were the group through which the Russians made known their desires to the Spanish Communist party. These advisers included Palmiro Togliatti, now as then head of the Italian Communist party; Vittorio Codovilla, Italian-Argentine, who was rated as one of Stalin's closest associates within the Comintern; Stepanov, a Russian; Guère, a Frenchman; André Marty, sometimes substituted for by Jacques Duclos. It was with these people that Hernandez was most frequently in contact.

He makes it clear that it was the Comintern "advisers" who were the ones who actually determined the policy of the Spanish Communist party. For instance, the fateful decision to carry on a campaign to oust Largo Caballero as Prime Minister of the Loyalist government was taken on orders of Stepanov and Togliatti. The "advisers" also designated the successor of Caballero, Dr. Juan Negrin. A year later, the "advisers" decreed that Indalecio Prieto must be removed as Minister of Defense, and this was accomplished.

Almost without exception, the majority of the Politburo of the Spanish Communist party did as they were told by the Comintern "advisers". Although Hernandez pictures two members of the Politburo—himself and Jose Diaz, the party's secretary general—as being frequently in the opposition, the majority, consisting of Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), Vicente Uribe (Minister of Agriculture during most of the Civil War), Antonio Mije, and Vicente Checa, were virtually rubber stamps for the Comintern bosses, who, incidentally, maintained direct wireless connections with Moscow on a day-to-day basis. Only once does Hernandez note that the Politburo balked at something which the Comintern "advisers" ordered.

This account of the Spanish Civil War is also interesting for its analysis of the reasons why the Communists were able to gain so much ground within the Republican régime during the two and a half years of the war. According to Hernandez there were seven reasons for the increase in Communist influence. These were: (1) the prestige given the Communist party by the aid which the Russians gave the Loyalist cause; (2) the correct policy of the Communists in favor of establishing a regular Republican army; (3) the good job done by Communist Ministers of Agriculture and

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Education; (4) the superior discipline and unity of action of the Communists; (5) the presence of the International Brigade, who were exceedingly good troops and came largely under Communist influence; (6) the nonintervention policy of the Western Powers; (7) the turning on and off of Russian aid as the Spanish government accepted or balked at Russian political and military demands.

After the end of the Civil War, Hernandez and a number of other Spanish Communists received refuge in the Soviet Union. Hernandez' disenchantment with communism was completed there. He witnessed the terrible mistreatment of most of the Spanish refugees, as well as the dissolution of the Comintern by Stalin, Manuilsky and Dmitroff without even consulting the other members of the Executive Committee of the International.

This volume should be of value to all interested in the techniques of penetration used by the Communists. The story indicates that Communist successes have little to do with Marxist doctrine. More often they are due to the weaknesses, errors and divisions of their opponents rather than to any great virtue on the part of the Communists themselves.

ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

*Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: The Failure of the First Attempt.* By ROBERT A. SCALAPINO. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1953.—xii, 471 pp. $6.50.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the brave attempt from 1945 to 1952 to "reorient" or to "democratize" Japan under American military occupation, cloaked as it was by international participation, was the fact that the American people little realized how revolutionary an act they were committing. It was actually the second attempt, this time by outsiders, to impose an institutional framework of constitutionalism, a party movement, and democracy in the broader sense.

Professor Scalapino, in his interesting and scholarly analysis of the first attempt made within Japanese society from 1872 to 1940, uses the term "democracy" with two criteria in mind: adherence to the concept of the innate dignity of man and his development as the ultimate goal of the state; and choice as the basis of democratic institutions, with civil liberties and especially a competitive party system (Preface, p. vii). These criteria, incidentally, might well someday be applied to the American experiment in "induced revolution" during the Occupation.

In this examination of the social structure of Japan, with the pre-war

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party movement as a central thread, we have a splendid example of the quality which post-war American scholarship can achieve, probing with extensive use of Japanese-language materials the undeveloped area of Far Eastern political dynamics. In this sense, Professor Scalapino carries on the fine tradition laid down by the Canadian, E. Herbert Norman, in his classic reconnaissance, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* (1940); and by Dr. Scalapino's friend, Nobutaka Ike, *The Beginnings of Political Democracy in Japan* (1950).

Leaving aside for the moment the question whether Japan's pre-war party movement "was fundamentally dedicated to Western liberalism" (chap. i, p.1), the gulf between hostile attitudes and institutional structure inherited from the Tokugawa Era (1603–1867) and Western democracy was too great to bridge. As the parties emerged, their "liberalism" aimed at building a strong state.

Although the author, in his Preface, quite properly limits the bulk of his analysis to political developments, he does later deal with the nature of Japanese capitalism (chap. vii) and its impact on the party movement. It may not be inappropriate, then, to add to his description of early philosophic struggle (chap. ii) the fact that many of the "liberals" whom he mentions, or their colleagues in the field of economic thought, just as soon forsook earlier, popular doctrines of *laissez-faire* (*jiyū-bōeki-shugi*) for protectionism (*hogo-bōeki-shugi*). Fukuzawa Yukichi, for example, early carried the banners of free trade and an "open economy"; by 1874–75, however, he was a protectionist. By the 1890's, writers like Oshima Sadamasu, expounding Friedrich List's national system of political economy, had already won the day.

In this reviewer's opinion, Dr. Scalapino's treatment of the nature of early party organization and tactics (chap. iv) is the core of his volume. It might well be read and reread by the specialist who wants to relate political forms to basic culture; or by the general reader who desires a guide in an outline of Japanese national character, to the confusing and often contradictory unfolding of modern Japanese political history. Particularly in regard to Japanese family structure, the author reviews (pp. 120–126) recent Japanese-language sociological studies and brilliantly relates them to problems in his own discipline.

Dr. Scalapino in workmanlike fashion then moves through the evolution of parties, 1890–1913 (chap. v), and 1913–1932 (chap. vi). The volume concludes with a survey of the even more disastrous failure of the Left in Japanese politics (chap. viii), and a wisely limited but adequate summary of the forces of nationalism, militarism and "fascism" in Japan (chap. ix). Shrewdly, Professor Scalapino differentiates—as he did in dealing with "liberalism" and "democracy"—Japanese totalitarianism

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from its European cousins. "The Problem of Japanese Democracy" (chap. x) cannot, he writes, easily be forced into any simple mold such as a "plot" by evil men or even "cultural differences" alone. Certainly the Japanese inheritance from their own past, in institutions and ideas, played a vital rôle; timing, another clue to the emergence of Japan as a modern state, has extreme significance for the entire Far East—indeed, for post-surrender Japan itself! In passing, some question might even be raised as to the assumption by *Taiyo*, cited by the author (p. 268), that "the period from 1905 to 1920 marked the real transition in Japan from an agrarian to an industry-centered economy."

For the specialist, Professor Scalapino has carefully and thoroughly documented his pages and has added a useful glossary of Japanese transliterations, with ideographs, as well as a bibliography of Western and Japanese works, also with ideographs.

ARDATH W. BURKS

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

*Rebirth and Destiny of Israel.* By DAVID BEN GURION. Edited and translated from the Hebrew under the supervision of Mordekhai Nurock. New York, Philosophical Library, 1954. —xiii, 539 pp. $10.00.

In December 1953, after having been the recognized political leader of his people for a generation, David Ben Gurion, first Prime Minister of Israel, voluntarily resigned and retired to an outlying desert settlement in the south of Israel. Shortly before this decision he wrote the preface to an English edition of his selected addresses and articles.

The first article included in this volume was written in 1915, the last one in 1952. Most of the material, however, dates from the twenty-year period of 1932–1952 which future historians will probably call the Ben Gurion era of Israeli history. The bulk of the volume consists of addresses to various Jewish and non-Jewish political bodies, such as the Zionist Congress, Council and Executive, the Elected Assembly of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, the Provisional State Council of Israel, and the Knesseth (Parliament) of Israel.

Throughout, Ben Gurion appears as the unwavering and spirited leader of the Labor Zionist movement within Israel, and of Israel as a whole, within the wider context of Middle Eastern and world politics. But he is never politician alone; he is historian as well. He has Biblical and later Jewish history at his fingertips. There is no situation or emergency in the present which does not immediately bring to his mind a similar event in the Biblical past, to be described and applied to the

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problem at hand as if it were a matter of 30 rather than 3,000 years ago. In a two-hour address on "Mission and Dedication" to the officers of the Israel Defense Forces (1950), for example, he dwells on the civilizations of ancient Egypt and Babylonia, quotes extensively from Jeremiah to demonstrate the ancient Hebrew attitude to these Powers, discusses the struggle between the Maccabbees and the Greeks, treats of the origin of Christianity and the encounter of Judaism with Islam, surveys the Russian and German attempts to annihilate the Jewish people, and then, returning to the Biblical period, analyzes the universalistic ideas as manifested in several books of the Bible. In the same address, when speaking of the mass immigration to Israel, he compares it to the return from Babylonia under Cyrus, quotes from Ezra, Joel, Isaiah, Strabo, Philo and the Pentateuch. And after all this, in the fourth half-hour, when he comes to speak of the tasks of the army today, he again does so by frequent references to the nature of the Hebrew army in the days of Moses and Joshua, and to the militarization of Judah under King Uzziah in the eighth century B.C. Without knowing the identity of his audience, one would imagine it a forum of scholars rather than a group of army officers.

Another instance illustrating the sense of historical unity which pervades the thinking of Ben Gurion (as well as of his most diverse audiences) is that of a parliamentary address in which the pros and cons of the adoption of a constitution for Israel are dealt with in terms of the most correct interpretation of certain Biblical passages.

Thus, this volume tells the reader as much about Biblical history and the historical orientation of the population of Israel today as it does about the rebirth and destiny of the Jewish state.

The translation, in general, does justice to the classicistic Hebrew of the original. The rendering of some parts, however, is characterized by a regrettably poor English style. Occasionally it is difficult to grasp the meaning of sentences contained in these sections.

RAPHAEL PATAI

THE DROPSIE COLLEGE, PHILADELPHIA

*The Jews in the Soviet Satellites.* By PETER MEYER, BERNARD D. WEINRYB, EUGENE DUSCHINSKY and NICOLAS SYLVAIN. Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1953.—viii, 637 pp. $6.50.

The composite volume on Jews in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria is a successor and companion to the book, *Jews in the Soviet Union* by Solomon M. Schwarz published in 1951. Both books present the results of comprehensive research about the impact

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of Communist régimes on the fate of the respective Jewish minorities, against the background of their general minority policies. To put it in a nutshell: no totalitarian Communist state is in a position to tolerate any noncomforming group within its boundaries. And this nonconformity was perhaps most conspicuous in the Jewish group, a nonterritorial minority exposed to greater disintegration and absorption than other minorities; however, this group assimilated only at a slow pace. Moreover, this Jewish minority had the largest international connections. Jewish "cosmopolitanism" and sympathies for a foreign country (Israel) are an anomaly in the Communist states, It is a most appropriate, ingenious observation of Peter Meyer (p. 40) that totalitarian régimes, of both the Nazi and Communist brand, aimed *au fond* at the same goal: a final solution of the Jewish question. But, while final solution in Nazi style meant total physical destruction, in the Communist fashion it stood for "voluntary" total assimilation and disintegration.

The authors definitely destroy the myth that Communist society automatically eliminates racial or ethnic discrimination, as well as the hate-complex. They demonstrate how new forms of anti-Semitic sentiment and action are being developed in Communist countries. Government and party anti-Semitism appears in the disguise of charges of Zionism, bourgeois mentality, Jewish nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and so on. How this heavy ammunition has been utilized in various purges and trials of Jewish defendants is best demonstrated in the excellent analysis of the Rudolf Slansky trial (pp. 153–191). While purges and trials decimated the top-level Jewish officials, large-scale deportations reduced the rank and file, particularly in Rumania and Hungary. This neo-anti-Semitism, however, is not rooted in emotional or pathological hatred, but is a coldly calculated political expedient. Moreover, indulgence for Jew-baiting is a means to win over the former Nazis who flooded the Communist party in Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Ironically enough, the anti-Semitism of the population has been enhanced by the very fact of the high proportion of Jews in the top leadership of the Communist party and in the government, as in Hungary and Poland. In addition, new economic conflicts arose because the Jewish survivors claimed property of theirs which had been sold or distributed in Nazi times, and in some backward regions medieval superstitions were revived. Thus tensions led to pogroms with many casualties. As a Hungarian-Jewish paper stated it: "antisemitism is stronger [now] than at the height of Hitler's power" (p. 417).

A second myth to be destroyed was that of the generous Liberator of All the Oppressed and Persecuted. Communist tactics during the war, to infiltrate as far as possible all underground movements in Axis-occupied

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Europe, aroused hope for liberation by the Soviets. However, when the respective revolt movements did not fit entirely into their pattern, the Soviet armies let them quietly die as, for example, the Warsaw ghetto uprising (April 1943), the Polish Warsaw revolt (August 1944) or the Slovak revolt (September 1944). They maintained the same indifferent attitude during the mass deportations to death camps of Hungarian Jews (summer 1944) and after the war toward the Jewish survivors. This callousness sharply contrasted with the helpful attitude of the Western democracies and particularly the United States Army toward the displaced persons.

The reactions of the Jewish population to Communist policies are not always adequately described, except by Weinryb who made extensive use of the rich Yiddish press and literature (in Poland). The mass exodus from Poland, Bulgaria and partially Czechoslovakia, and the staggering attempts of emigration from Hungary and Rumania are portrayed in this volume in an exhaustive and fascinating way.

The five studies in the book are tied together by an introduction by Peter Meyer giving an excellent analysis of the historical background of the Jewish question in Central and Eastern Europe. However, some of his views could easily be challenged, as, for example, his concept of East European Jewry "only recently transforming into a 'nationality' in the Central European sense" (p. 10). This concept completely ignores the history of East European Jewry since the sixteenth century with its highly developed Jewish national autonomy and culture. In the opinion of this reviewer, a concluding chapter would have been desirable in order to integrate the individual studies, and to elucidate various aspects only perfunctorily touched upon—such, for example, as differences in policies and developments in the various countries. Also a number of contradictions, omissions, or simply mistakes could most likely have been avoided by tighter editorial guidance. A study about the Jewries of East Germany, Yugoslavia, the Baltic countries and the old Soviet republics of Ukraine and White Russia would be a valuable supplement to these useful and competent volumes.

PHILIP FRIEDMAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Serbia Between East and West: The Events of 1903–1908.* By WAYNE S. VUCINICH. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1954.—x, 304 pp. $4.75.

This is a scholarly work of high quality on an important section of modern European history. In discussions concerning the causes of the First World War Serbia figured prominently but no serious effort was

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made to give to the English-speaking world a comprehensive and dispassionate account of Serbian political developments in the decade preceding the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo. Professor Vucinich covered only five years of Serbian history from the conspiracy against the Obrenović family to the outbreak of the Bosnian crisis. Nowhere in his book do we find an express statement that he contemplates writing a sequel to this volume but let us hope that this is his intention.

Professor Vucinich's study of Serbia consists of eight detailed chapters of unequal length. About one fifth of this volume has been reserved for critical notes, bibliography and index. Each important statement is corroborated by references to either unprinted documents or critical literature.

The crux of the story is the change of the Serbian dynasty brought about, in June 1903, by violent methods and under circumstances which had wide echoes and repercussions for several years. It is easy to understand why the contemporaries strongly reacted against the murder in cold blood of Alexander Obrenović and his morganatic wife Draga. But the subsequent events amply proved that Serbia urgently needed political stabilization and moral regeneration if she was to survive as a sovereign nation.

The book has not been compiled hastily and the text bears many evidences of a careful revision by which disproportions or unorganic details were eliminated and a well-balanced picture produced. While international relations were treated in close connection with the changing pattern of home policy, a special chapter of a little over forty pages has been reserved for a sketch of the emancipation of the Serbian economy. The final section on the Danube-Adriatic railway connects by many links with the survey of Serbian economic life but it cannot be detached from the study of international developments. The Serbian foreign policy from 1903 to 1908 was determined chiefly by the desire of leading Serbian statesmen to reduce the dependence of their country on the Dual Monarchy of the Habsburgs. Combined with this were efforts to secure Russian support both for political maneuvering in the Balkans and for various economic projects to check the Austrian penetration into the Balkans. The fate of Macedonia and Serbian access to the Adriatic coast stood in the forefront as the most delicate and controversial questions.

The author undertook an extensive search for official documents, contemporary pamphlets and newspapers as well as books published in Serbia before 1914 and afterwards. It is gratifying to see his work included among Stanford University publications inaugurated happily

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in 1922 by R. H. Lutz's penetrating appraisal of the German Revolution 1918/19. Professor Vucinich has put to good use his training in history and his linguistic equipment. He gives us a much-needed story of Serbia as it marched from weakness and chaos toward political consolidation and active partnership in Balkan affairs.

OTAKAR ODLOZILIK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*The South African Way of Life: Values and Ideals of a Multiracial Society.* Edited by G. H. CALPIN. New York, Columbia University Press, 1953.—ix, 200 pp. $3.50.

This symposium on South African society has been prepared by fourteen authors under the auspices of the South African Institute of International Affairs at the request of UNESCO. It is one of a series devoted to an exposition of the social, political and economic problems of various areas of the world.

In the all-too-brief historical introduction David Marquard writes: "For the past 150 years the history of South Africa has been a history of struggle and conflict. Conflict between black man and black man, between white man and black man, between white man and white man; struggle of white and black against a not over-generous nature—this is the background to its present problems" (p. 6).

In the succeeding chapters considerable light is shed on the heritage and upon the cultural and economic aspects and implications of this complex of conflicts. Most of the authors display a commendable degree of impartiality and seem genuinely interested in presenting material that will contribute to an understanding of the great human problems of the Union. But an increased understanding does not, unfortunately, provide an answer to the many dilemmas.

It is more likely that the reader will be impressed with the growing intransigence of the situation, and that he will put down the book with the conviction that the path now being taken by South Africa leads but to further conflict. On the one hand, one reads of the "caste-like race consciousness" of the Afrikaans-speaking section (p. 14), of the machinations of the Afrikaner Broederbond, of the increasing rigidity of their apartheid philosophy supposedly "based on the Christian principles of justice and reasonableness" (p. 44), of the submergence of the perhaps more moderate English-speaking section and of their increasing adherence to white domination policies, of the "strong social prejudices against non-Europeans" held by the Jewish community, themselves restricted from membership in the Nationalist party in the Transvaal (p. 41.)

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One is also reminded of the design to apply apartheid to the Colored people, of the policy of most Europeans in South Africa increasingly to segregate Indians, to control their activities and to restrict their political representation (p. 83), and of the Nationalist party manifesto of 1948 which said "that Indians are a foreign and outlandish element which is unassimilable" (p. 146).

On the other hand, we are told by Mr. Ngcobo of the growing adhesion and tendency toward mutual respect of the many Bantu tribes (p. 52), of an increasing refusal to accept ideas of inferiority and a strengthening belief in the capacity of their people (p. 58). Mr. Ngcobo's excellent chapter, notably moderate in exposition and tone, is clear in stating that the Whites cannot rest secure at the apex of the pyramid of South African civilization (p. 60). In the same vein, Mr. Golding, writing for the Colored community, notes "a definite move to unite with other non-European groups for the furtherance of the common cause" (p. 77), and an inevitable moving of a segment of this community "towards the militant Indian groups" (p. 77). We are also reminded of the evidence from the mineworkers' strike in 1945 of the ability of the "unorganized, unsophisticated and tribalized Natives" to engage in large-scale concerted action (p. 151).

In the economic sphere, the same dichotomy is observed. On the one hand, the shortcomings of the Native as a laborer are defined, and it is stated that advance cannot be permitted until tribal customs have fallen away (p. 159). But, on the other hand, we are told that, where skill has been acquired, the trade unions do not permit entry into the skilled workers category (p. 185), and that the vested interests of the European community "are protected not so much by legal measures as by written and unwritten conventions" (p. 188).

What solution is there to these terrible paradoxes? The book does not present the answer. But it is to be hoped that this volume and later ones designed to focus light upon the issues will increasingly reveal the impossibility of following a practice of enforced differentiation or apartheid.

WILLIAM A. HANCE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook.* By W. S. WOYTINSKY and E. S. WOYTINSKY. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953.—lxxii, 1268 pp. $12.00.

A witty critic once observed that a scholarly treatise is a book which cannot be used for factual information, while a reference book is one lacking ideas. According to this definition the Woytinskys' monumental

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work would be neither a reference book nor a scholarly treatise; actually it is both. With its 1268 pages of double-column text, written in a concise encyclopaedia-like manner, its 497 statistical tables and 338 charts and maps, the book is the most comprehensive collection of world-wide information about the subject matter it treats. But it is by no means a voluminous conglomeration of statistics nor merely a systematized presentation of data. There is a leading idea permeating the work: that the world has entered a new phase of economic civilization, opening up for mankind a better future, in spite of the unrest which so heavily presses upon our time and which for a great part may be a consequence of too rapid economic growth. The progress of mechanized civilization, as the central topic of the study, increasingly shows a new face. In the nineteenth century, mechanized economy was limited to a few nations, whose wealth and privileged position it created. In the new phase of progress, which only recently has been entered, "modern technology spreads as widely as gaseous matter released from a container." It becomes accessible to peoples the world over, and this all the more because skills based on scientific knowledge are being recognized as even more fundamental for economic progress than accumulated wealth.

This concept is not developed at length by itself. It rather shows the authors' scholarly approach to facts of life and serves as a skeleton for the presentation of statistical data. Part I, "Man and His Environment", starts with man's habitat, surveys the geographic distribution of world population, its composition and structure, and its changes (migration, urbanization, natality, mortality, morbidity), and concludes with population projections and predictions. Part II, "World Needs and Resources", discusses the basic factors which determine the type of economic civilization: consumer needs, standards of living, natural resources, labor force, and national income. Then follow Part III, "Agriculture", IV "Energy and Mining" and V "Manufactures".

It is hardly conceivable how two persons—even with the background and experience of the authors—could carry out such a gigantic work so brilliantly in only five years, and without a research staff. The countless statistics supplemented by authoritative estimates are critically selected and skilfully adapted by the authors. When important problems are concerned, historical introductions are given often going back as far as to antiquity and even to prehistoric times.

The authors point out the main problems our economic civilization is facing and indicate ways for their solution. Their approach is throughout optimistic, generally an optimism founded on facts abundantly presented to the reader. There is, however, one problem of great im-

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portance where the authors' conclusions hardly can be accepted. This is the never-ceasing controversy around Malthus' theory, appearing as the crucial question of whether the future yield of agriculture will satisfy the demands of the steadily growing world population. True, the rapid increase, which has been in full swing in the course of the last two centuries, is characteristic for a transitional phase between the old equilibrium of high birth rate and high death rate and a new equilibrium where both natality and mortality are low (Mr. Woytinsky calls this "Notestein's concept of the three phases of the demographic cycle"; although Frank W. Notestein and other members of the Princeton Office of Population Research have successfully developed the idea since the 1940's, it was formulated before then—in 1927 at the World Population Conference by H. W. Methorst, *Proceedings*, p. 172, and in 1932 by the present reviewer and his late brother, in *Kriegs- und Wanderzüge*, pp. 139–140). But Mr. Woytinsky admits that this phase is not yet over for a great part of mankind, and if the present trends continue he visualizes for 2000 A.D. a world population increased by nearly a billion, most of them in Asia. Mr. Woytinsky rightly rejects as ineffective and dangerous any attempt to impose birth control on Asia, but he believes the future yield of agriculture will keep pace with the growing population. This thesis is fairly well substantiated if the world is considered as a whole. But Mr. Woytinsky states himself that the core of the problem is whether enough food can be supplied where it is most urgently needed, that is, for the population of Asia. He admits that the prospects of bridging the transitional phase by migration are limited, but he assumes that mechanization of Asian economy will solve the problem, partly by increasing agricultural output, partly by enabling Asia to buy additional foodstuffs with exports of her manufacture. Is the latter assumption not about as chimerical as a belief in a peaceful migration of tens or more millions of Asians?

Mr. Woytinsky's concluding remark is that "here economic problems merge with political considerations." For this and other reasons we await with great interest the second volume of the study which will deal with the political organization of the world and international cooperation, trade and investments.

EUGENE M. KULISCHER

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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*Economic Change: Selected Essays in Business Cycles, National Income, and Economic Growth.* By SIMON KUZNETS. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, 1953.—viii, 333 pp. $4.50.

*Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings.* By SIMON KUZNETS, assisted by ELIZABETH JENKS. New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1953.—xli, 725 pp. $9.00.

These two books differ widely in purpose and contents, but they both reflect a balance of judgment, a willingness to check theoretical hypotheses against empirical data, and conversely an insistence on the use of adequate theoretical considerations in assembling and interpreting data, that could well serve as a model for both the theoretically inclined and the empirically inclined economist.

*Economic Change* is a collection of eleven essays written over a span of more than two decades. While some of them are by now a little dated, the issues they raise are by no means obsolete, and many of the essays, especially of the more recent ones, were not published in very accessible spots. The collection begins with an article dated 1930 on business cycle theory, emphasizing the importance of considering time lags in the study of business cycle relationships, a precursor of what has since become popular as "process analysis". Next comes an interesting discussion of static theory, said to be based largely on deduction from a priori assumptions, as contrasted with dynamic theory which is said to be to a greater degree if not completely dependent upon the accumulation and analysis of quantitative data for the suggestion of its basic underlying assumptions. Perhaps today economists would be more inclined to draw the line in terms of prescriptive versus descriptive theory instead of in terms of static and dynamic theory, but the relationship in some form remains apt. Following, as an illustration of this dichotomy, is a confrontation of the acceleration principle as an a priori explanation of business cycles with an almost complete failure to observe in the annals of business cycles the relationships that would be predicted by this theory. To Kuznets the data indicate not so much that the acceleration principle is wrong but that it is only one among many and more important forces at work, and that one should not hope that as complex a concrete phenomenon as cyclical fluctuations could be adequately explained in terms of simplified a priori assumptions. The business cycle section of the book winds up with what are perhaps the two most rewarding essays in this part, one a review of Schumpeter's *Business Cycles*, and the second a summary lecture on economic trends and business cycles, in which the

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need for cautious, eclectic and painstaking work in the analysis of the available data, and the danger of too easy generalization on the basis of incomplete data or oversimplified schemes, are emphasized.

The next two essays on the measurement of national income have as their common theme the pitfalls attending the use of the more usual national income figures as indices of economic welfare. Much of the content of national income, as the figures are normally presented, represents mere "busyness" rather than welfare; or, to put it another way, many of the amenities of nonindustrialized or rural life find no representation in national income, while much of the higher processing and paraphernalia found in industrialized countries, and included in "income", represents merely outlays made to offset the disadvantages of working in urban or industrialized environments. Comparisons of widely different circumstances will always be to a high degree subjective, but Kuznets has made a valiant attempt to make such adjustments to the usual figures as he can find quantitative magnitudes for, and to suggest ways in which further efforts might proceed in obtaining magnitudes that have a more direct significance as indicia of welfare. By applying considerable ingenuity in making allowances for these factors, Kuznets manages to come up, as an illustration, with the estimate that real per capita consumption was some 7 times higher in the United States than in China over the period 1931–1936, as contrasted with the 12 to 1 ratio produced by, for instance, Colin Clark's estimates in terms of a more conventional definition of national income. Even so, if Kuznets was originally somewhat challenged by attempting to conjure up the picture of a person trying to keep body and soul together in the United States with $40 a year, one cannot help feeling that for such a comparison raising the figure to $75 and perhaps even higher may still be short of resolving the conundrum. Kuznets hints that further adjustments might be justifiable, but one can also question more fundamentally to what extent quantitative comparisons between such extremes can be made meaningful at the level of individual welfare.

The last four essays concern long-term trends in the development of industrial economies, including an attempt to trace the sources of international differences in income, a discussion of the slowing down of industrial growth, a long-range assessment of possibilities as of 1941, and some observations on past and present prospects in international economic relations, all of which is difficult to summarize except to say that the commentary is cautious, searching but inconclusive.

*Shares of Upper Income Groups* is a thorough and massive analysis of the distribution of income to the top 5 or 7 per cent of the population, based primarily on income tax data for the years 1913 to 1948, adjusted

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in various ways to reflect various definitions of income. Comparisons are made with other distributions of income that have been compiled from time to time, and very few data bearing on the subject appear to have been neglected. No attempt has been made, however, to estimate distributions of income within the lower ranges of income.

The salient facts that emerge from this study are that, while relatively little secular change in the over-all concentration of incomes occurred in the period 1913–1939, World War II brought about a very sharp reduction in the relative shares of the upper income groups, and that, while there were some indications of partial reversal of this shift from 1944 to 1948, the more recent figures for 1950 indicate no tendency to retrace any but a small fraction of this shift. To a somewhat erratic extent, shifts in income concentration tend to be associated with cyclical fluctuations in such a way that the relative share of the lower 95 per cent drops in a depression and rises in prosperity: the economic impact of depressions appears thus to have been relatively more severe upon the lower income classes.

The data and the manner of their processing are presented in meticulous and indeed overwhelming detail; the investigator who wishes to do further work in the field is presented with a wealth of material. There are, however, two points at which this reviewer notes an unrecognized bias, which would probably not, to be sure, be large enough to affect the over-all picture very much. One is the omission of earnings on life insurance reserves from the incomes of policyholders. This is an item of the order of $2 billion a year, and would probably be fairly well concentrated in middle-upper brackets, in that, while a large face value of insurance is in force among low income brackets, it is mainly of relatively short-term and low-reserve accumulation. Another item is the lack of any reallocation of taxable incomes reported by trusts and estates among income classes: while the amount involved is small (in 1942, of the order of $.3 billion as compared to $12 billion total income for the top 1 per cent of the population), it has shown a strong tendency to increase as the pressure of increased tax rates drives more taxpayers to take advantage of this tax loophole. But it is easy to pick flaws in a work of such magnitude, and possibly Kuznets was quite justified in ignoring these factors among many others as too insignificant to warrant the complicated and uncertain adjustments that would be involved.

As to the causes that may have brought about the rather dramatic shift in the distribution of income, Kuznets is characteristically non-committal. A long-continued high level of employment, intensifying the normal tendency of prosperity to decrease relative inequality, is obviously one of the factors. During the war years proper, some of the

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observed effect may in a sense be spurious in that it reflects merely the monetization of the value of women's work as they shift from housekeeping to wartime factory work. The impact of the unprecedentedly high income tax rates, especially on the second to seventh percentiles, is also a factor, especially if the distribution of disposable income after taxes is considered. But also relevant, though not mentioned by Kuznets, is the combination of a continued easy money policy and high corporation taxes; possibly price and rent controls had a significant influence. But here we are stepping beyond the rôle of observer to the more vulnerable one of theorist, a rôle which Kuznets is ever hesitant to assume.

These two books are admirable examples of cautious empiricism built on a carefully laid out theoretical foundation, and may well serve as a pattern toward which many writers in applied economics could move with advantage, even though at times, as in these instances, this may produce a less exciting result than when authors rush out onto the thinner ice.

WILLIAM S. VICKREY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Railroad Leaders, 1845–1890: The Business Mind in Action.* By THOMAS C. COCHRAN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.—xii, 564 pp. $7.50.

*Railroads of New York: A Study of Government Aid, 1826–1875.* By HARRY H. PIERCE. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.—xiii, 208 pp. $3.00.

American railroads have long been the subjects of violent adoration by fascinated and undiscriminating devotees or of equally violent vituperation by self-constituted exposers of the evils of predatory capitalism. Only gradually has there been taking form a body of careful and trustworthy railroad literature, of which the two books under review are both parts, even though they are vastly different in point of view, material and emphasis. The Cochran study, an outgrowth of the Research Center in Entrepreneurial History, analyzes the opinions and attitudes of sixty-one important railroad executives over a forty-five-year period. The Pierce study, descriptive rather than analytical, concerns government aid to the railroads of the state of New York.

The railroad executive described by Cochran was a man of generally conservative religious, political and economic views, thoroughly imbued with a conviction of the sanctity of private property. He objected to interference by either labor or government in the running of his business, and when government control became inescapable he preferred the federal over the state government. This spirit of independence, however,

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did not inspire him to fight against governmental aid. He believed in the virtues of free competition, but then illogically supported railroad coöperation on the management level, including the formation of large, integrated systems. Such ideas would be accepted by everyone as quite natural and to be expected, but less obvious would be the very considerable diversity of executive opinions, ranging even to the support of a guaranteed annual wage for labor. These men give little basis for the old and widely accepted "robber baron" concept in which nineteenth-century capitalists have been pictured as aggressive, crafty, ruthless, predatory and amoral exploiters. Actually the individuals studied by Cochran showed no particular urge for innovation and speculation, preferring prudence and tradition. They exhibited no tremendous love for big profits, favoring moderate and steady prosperity. They were kind-hearted and generous men who may well at times have made mistakes, but who thought of themselves as working for the best interests of society in general.

The reader of the Cochran volume quite naturally speculates as to just how far these entrepreneurial characteristics may be generalized. Obviously they are drawn from a limited sampling of only one group of managers. Cochran himself carefully and modestly limits the implications of his findings by stating quite early (p. 4) that "the writings of our sixty-one men are probably representative only of the more scrupulous railroad thinking and attitudes of the period." Possibly he is a trifle more modest than is absolutely necessary.

The Pierce study by contrast is highly specific and factual, and yet out of it also emerges a more favorable judgment of railroad promoters and speculators than is usually current. The railroads of New York were planned primarily to meet local desires for improved transportation, and not for speculative ends. Funds came but little from the large speculators and from Europe until after the railroads were going concerns. The federal government provided a little aid, and the state somewhat more, but the main financing was by individuals and communities along the lines of the new roads. While some projects were ill-advised and others were run inefficiently or even corruptly, the usual situation found the managers using diligence and moderately good judgment, with the local communities benefiting much more than the cost of the aid that they had provided. Just as in other parts of the country, hostility to railroads became widespread during the depression of the 1870's; in New York, government aid was stopped in this period. Many local communities found difficulty in paying the debts they had assumed so eagerly when the railroads had seemed to them to promise an economic utopia; their efforts at avoidance received some sympathy in the state courts but practically none in the federal judiciary, which clung steadily to the

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concept of the validity of contracts. As bearing on the points made by Cochran, the conclusions of Pierce seem to be that railroad executives were generally conscientious, conservative and public-spirited men who identified moderate profits to themselves with the good of the entire community.

Both of the authors of these studies are academic in background. Professor Cochran is at the University of Pennsylvania, and Professor Pierce at the School of Citizenship of Syracuse University. Both books involve extensive research and careful documentation. Both contain maps and considerable other supplementary material. The Cochran volume includes some 270 pages of extracts from the correspondence which furnished its basic material; unfortunately, a considerable part merely duplicates the lengthy extracts reprinted in the text. The Pierce volume has unusually excellent maps, together with valuable charts and tables. Both books have been printed by the Harvard University Press, which in general has done a good job if one makes allowance for the effort to save money in the last thirty pages of the Pierce book. Both monographs are the products of careful work by competent scholars of calm and even-handed judgment, and both are designed for the information of scholars rather than for the amusement of the general reader.

ROBERT E. RIEGEL

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

*The Organizational Revolution.* By KENNETH E. BOULDING. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1953.—286 pp. $3.50.

Professor Boulding's book, like all his other publications, is refreshing, stimulating reading. The first part discusses the nature, causes and effects of the organizational revolution. The second part contains case studies in the fields of labor movements, the farm organization movement, and business organizations. The author sums it all up in the following sentence: "The rise of the labor movement, the farm organization movement, the great corporation, the trust, the cartel, even the enormous rise in the activity of the national state itself, are part of a general movement in history, a movement which has suffered a remarkable acceleration of pace in the past seventy or eighty years."

The author is certainly right in his assertion that we are inclined to accept principles and beliefs which were applicable to an early system but which do not really apply to the present. Today all trades and professions are organized in associations, and the national state in all countries is immensely more powerful and reaches much farther down into the lives and pockets of the individual than a hundred years ago. Mr. Boulding says: "This movement is seen in its extreme form in the

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rise of communist states like Russia, where the nation becomes virtually the only economic organization" (p. 203).

The two most important groups of problems which arise out of the organizational revolution are those connected with the conflict between the private and general interests and those connected with the use of coercion.

This reviewer does not agree with the author's statement that the "supply" rather than the "need" has been the cause of the rise of organizations. When one social group becomes organized, the other groups have to get organized too or lose their bargaining position. Protection of economic interests is an impelling factor contributing to the organization of bargaining groups, groups which do not want to be coerced by other groups.

The political and psychological effects of the organizational revolution are reflected, according to the author, in the "ever-increasing efficiency" of a monstrous leviathan, the state, which has enormously increased its ability to control the lives of its citizens." "No aspect of the organizational revolution is more menacing than the growing efficiency of coercion."

The modern Western states, called by the author "social-democratic", are characterized by the increasing proportion of national income absorbed by central governments, by the development of progressive income taxes and by the increasing degree of governmental control of the pricing system through various kinds of regulations.

The excellent "Summary and Conclusions" ends with a chapter entitled "Continuing Dilemma", and a continuing dilemma it is. Are the conclusions to be sought in the powers of the "monstrous leviathans" to inspire so much fear to each other that a disastrous onslaught will be avoided ad infinitum? With regard to the internal affairs of the state, is the conclusion to be sought in unavoidable mounting strength of the government to assume the steadily increasing rôle as an arbiter between the bargaining groups and ultimately to suppress them and become the all-might monster directing all human activities? Perhaps this is what the author means, though he does not say it. (This reviewer was reminded of George Orwell's Big Brother when the author speculated on the future consequences of the organizational revolution.) What gives this book its value is the courageous and clear presentation of the complexity of the problems. As it was meant as a contribution to discussion, it certainly has achieved its aim most eloquently.

MICHAEL ALBERY

BOSTON COLLEGE

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*Church and Society: Catholic Social and Political Thought and Movements, 1789–1950.* Edited by JOSEPH N. MOODY. New York, Arts, Inc., 1953.—914 pp. $12.00.

Students of politics are well aware that, even in a secular age like our own, the rôle of religious groups is important for an understanding of a nation's social and political structure. Yet despite this awareness, serious books in the field remain rare; and those which exist are often marred by violent partisanship, prejudice, or special pleading.

This new volume, therefore, is both welcome and useful. Mr. Moody and his collaborators have sought to survey, as objectively as their Catholic faith will permit, the social and political activity of Catholics in the major Western nations during the last two centuries. Most of the essays rest on broad and solid documentation. A vast amount of information is packed into the book—so much, indeed, that the conscientious reader is likely to develop a case of mental indigestion. More than a hundred pages of selected documents accompany the text. Along with the facts, there are many provocative ideas; and embarrassing questions are, for the most part, examined (or at least touched upon) rather than evaded.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the volume is its stress on the internal divisions of Catholics with respect to social and political doctrines. These intra-faith conflicts occupy as much space as the controversies between Catholics and non-Catholics. Mr. Moody and his team do not represent a cross section of the various Catholic schools of thought; all of them are deeply committed to the Christian Democratic position. While they seek to understand and explain the attitudes of the conservative, authoritarian element in the Church, they are plainly convinced that this element led Catholicism into a blind alley during the nineteenth century. Their sympathies lie with Leo XIII and Benedict XV, not with Pius IX or X. They are frankly critical of the Franco régime, of Schuschnigg's "pseudo-Catholic Christian Corporative State", and of Msgr. Ryan's doctrine that in a Catholic state, non-Catholic groups have no right to propagandize "in favor of their several species of untruths". Yet the volume closes with a eulogy of that same Msgr. Ryan (by John L. Lewis!); and it is dedicated to Cardinal Spellman, who can hardly be classed as a vigorous critic of General Franco.

Like all collaborative works, this book has serious flaws. It is a massive, sprawling, unbalanced volume, varying widely in literary merit, approach and depth. In places it is lucid and vigorous; in other sections, turgid, diffuse and dull. An editor's job in such circumstances is an almost

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impossible one; but one cannot help wishing that Mr. Moody had been more ruthless in holding his co-authors to some sort of plan, and to a consistent standard of literary expression.

The weightiest contributions are those on France (by the editor, who is professor of history at Notre Dame) and on Germany (by Edgar Alexander, formerly a prominent figure in the Center party). These two sections together make up half the volume. A long chapter of more than a hundred pages is devoted to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; and there are brief essays on Belgium, England, Latin America, the United States and post-war France. Trends in Italy are interwoven with (and more or less submerged by) a discussion of the Papacy since 1789. It is especially startling in such a book to find a total of only ten pages devoted to Spain, and no space at all to Portugal or Ireland. The editor explains that his plan to include a thorough treatment of Spain was frustrated because "a non-partisan analysis of the complex socio-religious situation" there would require too much space and would be too difficult to achieve. No doubt this is true; yet it would seem that such an analysis —even if imperfect—would have been far more useful than the long and not very enlightening accounts of Polish and Hungarian Catholicism.

It would be unfair to overstress the weaknesses of the book. Despite its flaws (which also include an exceptional number of typographical errors), Mr. Moody's volume is a valuable addition to the literature in the field. He has intended it to be "an exploratory study" rather than a definitive work; his purpose is to "start thinking . . . and thus curtail the effect of those generalizations which are proposed all too frequently in this area." Perhaps it will help to erode the barriers of suspicion which still hamper coöperation among democrats of all faiths. Much will depend, of course, on future trends within Catholicism itself. Mr. Moody's book makes it clear that the internal conflict between conservative and Christian Democratic elements has not been fully resolved in any Western country. Even in the United States, writes Francis Downing, "the number of social illiterates are [*sic*] still in excess of the allowed quota. But the new wind is rising, and the waters flow." Non-Catholics will be encouraged by the spirit in which this particular group of scholars has tackled a difficult and complex subject.

Gordon Wright

University of Oregon

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*Principia Politica: A Study of Communal Psychology.* By LEONARD WOOLF. New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1953.—319 pp. $5.00.

The conflict between divine right and popular sovereignty theories of legitimacy, frequently it is assumed, occurred during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and terminated in a fairly conclusive victory for the view that no régime is justified and righteous unless founded on the consent of the people. The main purpose of *Principia Politica*, it would seem, is to destroy this delusion, to assert that the foe, "authoritarianism", not in the old familiar guise of divine right retained now only by the churches but in the form of infallible Fuehrers and of the infallible Bolshevik party, is still as virulent and destructive as it was at the dawn of the Enlightenment. But be of good cheer; authoritarianism is neither necessary nor viable.

Mr. Woolf has no patience for the argument that ecclesiastical or political authority is necessary as a crib-work for society. Advocacy of authoritarianism on the pragmatic ground—Santayana's *Dominations and Powers* is the illustration—that moral values are liable, to the detriment of social stability, to be in practice ignored and even in conviction denied unless the lower orders can be made to believe that the moral laws are of superhistorical origin and that God has commissioned vicegerents to require obedience is dismissed as hypocritical and false. Furtive prejudice prompts the notion that the many cannot be trusted with moral autonomy just as successfully as their aspiring custodians. History has demonstrated (p. 288) the falsity of the claim that "authoritarian governments produce social stability and decent standards of morality and social values in their subjects . . . ." The truth, contrary to this whole argument, is that God, who in the beginning was created by man in the image of his male parent (pp. 65–67), is a much more recalcitrant barbarian than is man.

Political authoritarianism was viable until our century. Indeed, from Xerxes down through the centuries to Hitler and Stalin the idea that there is a particular man or group who cannot err in the establishment of policy and who, therefore, ought to direct the masses has been always, save for "a few brief and doubtful interludes", the basis of governance. And the record shows, not divine perspicacity, but stupidity and incompetence. Now, under the conditions introduced by industrialism, the concentration of absolute power in the hands of one man or a few men invariably produces, we are told (p. 300), with "monotonous precision those effects which it is supposed to prevent: social insecurity, economic hardships, mass misery, international anarchy, and finally that inevitable

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final act by which bad governments try to cut the Gordian knot of their own tying, war." Any contemporary régime—Mr. Woolf is thinking chiefly of the U.S.S.R.—that would develop modern technology must encourage the education of talents and stir up individual initiative; but intelligence and self-reliance cannot be isolated, and democracy "is the natural and inevitable result of ordinary persons acquiring sufficient knowledge and intelligence to think about politics" (p. 303). This outcome, of course, may be deterred temporarily by a program of "stupification" which affects both ruled and rulers, or may be obviated completely by an international holocaust that conclusively liquidates the dilemma of modern authoritarianism. Authoritarianism, which blundered through in the past, in our own century is not viable.

In 1931 and in 1939 Mr. Woolf published the first and second volumes of *After the Deluge*. The present work, although to a limited extent autobiographical and although a great deal more analytical than historical, purports to be the third volume of his study of the changes in the intellectual climate—"communal psychology" is his term—of the period since 1789.

This book—since there is to be a fourth volume, one dealing with the question (p. 291) of whether or not a really democratic society can be made viable in the modern world, these comments may not be inappropriate—is not without serious flaws. The author tried to do at least three things; and each obstructs the others. He tried to write the third volume of *After the Deluge*, to write an autobiography, and to give us *principia politica*. His attempt to use his earlier study of communal psychology as his point of departure distorted the structure of this work and led to tedious cross-references. The autobiography, which could have served as a frame for the political knowledge and wisdom that he must have accumulated, after a promising beginning fades out just before the end of the very first chapter. And the examination of the politics of authoritarianism, on which finally he focuses, is only the obverse of a coin. We have before us only one part of an argument. We know the reasons why he considers one of the logically possible adjustments, that is, complete authoritarianism, both unnecessary and not viable. But we have not been told whether the other extreme, that is, complete popular rule, is desirable or viable. Besides, if it is not, we have been given no clue whatsoever as to the criterion by which he will prescribe a suitable admixture of the two. This incompleteness, rather than the lack of coherent organization and of succinct expression that obscures the thesis, is the chief defect of *Principia Politica*.

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*English Law and the Moral Law.* By A. L. GOODHART. London, Stevens & Sons Limited; Toronto, The Carswell Company Ltd., 1953.—x, 151 pp. 12*s.* 6*d.*

Despite the rhetoric of a Coke and the tergiversations of a Blackstone, the legal climate of England has been inhospitable to definitions of law in terms of transcendental norms. Law—whether based on custom, statute, or prerogative ordinance—has been identified by positive validity, binding force: "A law . . . is any rule which will be enforced by the courts" (Dicey).

From this positivist tradition of English jurisprudence, Dr. Goodhart, in his Hamlyn Lectures on *English Law and the Moral Law*, dissociates himself, tearing down the Austinian fence that separates law from morals. The result is that the concept of law escapes the confines of disciplined usage and becomes lost in a maze of ambiguity. True, our author seems reluctant to shake off *all* fetters of positivist restraint: "Law is not necessarily either reasonable or moral" (p. 5). Yet he proposes Thomistically that "without justice law is nothing more than a system of arbitrary rules . . ." (i.e., *non-law*?) (p. 8), and pronounces inadequate the Hobbesian-Austinian theory—because it excludes religious and moral "law" (p. 14)! These norms being law as much as "State law" is, he eliminates the sanction as an essential element in law (pp. ix, 16–17, 42).

What, then, is the essence of law? Professor Goodhart finds it in the recognition of an obligation (pp. 19, 150), in "the feeling of *oughtness*" (p. 20): What makes a rule a law is my recognizing it as obligatory, whereas if we "obey an order solely because we fear that if we do not do so we shall incur an evil . . . we are reacting to naked force . . ." (p. 19), not to law. (Stammler is taken to task [p. 21] for considering it *legally* [and only legally] immaterial whether a person obeys legal norms out of respect for the law or out of fear!)

One need not labor the anarchism of such a subjectivist theory of law. Nor is it necessary to demonstrate that on this foundation a science of (positive) law is impossible. Nowhere in his lectures does Dr. Goodhart distinguish a legal from a moral obligation—an ambiguity essential to his position. For if we recognize this distinction, we accept legal positivism with its sanction theory: I may recognize a rule as *legally* obligatory (i.e., as a *law* in the meaning unacceptable to Goodhart), and still I may obey it for fear of punishment only. To the extent, that is, that "obligation" means legal obligation, the "coercive order" and the "obligatory order" are identical. It is evident, therefore, from Goodhart's view, *contra* Kelsen, of the two orders as essentially different (p. 17), that he conceives of "obligation" as exclusively moral obligation and that to

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him the only legal order is the (morally) "obligatory order". Since "it is the sense of [moral] obligation which gives the rule its legal character" (p. 150), it seems self-contradictory for Dr. Goodhart to speak of a "moral obligation [a pleonasm, with him, in any event] to obey any *law* issued by the Government merely because it has been issued" (p. 25; italics mine). For the legal positivist this is meaningful; a rule is law to him precisely *because* "issued by the Government", and the moral obligation to obey it rests (unless on the feeling that the rule is a just one) on this recognition of its "lawness". But when Goodhart, for whom "law depends on the recognition of a [moral] obligation [to obey]" (p. x), speaks of a "moral obligation to obey any law . . .", he is manifestly revolving in a circle.

His insistence, finally, on calling "law" every rule recognized as obligatory causes him to mix up not only law and morals, but also law and political fact. Surely everyone recognizes that the Queen is obligated not to withhold her assent from a bill passed by both Houses and that there are things the (legally) sovereign Queen-in-Parliament cannot do. But Professor Goodhart converts both the rule of constitutional practice ("convention") and the rule of political reality into rules of constitutional *law*. Speaking as a *lawyer*, he finds the statement that "the Queen-in-Parliament is supreme . . . nearly as misleading as is the statement that the Queen's consent is necessary to a valid act of Parliament" (p. 54). Neither statement is legally misleading. Both are politically wrong.

Frederic S. Burin

Columbia University

*The Party System in Great Britain.* By Ivor Bulmer-Thomas. London, Phoenix House Ltd., New York, The Macmillan Co., 1953.—vii, 328 pp. 25*s.*; $5.00.

The author of this book has unusual qualifications for writing on British politics. In 1942, he was elected to Parliament as a member of the Labor party. Thereafter he became Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation, and then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. Breaking with the Attlee government on the issue of steel nationalization he crossed the floor to the Conservatives. He is now without a seat in Parliament.

Parallel with this parliamentary experience has gone a successful career as a journalist. Before the war, Mr. Bulmer-Thomas was an editorial writer for *The Times* and the *News-Chronicle*. He is now Deputy Editor of the *Daily Telegraph*.

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The characteristics of his book reflect the experience of its author. It is not a profound or highly original work. It does not push the analysis of political parties into new areas or endow it with new methods. It is not a major exposition, still less a major critique, of the British party system, such as one would expect were Mr. Bulmer-Thomas an Ostrogorski or a Lowell. But it has all the virtues of a work by an experienced, careful, and scholarly publicist and politician—lucidity of style, systematic organization, up-to-dateness and a sense for political realities.

Mr. Bulmer-Thomas first traces the history of parties up to 1951 and then describes in considerable detail, sometimes rather wearisome detail, their organization. There is a useful treatment of the press giving the party allegiance of newspapers and other information. Ancillary associations (e.g., political clubs such as The Carlton) and nonparty political organizations (such as the Anti-Corn Law League of historic fame and the more recent League of Nations Union) are described. A concluding series of chapters discusses current trends and problems.

Surveying the contemporary scene, Mr. Bulmer-Thomas feels only a restrained regret over the disappearance of the Independents from Parliament in 1951. "A Parliament of Independents would be both impracticable and undesirable; but a dozen Independents in a House of 625 members can be the leaven that leaveneth the lump." More serious is "the loss of independence of mind within a party," which has come about, even if not completely, in recent times. To stop this decline he would provide that "Governments should not feel obliged to resign if defeated in the House of Commons unless the question of censure or confidence is specifically put" and seek to persuade constituency organizations to tolerate occasional "divagations in speech and vote" on the part of their members. These proposals reveal that the author is not altogether free from Utopianism.

This loss of independence troubles the author more than the introduction of party politics into local government. It is true, he agrees, that the issues of local government are matters involving a choice of techniques more often than a clash of philosophies. But many of them are the same issues upon which politicians divide in the national arena. Inevitably, therefore, party tactics and party loyalties have seeped down to the local level. All that can be hoped for is the exercise of restraint.

Perhaps Mr. Bulmer-Thomas is led to hope for this by his views on the future of parties. He thinks that the Conservatives have more chances to attract Labor votes, and thereby create a majority, than vice versa. Nor is this due only to the well-known tendency of Left-wing parties to split into fractions. He believes, in addition to this,

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that the Labor party has lost much of the original appeal it possessed before it took office. Moreover, much of its program has already been placed into operation and no new one developed. A split in the Labor party coalition of "socialists" and "laborites" would certainly provide some opportunities for the Communists to make gains. But Mr. Bulmer-Thomas sees very little future for minor parties. The Conservatives should profit most, he feels, from the difficulties of Labor.

Such anticipations do not bulk large in Mr. Bulmer-Thomas' book which is mainly a straightforward analysis and presentation of the party system. Students of British politics will find it worth reading.

THOMAS P. PEARDON

BARNARD COLLEGE

*The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by the United States Senate.* By JOSEPH P. HARRIS. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1953.—xii, 457 pp. $5.00.

The first and longest of the three sections of this book is a history of senatorial confirmation from the debates in the Philadelphia Convention and the rejection in 1789 of one Benjamin Fishbourn to the confirmation of Charles E. Bohlen in 1953. The second part analyzes the uniquely American practice of "senatorial courtesy" and discusses the differing attitudes and procedures of the Senate as it considers cabinet nominees, commissioners of independent agencies, diplomats, judges, and top administrative and military personnel. The last two chapters are concerned with recent proposals extending confirmation further down the executive hierarchy and with an evaluation of the constitutional power as presently utilized.

The "advice and consent" of the Senate is a crucial problem in the study of American public affairs, because it goes to the heart of the major dilemma of modern American government. Reflected in the mirror of senatorial confirmation are the images of the federal system we evolved in the hope of decentralizing governmental activity and the separation of national political powers we demanded in the hope of impeding tendencies toward tyranny. That this double fragmentation has made our political process slow-moving, minority-oriented, frustrating, and even deadlocked has been the theme on which most of our political scientists have played numberless variations.

"Most contests over nominations", writes Harris (p. 397), "represent little more than a struggle for power. . . ." Perhaps he might have

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used this sentence as an opening hypothesis, rather than as a passing and pejorative remark at the end of the book. He confines himself largely to a historical summary of confirmations and rejections, but he never considers the individual Senator as a spokesman for a faction of his state organization. Given the realities of our decentralized party system, the implications of senatorial confirmation can be understood only in the context of power struggles among intrastate factions of the party of the President.

Sometimes this pattern is clearly visible, as in the cases of Roosevelt's nomination of Floyd Roberts to the federal bench and Truman's choice of Martin Hutchinson for a Federal Trade Commissionership. Both men had been active in the pro-New Deal, anti-Byrd faction of Virginia's Democracy, and both were rejected under the rule of "senatorial courtesy". In other instances, however, the view is not so sharply defined. In the contest to confirm Gordon Clapp as Chairman of the Board of TVA, the author neglects the rôle of Tennessee Democratic politics. Whatever else Kenneth McKellar was in 1946, he was primarily the senatorial spokesman for a Memphis group even then on the defensive, challenged by a faction which had already put Estes Kefauver and Albert Gore into the House of Representatives. Similarly, the case in 1951 of the rejection of Truman's nominees to the Illinois federal bench on the request of Senator Douglas cannot be studied without understanding the factionalism shown by Douglas' relation to Chicago Democratic leader Arvey, the latter's endorsement of Douglas' choices, and the President's consultations with Congressman Sabath and former Senator Lucas. Not to be forgotten is Douglas' overwhelming majority in Illinois in 1948, Truman's tiny one, and Arvey's interest in Eisenhower as Democratic presidential nominee that year. Senator McCarthy's opposition to Bohlen in 1953 (and thus to his colleague Wiley) took on a new dimension as the struggle—nowhere discussed by Harris—between Wisconsin Republican factions broke into the open over the Bricker amendment.

Research in state political party organizations and their internecine conflicts is the next step in understanding the problem of confirmation and its proper rôle in the process of national politics. Mr. Harris has begun this study by demonstrating its necessity and by showing us in which states and during which historical periods this research will be most fruitful.

MERTON L. REICHLER

COLUMBIA COLLEGE

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*The Tidelands Oil Controversy: A Legal and Historical Analysis.* By ERNEST R. BARTLEY. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1953.—x, 312 pp. $5.00.

Ernest Bartley's monograph on the tidelands oil controversy is less a historical analysis than a detailed legal brief for the states' rights position. His approach to politics is that of a contentious attorney, amassing legal precedents to prove his client's case. This not only produces a work of special pleading, since Mr. Bartley has little sympathy for the government position, but results in a piece of political history which is excessively legalistic. For all the contemporaneity of the issues, and the careful analysis of recent cases, there is something curiously old-fashioned about this book. Mr. Bartley approaches politics from the point of view of a late nineteenth-century political scientist of the Burgess school, as though a half-century of study of the economic roots of political institutions and the conflict of interest groups had been wiped out. He cavalierly dismisses the notion that the large oil companies were behind the tidelands issue, without ever actually examining the influence of the companies, contenting himself with noting that, if almost all of the inland states supported the tideland states, then it must have been concern over states' rights and not the stake of the oil companies which was at the bottom of the agitation. In so far as he looks into the politics of the oil companies at all, it is to study, not the major oil companies which had interests in the tidelands, but the minor outfits which were opposed to state control of the tidelands.

In addition to his central plea for Congressional action to reverse the Supreme Court decisions in the tidelands cases (action which was taken shortly after the publication of the book), the main burden of Mr. Bartley's argument is that Mr. Justice Black in *U.S. v. California* [332 U. S. 19 (1947)] set forth a dangerous new doctrine of the "paramount powers" of the federal government in the tidelands, which might upset the traditional balance of federal-state relations, and even, conceivably, threaten state control over inland waters. Mr. Bartley shows the affinity of Black's decision with Sutherland's opinion in *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* [229 U. S. 304 (1936)] and Douglas' opinion in *U.S. v. Pink* [315 U. S. 203 (1942)], but he is unable to show that the decision presents any real threat to state control of inland waters. Even more important, he treats the federal government as though it were a hostile enemy power, with little grasp of the idea that American federalism must be flexible enough to embrace expanding federal power, as the economy and the demands of foreign affairs change.

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Despite the limitations of Mr. Bartley's approach, his book has considerable merit, both as a presentation of the history of the legal aspects of the tidelands question, particularly in his discussion of the territorial concept of the marginal sea, and as a critique of Black's reasoning in the tidelands cases. Mr. Bartley demonstrates that, whatever the merits of the majority opinion in *U.S. v. California*, the Court raised far more questions than it answered, and, in distinguishing between title and control, has issued an invitation to litigation for years to come.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

*Age and Youth: Memories of Three Universities* and *Father of the Man*. By SIR ERNEST BARKER. London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1953.—xi, 347 pp. 21*s*.; $3.40.

The reader of this book is likely to find himself about equally interested in the author and in his experience. Thirty-five years ago, orthodox Oxford tutors vainly forbade their pupils to attend Barker's lectures because "he pots his subject." As one reads his earlier life, one sees why. It was by being able to drill himself (and subsequently an appalling number and variety of students) to take examination hurdles, that Barker overcame the handicap of birth in rural poverty and rose to eminence at Oxford. Neither there nor at London or Cambridge did he shed his Northern accent or ape gentility. He taught, wrote and administered with astonishing energy. At twenty-five, a publisher's contract for what was intended to be a cram-book on Aristotle's *Politics* put him into communion with his acknowledged intellectual master, and it is no accident that that book, as it has developed in revisions, seems likely to be his lasting intellectual monument.

The historian may be forgiven for hoping that this autobiography will survive too, for in an amiable, conversational way it etches academic men and memories of societies too easily lost or submerged in more pompous or precious recollections. Barker studiously shuns what he calls "peacockery". In spite of an extraordinary gallery of the great and near-great in his life, and the obvious, if temporary, pleasure that he had in administration and public affairs while Principal of King's College, London, the prevailing impression is of an unprejudiced, enquiring and wondering mind that, while eager for new experiences, remained focused in the mystery of education. He recurs again and again to comparisons among Oxford, London, Cambridge, Glasgow,

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Bristol, Aberystwyth, Amherst (where Mr. Lewis Douglas was his assistant), Harvard, and Cologne. He balances university and college against each other, lecturing and tutoring, and so on. He tried to cope with the problem of graduate studies at both Oxford and Cambridge and he acknowledges, without much attempt to explain, the relative failure to solve it. Oddly enough, he seems to have overlooked London's degree of success.

A certain amount of this life must be guessed at, for family matters are for the most part expressly excluded, and the two occasions when Barker surprised and to some extent offended his peers, by leaving St. John's College for New College and New College for London, are displayed clearly, but not explained. Occasional asides and digressions, however, provide candid illuminations of the man and his mind which the reader may apply to the events in the chronicle, for example: "Whenever I have belonged to a group, and have found the group cultivating and expecting the quality called *esprit de corps*, I have instinctively shied at the expectation" (p. 304). *Father of the Man*, the fascinating record of his first twenty-four years, recalls Sir Fred Clarke, another poor farm-boy whose merits and energy carried him to the top of the British educational world, and it is appropriate that Clarke was one of the first two of Barker's students to place in the First Class at Oxford.

At eighty, having indulged in every variety of the British educational experience, Sir Ernest concludes: "A professor does not lie on any bed of roses. I have found, in the course of my own life, that administration is easier than genuine cogitation."

J. B. BREBNER

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## BOOK NOTES

To students of politics the records of our public bodies often seem fiendishly designed, even when they are available, to make analysis and interpretation of the process difficult. Since 1945, journalists, professional students of government, and interested citizens have found the task of following one segment of this complicated structure, the national legislature, considerably simplified by the weekly and annual publications of Congressional Quarterly News Features. In releasing the present annual volume, *Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 83rd Congress, 1st Session—1953*, Volume IX (Washington, Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1954; 663 pp. $17.50), the publishers for the first time are offering the *Almanac* to individual purchasers without the necessity of subscribing to the entire service. This should be an attractive opportunity for anyone seriously interested in studying the Congress, since the 1953 volume, containing all the material in the weekly reports, maintains and even improves upon the remarkable accuracy and completeness attained by its predecessors. The core of these materials is a readily usable tabulation of every roll-call vote in the session, giving the name, constituency, and party affiliation of every member, and recording not only votes, but pairs, absences, and, in some instances, the absent members' reports on how they would have voted had they been present. The latter, accomplished through questioning absentees on selected issues, is an ingenious device, although unfortunately it is not always possible to tell from the tabulation when a member has been recorded in this way and when by official procedures. The tabulation has recently been improved by addition of a notation indicating when a man is unrecorded because he was not at the time eligible, and it is supplemented, for all major and a good many minor bills, by a series of remarkably skillful summaries of the background and contents of proposed legislation, committee action, floor debates, and the positions taken on the measures by the major organized interest groups. In addition, thumbnail sketches of all bills introduced or in any way acted upon are provided in convenient form. Among other useful items will be found a good summary of the reports filed during the year under the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act and a helpful section of background for the congressional elections of 1954. As in previous editions, the reader is provided with a number of summary indexes of congressional behavior which lend themselves



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readily to journalistic treatment but which are not likely to be used without caution by wary students. For example, the "party unity" percentage, which records the frequency with which a member has voted with the majority of his party when they oppose a majority of those from the other side of the aisle, is useful as applied to individual members. When the editors suggest, however, that (p. 92) "Democrats . . . stood with the main body of Republicans 26.12 per cent of the time" they are being something less than completely enlightening. When they attempt to compare presidential "boxscores" (p. 87) they raise more questions than they answer. These, however, may be inevitable compromises which a news service must make, and they do not seriously weaken what the editors not inaccurately call "the authoritative reference on Congress." —DAVID B. TRUMAN, Columbia University.

*The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation* by Professors Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven, Jr., of the University of Chicago Law School (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1953; viii, 107 pp. $2.50) is a splendid illustration of Alexander Pope's couplet that "True wit is Nature to advantage dress'd, What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd" (*Essay on Criticism*). An enviable intellectual stamina has enabled the authors to plow through the mountainous literature which has accumulated since Adam Smith first suggested that "It is not very unreasonable that the rich should contribute to the public expense, not only in proportion to their revenue, but something more than in that proportion" (*The Wealth of Nations*, Modern Library Edition, p. 794). In analyzing the effects of progressive rather than proportional taxation of all personal income above the subsistence level, the authors present two moderately persuasive reasons for opposition to progression: it is responsible for the appalling complexity of the present income tax law and it tends to dampen investment incentives. The cogency of the second argument is somewhat reduced when it is realized that "high corporate taxes are typically much more repressive in their effects than are high personal taxes—at least as long as capital gains continue to receive very favorable treatment" (J. K. Butters and J. Lintner, *Effect of Federal Taxes on Growing Enterprises*, 1945, p. 2). Most of the book, however, analyzes not the arguments against progression but those traditionally used to support progression. The book's title suggests that the case for progression is merely uneasy; the authors appear convinced that it is nonexistent. The major justifications considered, and consigned to the intellectual rubbish heap, include the inhibiting effects of progressivity on business fluctuations and on the tendency toward

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secular stagnation. The benefit and sacrifice theories which were erected in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to justify progression are destroyed with impressive brilliance by revealing their unwarranted assumptions. The authors excel at demolition jobs in which they can minimize the discussion of social values and ethical considerations. When these issues must be faced, the discomfort of the authors appears on every page. When, for example, they cannot reject greater economic equality as a basis for progression, they damn it with faint praise by stating that progression perhaps can be sustained as "a sort of last refuge for doing something politely about the distribution of income under a market system" (p. 85). This defect in a book which is well written, clearly reasoned and superbly comprehensive is not too serious. The authors understandably prefer to restrict themselves to matters where logic can be decisive rather than deal with those elusive ethical subjects which ultimately defy rational analysis and on which even reasonable men can differ.—LEON QUINTO, The Pennsylvania State University.

No subject is more enticing to the historian or more important to those who have the responsibility of formulating public policies than the development of rigidities in society to a point where no opportunities are left for relieving tensions by gradual change. Nor is any example of such a development more perfect than the French case of the *ancien régime*. In fact, the Great French Revolution of 1789 can best be understood as the snapping of institutional arrangements which had been drawn so taut that they offered almost no chance for orderly release. To the literature of the problem of growing rigidities in France in the eighteenth century, *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV*, by Franklin L. Ford (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953; xii, 280 pp. $6.00) is an important contribution. Its argument is that the "new" nobles of the robe, who had acquired their titles mainly by buying judgeships in the major courts of the land, had assumed by 1748 leadership in defending the privileges of the aristocracy of France. Although this thesis is not new, Mr. Ford has developed and amplified it with abundant evidence and literary skill. He describes a situation in which the nobles of the robe were to lead a revolt against the King in the years 1787 to 1789 in defending their traditional privileges. Perhaps the one aspect of this problem upon which Mr. Ford might have thrown more light was the infiltration of commoners into the noble class in the eighteenth century. This subject is fortunately being looked at anew by Professor Jean Egret and by a candidate for a doctorate at the Sorbonne, Joël Bluche.—SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, Columbia University.

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The publication of *English Historical Documents*, Volume VIII: *1660–1714* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953; xxxii, 966 pp. $17.50), ably edited by Andrew Browning, marks an important step forward in realizing the projected series of thirteen volumes of English historical documents that are to be published under the general editorship of Professor David Douglas. The completed series will make the primary sources of English history more readily available both to students of history and, it is hoped, to a wider reading public outside the colleges and universities. While Volume II, the first of these volumes to appear, centered on the Norman Conquest and the subsequent erection of the strong Norman monarchy, Volume VIII records the chief themes of the equally momentous period in English history when the Stuart monarchy plainly became the parliamentary monarchy that prevailing constitutional theory proclaimed it to be. The emphasis, however, is more than constitutional; for this is a work of wide scope, reflecting prodigious editorial activity and touching aspects of English life that range from witchcraft to weather, travelogues of the English countryside to an account of Hudson's Bay Company in North America, and from a pen portrait of Titus Oates to one of Henry Sacheverell. Professor Browning, biographer of the Earl of Danby and editor of the Reresby memoirs, has placed some 400 documents, illustrative of the years from 1660 through 1714, under eleven main categories, the enumeration of which hints at the many-sided presentation undertaken here. These are the monarchy, parliament, public finance, the church, local government and social life, trade and plantations, Scotland, Ireland, armed forces, foreign affairs, and, finally, sovereigns, politicians and some other men. Each category is preceded by a competent introduction, while a general introduction describes the drama of the House of Stuart as this was played out in the Restoration, the Glorious Revolution, and the Revolution Settlement. Throughout there are excellent bibliographies. As a whole, the documents in each category are commendably comprehensive, although a few omissions may be queried. For example, one misses under the monarchy explicit reference to the rudimentary cabinet system and under trade and plantations the sister statutes of the Navigation Act of 1660. In the realm of constitutional theory, an important thread is lacking. Surely some materials should have been included to show the pervasive influence after 1660 of the Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, that remarkable document in which Charles I on the eve of the Civil War depicted the English government as mixed and balanced and thus set the stage for the return of the monarchy without definite conditions being attached. During the Restoration, this classical theory became a

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commonplace in Whig and Tory literature alike. Accordingly, extracts from Sir Robert Filmer's *The Anarchy of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy* rather than his *Patriarcha* would have been very much to the point. But these are relatively minor matters in the face of Professor Browning's solid achievement in supplying a diversity of readings from which future historical study must benefit.—CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON, University of Houston.

R. C. Desai's doctoral dissertation (Cambridge University) now published in book form, *Standard of Living in India and Pakistan, 1931–32 to 1940–41* (Bombay, Popular Book Depot, 1953; xvii, 286 pp. Rs. 20/-), is a unique contribution to the limited literature on the national income of India and Pakistan. His approach is to attempt to measure consumer expenditures over the pre-war decade and his conclusion is that, while total consumer expenditure rose slowly in spite of and even during the depression, the rise was not sufficient to offset the rapid growth in the population, and the per capita expenditure, in both current and constant prices, fell over the decade. In Dr. Desai's opinion the most serious cause for concern was that the consumption of food, except for variations of nature, was steady while population was increasing so rapidly, thus giving rise "to a situation worse than contemplated by Malthus". "This essay, therefore, ends with this picture of an increasing number of motor cars, wireless sets, electricity, telephones, cinemas, newspapers, periodicals and books, and clothing in greater quantities and superior qualities. But all these were overshadowed by Malthusian portents looming on the horizon and waiting, at a little twist of nature, to swoop down on the teeming millions of human lives." There is evidence of careful and meticulous scholarship and painstaking detail in the handling of statistics, admittedly inadequate. Dr. Desai modestly declares: "Failing to possess scientifically accurate information, the author was compelled to use the data available in their present form. He has, however, constantly endeavored to divest himself from the hallucinations of accuracy induced by the neatly printed columns and totals published under the authority of the then Government of India. He has also come to entertain caution in assessing the accuracy or reliability of his estimates." A particular problem was imputation. In India, a larger sector of population obtains satisfaction of some of its wants outside the money economy and the need to make the estimates comparable with those for Western economies created problems of imputing values which, while arbitrary to a considerable degree, Dr. Desai appears to have handled quite satisfactorily. This study provides a very useful link between the pioneering work of

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Dr. V.K.R.V. Rao for the period up to 1931–32 and that of the Indian National Income Committee in the post-war period.—JEROME B. COHEN, Bernard M. Baruch School of Business and Public Administration, College of the City of New York.

In March of each year I look forward eagerly to the end of winter, the beginning of spring—and the appearance of the newest edition of Walter H. Mallory's indispensable annual compendium of political and journalistic facts about every country on the globe. The twenty-seventh of these veritable vade meca has now made its appearance under the title of *Political Handbook of the World: Parliaments, Parties and Press as of January 1, 1954* (New York, Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1954; 231 pp. $3.75). Like its predecessors, this volume lists for each country the composition of the cabinet and parliament; the leaders and programs of the political parties; the names, editors, and political affiliations of the chief newspapers and periodicals; a summary of recent political events; and the area and population figures. An additional section summarizes the organization, functions, and personnel of the United Nations and its associated agencies. Scholar, teacher, editor, writer, statesman, student, intelligent voter, interested citizen—all would find the confused world picture a little less puzzling by keeping the *Handbook* within easy reach.—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Gettysburg College.

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